TreatiseTreatise

Life at the Center: Reflections on Fifty Years of Securities Regulation

 by Hon. Roberta S Karmel
 
 Copyright: 2014

 Product Details >> 

Product Details

  • ISBN Number: 9781402423024
  • Page Count: 1598
  • Number of Volumes: 2
  •  

Roberta S. Karmel has been at the center of U.S. securities regulation throughout her distinguished career as a Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Commissioner, a practitioner, an attorney in the enforcement division of the SEC New York Regional Office, a public director of the New York Stock Exchange, and a prominent academic who has taught in the U.S. and abroad.

In Life at the Center: Reflections on Fifty Years of Securities Regulation, Professor Karmel addresses the key regulatory issues confronting the SEC over the past fifty years. The book is a compilationof 190 New York Law Journal columns she wrote between 1982 and 2014, and excerpts from law review articles, updated with additional commentary.

Life at the Center provides insight into the issues faced by the SEC, the choices available to it, and the actions taken, as well as the SEC’s relationships with other regulatory agencies. It brings the unique perspective of a distinguished scholar, author, and participant in SEC regulatory issues.

In the introductory first chapter, Professor Karmel, the first female Commissioner of the SEC, discusses her career and her early writings at the SEC. She then provides an overview of the SEC’s jurisdiction and programs, increased enforcement authority, pre-emption and regulatory competition.

The following chapters each focus on a specific regulatory subject:

  • Corporate Governance
  • Regulation of Financial Institutions
  • Corporation Finance Policies
  • International Securities Regulation
  • Market Structure and Regulation
  • Insider Trading, Short-Swing Profits and Tender Offers
  • Gatekeepers

In addition, Professor Karmel includes a chapter compiling her commentary on Supreme Court cases.

Drawing on her wealth of experience and insightful observations, Professor Karmel, in the final chapter of Life at the Center, points to the future and provides ten principles on how to improve financial regulation in the United States.

