TreatiseTreatise

Deskbook on Internal Investigations, Corporate Compliance and White Collar Issues (Second Edition)

 by Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP
 
 Copyright: 2017-2017

 Product Details >> 

Product Details

  • ISBN Number: 9781402427473
  • Page Count: 938
  • Number of Volumes: 1
  •  

Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP (list of authors)

Deskbook on Internal Investigations, Corporate Compliance and White Collar Issues provides practical guidance on how to carry out internal investigations to identify and remediate legal problems, protect the rights of employees when they’re subject to investigation or prosecution, and cooperate with government investigators in ways that help reduce legal and financial damage if wrongdoing is proved.

The Deskbook provides step-by-step instruction, including numerous checklists, on how to put together a comprehensive compliance program that can prevent legal missteps and help companies qualify for federal leniency programs if legal violations are committed.

Updated at least once a year, Deskbook on Internal Investigations, Corporate Compliance and White Collar Issues is a vital reference for attorneys, executives, compliance officers, securities professionals, and regulators.
  Introduction
  Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Internal Investigation of Suspected Wrongdoing by Corporate Employees
  • § 1:1 : Introduction1-2
  • § 1:2 : Steps to Take at the Outset of an Investigation1-3
    • § 1:2.1 : Who Conducts the Investigation—In-House Counsel or Outside Attorneys?1-3
    • § 1:2.2 : Defining the Scope of the Investigation1-4
    • § 1:2.3 : Doing a Conflicts Check1-4
    • § 1:2.4 : Expertise of Counsel1-6
  • § 1:3 : Investigative Tools1-6
    • § 1:3.1 : Document Holds, Collection and Review1-6
    • § 1:3.2 : Recovering Expenses Incurred During Internal Investigations1-9
    • § 1:3.3 : Employee Interviews1-10
      • [A] : Presence of In-House Counsel at the Interview1-10
      • [B] : Conducting the Interview1-11
      • [C] : Separate Counsel for the Employee1-14
    • § 1:3.4 : Whether or Not to Prepare a Written Report1-16
    • § 1:3.5 : Polygraph Testing1-16
    • § 1:3.6 : Workplace Searches1-18
    • § 1:3.7 : Workplace Surveillance1-18
    • § 1:3.8 : Drug and Alcohol Testing1-19
  • § 1:4 : Attorney-Client Privilege, and Attorney Work-Product Protection Regarding Internal Investigations1-20
  • § 1:5 : Obstruction of Justice1-22
    • § 1:5.1 : Obstruction of Justice Statutes1-23
    • § 1:5.2 : Liability of Attorneys1-26
    • § 1:5.3 : Guidelines for Counsel1-27
  • § 1:6 : Subpoenas and Review of Documents Located Overseas1-28
    • § 1:6.1 : Obstruction of Justice in International Cases1-29
  • § 1:7 : Indemnification and Advancement of Legal Fees1-30
    • § 1:7.1 : Mandatory Indemnification1-30
    • § 1:7.2 : Permissive Indemnification1-32
    • § 1:7.3 : Advancement of Legal Fees and Expenses1-33
    • § 1:7.4 : Constitutional Issues1-33
  • § 1:8 : Protection for Whistleblowers Against Retaliation1-35
    • § 1:8.1 : FCA Anti-Retaliation Protections1-35
    • § 1:8.2 : Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Protections1-36
    • § 1:8.3 : Retaliation Policies1-37
    • § 1:8.4 : Disciplining Whistleblowers1-37
    • § 1:8.5 : Separation/Confidentiality Agreements1-38
  • § 1:9 : Practitioner’s Checklist for Conducting Internal Investigations1-39
Chapter 2: The Attorney-Client Privilege, Work-Product Protection, and Self-Critical Privilege in Internal Investigations
  • § 2:1 : Introduction2-2
  • § 2:2 : The Attorney-Client Privilege2-3
    • § 2:2.1 : Elements of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege2-3
    • § 2:2.2 : Applicability to Experts, Attorney Agents, and the Corporation’s Former Employees2-4
    • § 2:2.3 : Attorney’s Duty to Assert Privilege2-6
    • § 2:2.4 : What the Privilege Does Not Cover2-6
    • § 2:2.5 : The Crime-Fraud Exception2-7
    • § 2:2.6 : Authority to Waive the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege2-10
    • § 2:2.7 : Effect of Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information on Waiver2-10
  • § 2:3 : Work-Product Protection2-14
    • § 2:3.1 : Work-Product Protection Qualified2-15
    • § 2:3.2 : Applicability to Materials from an Internal Investigation2-15
    • § 2:3.3 : Materials Protected by the Work-Product Doctrine2-15