Life at the Center: Reflections on Fifty Years of Securities Regulation is an invaluable commentary on ongoing securities regulation in the United States.
  Table of Contents
  Foreword
  Preface
Chapter 1: An Outline of My Career, My Early Published Writings, and My Dissents as a Commissioner
  • § 1:1 : Biographical Materials
    • § 1:1.1 : The Street is More Than a Place, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 18, 2001)14
    • § 1:1.2 : Ambivalent Reflections on Regulation, 12 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 95 (1979)19
    • § 1:1.3 : Life at the Center: Reflections on My Career, 18 Bus. L. Today 49 (Jan./Feb. 2009)23
  • § 1:2 : Sec Dissents
    • § 1:2.1 : Proposed Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 14,970 (July 18, 1978)32
    • § 1:2.2 : In the Matter of Spartek, Inc. and John A. Cable, Exchange Act Release No. 15,567 (Feb. 14, 1979)33
    • § 1:2.3 : The Commission’s Practice Relating to Reports of Investigations and Statements Submitted to the Commission Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 15,664 (Mar. 21, 1979)39
    • § 1:2.4 : Promotion of the Reliability of Financial Information and Prevention of the Concealment of Questionable or Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 15,570 (Feb. 15, 1979)41
    • § 1:2.5 : Keating, Muething & Klekamp, Exchange Act Release No. 15,982 (July 2, 1979)42
  • § 1:3 : A List of My Speeches As a Commissioner
Chapter 2: An Overview of the SEC’s Jurisdiction and Programs, Increased Enforcement Authority, Pre-Emption and Regulatory Competition
  • § 2:1 : Overview
    • § 2:1.1 : The SEC at Age 50, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 16, 1984)60
    • § 2:1.2 : A Decade of Greed, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 1, 1990)66
    • § 2:1.3 : Limitations on SEC Rulemaking, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 16, 1990)71
    • § 2:1.4 : Deregulation: Real or Alleged?, N.Y. L.J. (June 20, 1996)78
    • § 2:1.5 : Transition: SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt’s Tenure, The Future, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 15, 2001)87
    • § 2:1.6 : Financial Regulatory Reform Ideas, N.Y. L.J. (June 19, 2008)92
    • § 2:1.7 : The Blame Game, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 16, 2008)97
    • § 2:1.8 : Challenges Faced By the New Administration, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 19, 2009)105
    • § 2:1.9 : The SEC’s Budget and Organization, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 16, 2010)111
    • § 2:1.10 : If It Is Broken, We Should Fix It, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 16, 2012)116
    • § 2:1.11 : Challenges for the New SEC Commissioners, N.Y. L.J. (June 20, 2013)123
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 2:1.12 : The Challenge To Financial Regulators Posed By Social Security Privatization, 64 Brook. L. Rev. 1043 (1998)130
  • § 2:2 : Increased Enforcement Authority
    • § 2:2.1 : Dissolving SEC Injunctions, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 21, 1983)134
    • § 2:2.2 : Increasing the SEC’s Administrative Authority, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 19, 1984)140
    • § 2:2.3 : Does the SEC Need New Enforcement Powers?, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 20, 1989)147
    • § 2:2.4 : The Use of Prosecution (Again), N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 20, 1990)154
    • § 2:2.5 : Is the SEC Ready for ADR and Reg-Neg?, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 15, 1993)161
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 2:2.6 : Creating Law at the Securities and Exchange Commission: The Lawyer as Prosecutor, 61 Law & Contemp. Probs. 33 (1998)167
  • § 2:3 : Preemption and Regulatory Competition
    • § 2:3.1 : Federal Preemption: A Cloud Over State Blue Sky Regulation, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 12, 1983)178
    • § 2:3.2 : Pre-emption of Claims Under the Investment Company Act, N.Y. L.J. (June 21, 2001)185
    • § 2:3.3 : Self-Regulatory Organization Rulemaking as a Pre-emption Device, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 19, 2004)190
    • § 2:3.4 : Pre-emption of “Holder” Cases, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 20, 2006)196
    • § 2:3.5 : Will Harmony Prevail Between the SEC and CFTC?, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 17, 2009)201
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 2:3.6 : Blue Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to Investors or Burden on Commerce?, 53 Brook. L. Rev. 105 (1987)208
Chapter 3: Corporate Governance
  • § 3:1 : The Sec Proxy Rules
    • § 3:1.1 : Proxy Review Program Designed to Ease Burdens, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 13, 1982)219
    • § 3:1.2 : CalPERS Versus the Business Roundtable, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 21, 1991)226
    • § 3:1.3 : Shrinkage of Shareholder Rights Under Proxy Rules, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 17, 1991)233
    • § 3:1.4 : Can We Talk? A Greater Voice For Investors?, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 7, 1992)239
    • § 3:1.5 : Shareholder Nominations: Increased Access to Proxy Card?, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 18, 2003)245
    • § 3:1.6 : Conflicting Proxy Access Proposals, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 18, 2007)250
    • § 3:1.7 : The SEC Should Bow Out of the Proxy Access Battle, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 20, 2011)255
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 3:1.8 : Should a Duty to the Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional Shareholders?, 60 Bus. Law. 1 (2004)262
    • § 3:1.9 : Voting Power Without Responsibility or Risk: How Should Proxy Reform Address the Decoupling of Economic and Voting Rights?, 55 Vill. L. Rev. 93 (2010)266
  • § 3:2 : The One-Share, One-Vote Controversy and Stock Exchange Listing Rules
    • § 3:2.1 : Is One-Share, One-Vote Archaic?, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 26, 1985)268
    • § 3:2.2 : The SEC’s Power to Regulate Stockholder Voting Rights, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 21, 1986)275
    • § 3:2.3 : Federalizing Shareholder Voting Rights, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 8, 1986)284
    • § 3:2.4 : Shareholder Voting Rights Diminishing Under State Law, N.Y. L.J. (June 18, 1987)292
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 3:2.5 : Qualitative Standards for “Qualified Securities”: SEC Regulation of Voting Rights, 36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 809 (1987)300
    • § 3:2.6 : The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54 SMU L. Rev. 325 (2001)304
  • § 3:3 : Independent Directors, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and Audit Committees
    • § 3:3.1 : Treadway Commission and the Auditors, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 18, 1988)305
    • § 3:3.2 : Mandated Independent Audit Committees, N.Y. L.J. (June 17, 1999)313
    • § 3:3.3 : Audit Committee Reform Proposals, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 16, 1999)322
    • § 3:3.4 : Federalization of the Law Regarding Audit Committees, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 20, 2003)328
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 3:3.5 : The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?, 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 534 (1984)335
    • § 3:3.6 : Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 79 (2005)336
    • § 3:3.7 : Is the Independent Director Model Broken?, 37 Seattle U. L. Rev. 775 (2014)340
  • § 3:4 : Separating the Chair and Ceo
    • § 3:4.1 : Separating the Chairman and the CEO, N.Y. L.J. (June 17, 1993)343
    • § 3:4.2 : Splitting the CEO and Chairman, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 23, 2004)347
  • § 3:5 : Mutual Fund Governance
    • § 3:5.1 : The Supreme Court Weighs in on Corporate Governance, N.Y. L.J. (June 20, 1991)352
    • § 3:5.2 : Mutual Fund Governance, N.Y. L.J. (June 22, 2004)359
    • § 3:5.3 : Key Outcomes of “Chamber of Commerce v. SEC,” N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 18, 2005)364
  • § 3:6 : Executive Compensation
    • § 3:6.1 : Focus on Executive Compensation, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 21, 1994)370
    • § 3:6.2 : The Fuss Over Stock Options, N.Y. L.J. (June 20, 2002)378
    • § 3:6.3 : Focus on Executive Compensation, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 21, 2003)383
    • § 3:6.4 : The Stock Options Backdating Probe, N.Y. L.J. (June 15, 2006)388
  • § 3:7 : Stakeholder Theory
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 3:7.1 : The Duty of Directors to Non-Shareholder Constituencies in Control Transactions—A Comparison of U.S. and U.K. Law, 25 Wake Forest L. Rev. 61 (1990)394
    • § 3:7.2 : Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1156 (1993)396
Chapter 4: Regulation of Financial Institutions
  • § 4:1 : Functional Regulation after Glass-Steagall and the 2008 Meltdown
    • § 4:1.1 : Defining Banks as Brokers and Vice Versa, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 16, 1984)406
    • § 4:1.2 : Changing Population of SEC Registrants, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 15, 1985)413
    • § 4:1.3 : Functional Regulation, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 17, 1985)421
    • § 4:1.4 : Do the Capital Markets Need So Many Regulators?, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 18, 1990)427
    • § 4:1.5 : A Close Look at the Fiasco in the Banking System, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 20, 1992)435
    • § 4:1.6 : Gramm-Leach-Bliley Modernizes Financial Services, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 20, 2000)443
    • § 4:1.7 : The Future of the Securities and Exchange Commission— Harry Cross Lecture—Address at the University of Washington School of Law (Jan. 29, 2009)451
    • § 4:1.8 : Treasury Framework for Reform Seeks to Contain Systemic Risk, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 16, 2009)461
    • § 4:1.9 : Who Should Regulate Systemic Risk?, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 15, 2009)468
    • § 4:1.10 : Is Money Market Fund Reform Finally Coming?, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 21, 2013)474
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 4:1.11 : Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act a Model For Breaking Up the Banks That Are Too-Big-To-Fail?, 62 Hastings L.J. 821 (2011)480
    • § 4:1.12 : An Orderly Liquidation Authority Is Not The Solution To Too-Big-To-Fail, 6 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 1 (2011)483
  • § 4:2 : Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers
    • § 4:2.1 : Deregulation of Compensation for Investment Advisers, N.Y. L.J. (June 21, 1984)486
    • § 4:2.2 : Trends in Investment Adviser Regulation, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 18, 1985)494
    • § 4:2.3 : Revisiting the Shingle, Fiduciary-Duty Theories, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 16, 1986)500
    • § 4:2.4 : Proposed Reform of Investment Company and Adviser Acts, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 20, 1992)507
    • § 4:2.5 : The Suitability Doctrine, N.Y. L.J. (June 15, 1995)517
    • § 4:2.6 : Hedge Fund Registration, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 13, 2004)525
    • § 4:2.7 : Hedge Funds After Dodd-Frank, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 21, 2010)530
    • § 4:2.8 : Oversight and Studies of Investment Advisers, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 17, 2011)535
    • § 4:2.9 : A Harmonized Fiduciary Duty for Advisers and Broker-Dealers, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 21, 2011)540
    • § 4:2.10 : Should There Be an SRO for Investment Advisers?, N.Y. L.J. (June 16, 2011)546
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 4:2.11 : Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1271 (1995)552
    • § 4:2.12 : Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and Stock Market Volatility—What Regulation By the Securities and Exchange Commission Is Appropriate?, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 909 (2005)554
Chapter 5: Corporation Finance Policies
  • § 5:1 : Underwriters
    • § 5:1.1 : Focus on Underwriters, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 21, 1982)564
    • § 5:1.2 : Antitrust Challenges to Wall Street, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 17, 2003)570
    • § 5:1.3 : Underwriters’ Victory in Supreme Court Case, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 16, 2007)576
  • § 5:2 : What Is a Security?
    • § 5:2.1 : When Is Partnership Interest or Note a Security?, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 18, 1993)580
    • § 5:2.2 : Can a Telephone Be a “Security”?, N.Y. L.J. (June 19, 2003)587
  • § 5:3 : Disclosure Policies
    • § 5:3.1 : Redesigning Materiality, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 17, 1983)592
    • § 5:3.2 : Reform of the Municipal Securities Market, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 19, 2010)598
    • § 5:3.3 : Cybersecurity Roundtable and Disclosure, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 17, 2014)604
    • § 5:3.4 : SEC Rule on Disclosure of Conflict Minerals, N.Y. L.J. (June 19, 2014)609
  • § 5:4 : The Metaphysics of Section 5
    • § 5:4.1 : Expanding Exemptions From Registration of Securities, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 16, 1987)614
    • § 5:4.2 : Is § 5 an Anachronism?, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 21, 1995)620
    • § 5:4.3 : Small Steps to Company Registration, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 17, 1997)628
    • § 5:4.4 : Internet Prospectus Issues and Recent SEC Resolutions, N.Y. L.J. (June 15, 2000)636
    • § 5:4.5 : Integration of Public and Private Offerings, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 19, 2001)642
    • § 5:4.6 : Reform of the Disclosure System, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 18, 2002)648
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 5:4.7 : Regulation By Exemption: The Changing Definition of an Accredited Investor, 39 Rutgers L.J. 681 (2008)653
  • § 5:5 : The Jobs Act
    • § 5:5.1 : Crowdfunding and Related Deregulation, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 16, 2012)656
    • § 5:5.2 : JOBS Act Loosens Regulations for Start-Ups but Benefit Is Unclear, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 19, 2012)661
    • § 5:5.3 : Changes to the Gun Jumping Rules, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 18, 2012)667
    • § 5:5.4 : JOBS Act Implementation: Deregulation of Offerings, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 15, 2013)674
    • § 5:5.5 : The Crowdfunding Proposed Rules, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 19, 2013)680
Chapter 6: International Securities Regulation
  • § 6:1 : Iosco and the Eu
    • § 6:1.1 : The IOSCO Venice Conference, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 19, 1989)695
    • § 6:1.2 : Public Companies in the European Community, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 21, 1989)701
    • § 6:1.3 : The Stalled Investment Services Directive, N.Y. L.J. (June 18, 1992)706
    • § 6:1.4 : The Failed European Union Takeover Directive, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 16, 2001)712
    • § 6:1.5 : Reform of Public Company Disclosure in Europe, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 17, 2005)717
    • § 6:1.6 : The European Union Market Structure Directive, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 13, 2005)723
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 6:1.7 : Securities Law in the European Community: Harmony or Cacophony?, 1 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 3 (1993)729
    • § 6:1.8 : The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 9 (1999)730
    • § 6:1.9 : Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the United States and Europe, 28 Brook. J. Int’l L. 495 (2003)732
    • § 6:1.10 : Reform of Public Company Disclosure in Europe, 26 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 379 (2005)735
    • § 6:1.11 : The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities Regulation, 34 Brook. J. Int’l L. 883 (2009) (co-authored with Claire R. Kelly)739
    • § 6:1.12 : IOSCO’S Response to the Financial Crisis, 37 J. Corp. L. 849 (2012)740
  • § 6:2 : Sec Regulation of Foreign Issuers
    • § 6:2.1 : The SEC Goes International, N.Y. L.J. (June 20, 1985)742
    • § 6:2.2 : Contrasting SEC Approaches to Multijurisdictional Offerings, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 15, 1988)748
    • § 6:2.3 : An International Summer, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 17, 1989)755
    • § 6:2.4 : New Rules for Trading Foreign Securities, N.Y. L.J. (June 28, 1990)762
    • § 6:2.5 : Minimal Steps Toward Mutual Recognition for Foreign Issuers, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 15, 1991)768
    • § 6:2.6 : New Initiatives for Foreign Issuers, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 16, 1993)775
    • § 6:2.7 : Facilitation of Multijurisdictional Offerings, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 15, 1999)782
    • § 6:2.8 : Cross-Border Takeover and Rights Offerings, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 29, 2000)788
    • § 6:2.9 : NYSE-Euronext Merger: NYSE Is Losing Listings to Foreign Exchanges, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 17, 2006)794
    • § 6:2.10 : Reproposed Foreign Issuer Deregistration Rules, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 15, 2007)800
    • § 6:2.11 : Accommodating Foreign Issuers, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 21, 2008)805
    • § 6:2.12 : Mutual Recognition: More Global Regulators Appear Necessary, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 18, 2008)811
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 6:2.13 : National Treatment, Harmonization and Mutual Recognition— The Search for Principles for the Regulation of Global Equity Markets, Capital Markets Forum, International Bar Association (1993)817
    • § 6:2.14 : Barriers to Foreign Issuer Entry into U.S. Markets, 24 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 1207 (1993) (co-authored with Mary Herd)824
    • § 6:2.15 : A Report on the Attitudes of Foreign Companies Regarding a U.S. Listing, 3 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 51 (1997) (co-authored with James A. Fanto)826
    • § 6:2.16 : Will Convergence of Financial Disclosure Standards Change SEC Regulation of Foreign Issuers?, 26 Brook. J. Int’l L. 485 (2000)829
    • § 6:2.17 : The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes Abroad to Regulate Corporate Governance, 33 Stetson L. Rev. 849 (2004)832
    • § 6:2.18 : The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1692 (2008)835
  • § 6:3 : Securities Reforms Abroad
    • § 6:3.1 : “Big Bang” in London, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 20, 1984)838
    • § 6:3.2 : Stock Exchanges of India, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 17, 1986)844
    • § 6:3.3 : Developments in the German Stock Market, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 19, 1991)853
    • § 6:3.4 : Tossing Capitalism in Shanghai, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 19, 1993)860
    • § 6:3.5 : Italian Stock Market Reform, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 19, 1998)866
    • § 6:3.6 : Japanese Reforms Lift the Nikkei, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 22, 2004)872
    • § 6:3.7 : Chinese State Capitalism, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 26, 2004)877
    • § 6:3.8 : Developments in India 1992–2004: Nine New Laws, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 14, 2005)882
    • § 6:3.9 : The Brazilian Securities Market, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 19, 2006)887
    • § 6:3.10 : The Vietnamese Stock Market, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 19, 2007)892
  • § 6:4 : Extraterritoriality
    • § 6:4.1 : Changing Concepts of Extraterritoriality, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 3, 1998)897
    • § 6:4.2 : Should “Morrison” Be Overturned?, N.Y. L.J. (June 21, 2012)904
    • § 6:4.3 : The Application of “Morrison” to SEC and Criminal Cases, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 17, 2013)910
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 6:4.4 : The Applicability of the Margin Regulations to Foreign Financial Institutions, 4 Int’l Law. 496 (1970)917
    • § 6:4.5 : The Extraterritorial Application of the Federal Securities Code, 7 Conn. L. Rev. 669 (1975)919
    • § 6:4.6 : The Second Circuit’s Role in Expanding the SEC’s Jurisdiction Abroad, 65 St. John’s L. Rev. 743 (1991)922
Chapter 7: Market Structure and Regulation
  • § 7:1 : The 1987 Stock Market Crash
    • § 7:1.1 : Black Monday, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 17, 1987)931
    • § 7:1.2 : The Working Group Report, N.Y. L.J. (June 16, 1988)937
    • § 7:1.3 : The Rashomon Effect in the After-the-Crash Studies, Rev. of Sec. & Comm. Reg. (Standard & Poor’s) (June 22, 1988)943
    • § 7:1.4 : Looking Back on the Crash: Mayer’s “Markets” Reviewed, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 17, 1988)957
    • § 7:1.5 : What Is the Point of Circuit Breakers?, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 16, 1998)964
    • § 7:1.6 : The Stock Market Crash of 1987: A Look Back at Unlearned Lessons, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 19, 2012)970
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 7:1.7 : Securities Industry Self-Regulation—Tested by the Crash, 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1297 (1988)978
  • § 7:2 : Capital Adequacy and Leverage
    • § 7:2.1 : Net Capital, Customer Protection Rule Revisions, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 19, 1985)981
    • § 7:2.2 : Applying Margin Rules to Junk Bonds, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 20, 1986)987
    • § 7:2.3 : Margin, Limits and Market Volatility, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 18, 1988)994
    • § 7:2.4 : Capital Adequacy at Holding Companies, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 20, 1990)1000
    • § 7:2.5 : Reform of the Margin Rules, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 19, 1995)1006
    • § 7:2.6 : Speculation and Leverage, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 17, 2008)1014
  • § 7:3 : Regulation of Trading Markets
    • § 7:3.1 : Pegging Dealer Profits, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 20, 1987)1020
    • § 7:3.2 : Risk Assessment Reporting for Large Traders, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 16, 1992)1026
    • § 7:3.3 : The Market 2000 Study, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 15, 1992)1032
    • § 7:3.4 : Integrating the Auction and Dealer Markets, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 15, 1994)1038
    • § 7:3.5 : Spreads, Limit-Order Protection and Best Execution, N.Y. L.J. (June 19, 1997)1045
    • § 7:3.6 : What Trading Systems and Exchanges?, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 18, 1997)1054
    • § 7:3.7 : Bringing in Alternative Trading Systems, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 5, 1999)1061
    • § 7:3.8 : Confronting Market Structure—Déjà Vu All Over Again, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 17, 2000)1068
    • § 7:3.9 : The New Market Structure Rules, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 14, 2005)1077
    • § 7:3.10 : Competition Versus Fragmentation in Fast Equity Markets, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 18, 2010)1082
    • § 7:3.11 : Bowing to Political, Media Pressure: SEC Issues New Rules on Short Sales, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 15, 2010)1088
    • § 7:3.12 : High-Frequency Trading, Direct Electronic Access and Dark Pools, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 15, 2011)1093
  • § 7:4 : Stock Exchanges and Self-Regulation
    • § 7:4.1 : Stock Exchange Demutualization in Sweden and Australia, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 19, 1999)1100
    • § 7:4.2 : Should There Be a Single SRO?, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 21, 1999)1109
    • § 7:4.3 : Should the New York Stock Exchange Be Reorganized?, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 16, 2003)1116
    • § 7:4.4 : The Future of Self-Regulation, N.Y. L.J. (June 16, 2005)1121
    • § 7:4.5 : SRO Immunity in New Era of For-Profit Exchanges, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 20, 2007)1127
    • § 7:4.6 : The Future of Self-Regulatory Organizations, N.Y. L.J. (June 18, 2009)1131
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 7:4.7 : Turning Seats into Shares: Causes and Implications of Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 Hastings L.J. 367 (2002)1138
    • § 7:4.8 : The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The Regulation of Global Exchanges, 1 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 355 (2007)1140
    • § 7:4.9 : Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 151 (2008)1144
Chapter 8: Insider Trading, Short-Swing Profits and Tender Offers
  • § 8:1 : Insider Trading and Short-Swing Profits
    • § 8:1.1 : The Efficient Market and “Dirks v. SEC”, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 18, 1983)1154
    • § 8:1.2 : Market Information: Insider Trading, N.Y. L.J. (June 19, 1986)1161
    • § 8:1.3 : Defining Insider Trading, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 15, 1987)1171
    • § 8:1.4 : Timing the Disclosure of Merger Negotiations, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 21, 1988)1177
    • § 8:1.5 : Changes in Short-Swing Profit Regulations, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 16, 1989)1182
    • § 8:1.6 : The Bureaucratization of Reform: New § 16 Reporting Rules, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 18, 1991)1189
    • § 8:1.7 : Attacks on the Misappropriation Theory, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 17, 1996)1195
    • § 8:1.8 : Broker-Dealer Anti-Fraud Rules After “O’Hagan,” N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 16, 1997)1205
    • § 8:1.9 : The Controversy of Possession Versus Use, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 17, 1998)1213
    • § 8:1.10 : Avoiding Precedents by Adopting Insider Trading Rules, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 21, 2000)1220
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 8:1.11 : Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—A Breach in Search of a Duty, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 83 (1998)1228
    • § 8:1.12 : Transnational Takeover Talk—Regulations Relating to Tender Offers and Insider Trading in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Australia, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1133 (1998)1230
  • § 8:2 : Tender Offers
    • § 8:2.1 : Will Takeover Abuses Lead to Federal Corporation Law?, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 19, 1987)1232
    • § 8:2.2 : Authority for the Tender Offer Rules, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 19, 1996)1240
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 8:2.3 : Duty to the Target: Is an Attorney’s Duty to the Corporation a Paradigm for Directors?, 39 Hastings L.J. 677 (1988)1247
    • § 8:2.4 : Is it Time for a Federal Corporation Law?, 57 Brook. L. Rev. 55 (1991)1250
    • § 8:2.5 : Greenmail, the Control Premium and Shareholder Duty, 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 937 (1991)1251
Chapter 9: Comments on Supreme Court Cases
  • § 9:1 : Pre-Dispute Waivers
    • § 9:1.1 : Arbitration Clauses, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 20, 1983)1258
    • § 9:1.2 : Arbitration and the Demise of Wilko v. Swan, N.Y. L.J. (June 15, 1989)1263
    • § 9:1.3 : Sex, Lloyd’s and Pre-Dispute Waivers, N.Y. L.J. (June 18, 1998)1269
  • § 9:2 : Anti-Fraud Cases In ihe Supreme Court
    • § 9:2.1 : First Amendment Questions Challenge the SEC, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 18, 1984)1276
    • § 9:2.2 : Implications of the “Central Bank of Denver” Case, N.Y. L.J. (June 16, 1994)1283
    • § 9:2.3 : Curtailing Civil Liability, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 20, 1995)1290
    • § 9:2.4 : “Wharf,” the Reform Act and Scienter, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 26, 2001)1296
    • § 9:2.5 : Rebutting the Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 21, 2006)1302
    • § 9:2.6 : “Scheme Liability”: Court Actions Against Aiders, Abettors, N.Y. L.J. (June 21, 2007)1307
    • § 9:2.7 : Supreme Court on Securities Law: Conflicting Attitudes on Class Actions, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 18, 2011)1312
    • § 9:2.8 : In Defense of the Presumption of Reliance: Thoughts on Amgen, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 18, 2013)1317
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 9:2.9 : Securities Commentary, 44 Brook. L. Rev. 1189 (1978)1324
    • § 9:2.10 : When Should Investor Reliance Be Presumed in Securities Class Actions?, 63 Bus. Law. 25 (2007)1325
Chapter 10: Gatekeepers
  • § 10:1 : Attorneys
    • § 10:1.1 : Whistleblowing, N.Y. L.J. (June 16, 1983)1332
    • § 10:1.2 : Reining in the Bar by Naming Lawyers as “Causes,” N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 18, 1996)1339
    • § 10:1.3 : A Bid to Regulate the Entire Bar, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 19, 2002)1350
    • § 10:1.4 : Financial Fraud Cases Against In-House Counsel, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 16, 2006)1355
  • : Law Review Articles
    • § 10:1.5 : Attorneys’ Security Law Liabilities, 27 Bus. Law. 1153 (1972)1361
    • § 10:1.6 : Attorneys’ Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 24 Emory L.J. 747 (1975) (co-authored with Joseph C. Daley)1362
  • § 10:2 : Accountants
    • § 10:2.1 : Rule 2(e)—A Reprise, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 21, 1993)1364
    • § 10:2.2 : Accountants’ Culpability Under Rule 102(e), N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 29, 1998)1373
    • § 10:2.3 : Can Management Consultants Be Independent Auditors?, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 19, 2000)1382
    • § 10:2.4 : Enron and the Accounting Profession, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 21, 2002)1390
    • § 10:2.5 : A New Watchdog for Public Accountants, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 15, 2002)1399
  • § 10:3 : Research Analysts and Rating Agencies
    • § 10:3.1 : Analyst Conflicts of Interest and New Regulations, Prosecutions, N.Y. L.J. (Oct. 17, 2002)1404
    • § 10:3.2 : Focus on Credit Rating Agencies Post-Subprime Meltdown, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 21, 2008)1409
    • § 10:3.3 : Credit Rating Agency Reform Update N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 14, 2014)1415
Chapter 11: Afterword—An Agenda for Better Financial Regulation
  Index
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