    • § 2:3.4 : Government Assertions of Work-Product Protection over Investigative Materials2-16
  • § 2:4 : The Department of Justice’s Waiver Policy and the Sentencing Guidelines2-17
    • § 2:4.1 : Evolution of DOJ Policy on Waiver of Privilege2-17
    • § 2:4.2 : The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations2-19
    • § 2:4.3 : The Yates Memo2-23
  • § 2:5 : Disclosure to the Government and Its Impact on Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Protection2-25
    • § 2:5.1 : Attorney-Client Privilege and Selective Waiver2-25
    • § 2:5.2 : Work-Product Protection and Selective Waiver2-26
  • § 2:6 : The Common Interest Privilege2-31
    • § 2:6.1 : Applicability of the Common Interest Privilege2-31
  • § 2:7 : Self-Critical Privilege2-33
    • § 2:7.1 : Recognition of the Self-Critical Privilege2-34
    • § 2:7.2 : Rejection of the Self-Critical Privilege2-35
  • § 2:8 : Additional Practical Waiver Problems in Internal Investigations2-36
    • § 2:8.1 : Internal Investigations Because of Business Necessities2-36
    • § 2:8.2 : Investigation by and for Management2-37
    • § 2:8.3 : Use of Regularly Employed Auditor2-38
    • § 2:8.4 : The Pseudo-Hypothetical2-39
    • § 2:8.5 : Disclosures to Public Relations Consultants2-39
  • § 2:9 : Practitioner’s Checklist for Obtaining Benefits of Cooperation Without Waiver2-42
Chapter 3: Responding to Searches and Seizures
  • § 3:1 : Search Warrants3-2
    • § 3:1.1 : Generally3-2
    • § 3:1.2 : Specifics of a Search Warrant3-2
    • § 3:1.3 : Execution of the Warrant3-4
    • § 3:1.4 : Effects of Search and Seizure on Corporations3-5
  • § 3:2 : Searching and Seizing Electronic Data3-7
    • § 3:2.1 : Warrantless Computer Searches and Seizures3-8
      • [A] : Exigent Circumstances3-8
      • [B] : Consent3-9
      • [C] : “Plain View” Exception3-10
      • [D] : Searches at Border Crossings3-11
      • [E] : Exceptions Regarding IP Addresses and Cell Phone Locators3-11
    • § 3:2.2 : Warrants to Search Computers and Other Electronic Devices3-13
      • [A] : Computer Searches that Go Beyond the Scope of the Warrant3-15
      • [B] : Cell Phone Searches3-16
      • [C] : Time Limits for Government Seizures of Electronic Information3-17
    • § 3:2.3 : Out-of-District/-Country Warrants3-18
    • § 3:2.4 : Data Privacy and Access3-20
  • § 3:3 : Searching and Seizing Other Electronic Communications3-21
    • § 3:3.1 : Wiretapping3-21
    • § 3:3.2 : Intercepting Text Messages and Emails3-21
    • § 3:3.3 : GPS Tracking3-22
  • § 3:4 : Protecting Privileged Documents During a Search3-25
  • § 3:5 : Practitioner’s Checklist for Responding to Searches and Seizures3-26
Chapter 4: Grand Jury Investigations and Multiple Representations of Witnesses
  • § 4:1 : Overview of the Grand Jury Process4-2
    • § 4:1.1 : Responding to a Grand Jury Subpoena4-3
      • [A] : Litigation Holds4-3
      • [B] : Insurance Considerations4-4
      • [C] : Review of Relevant Documents4-4
      • [D] : Unduly Broad Subpoenas4-5
      • [E] : Discoverability of Documents Subject to Protective Orders4-5
    • § 4:1.2 : Motions to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas4-6
    • § 4:1.3 : Computer Records and Electronic Documents4-7
    • § 4:1.4 : Motions to Dismiss Grand Jury Indictments4-10
    • § 4:1.5 : Parallel Proceedings4-12
  • § 4:2 : Ethical Issues in Multiple Representations Before a Grand Jury4-14
    • § 4:2.1 : Ethical Considerations and Conflicts of Interest4-14
    • § 4:2.2 : New York’s Attorney Ethics Rules4-20
    • § 4:2.3 : The Prosecutor’s Response4-22
    • § 4:2.4 : A Carefully Thought-Out Decision4-23
    • § 4:2.5 : The Judicial Response4-24
  • § 4:3 : Practical Considerations When Considering Multiple Representation4-26
Chapter 5: Advising Witnesses in Light of Perjury Statutes
  • § 5:1 : Introduction5-1
    • § 5:1.1 : Federal Perjury Statutes5-2
    • § 5:1.2 : False Statements Statute5-4
  • § 5:2 : Materiality5-7
    • § 5:2.1 : Standard for Materiality5-7
    • § 5:2.2 : Literal Truth Defense5-8
  • § 5:3 : Perjury Prosecution Absent Prosecution for the Underlying Offense5-12
  • § 5:4 : Dangers of Crossing the Line5-15
  • § 5:5 : Perjury Traps5-16
  • § 5:6 : Conclusion5-18
Chapter 6: Representing Companies and Individuals in SEC Investigations and Parallel Proceedings
  • § 6:1 : SEC Investigations6-2
    • § 6:1.1 : Enforcement Scheme6-3
      • [A] : Authority and Powers of the Division of Enforcement6-3
      • [B] : Civil Suits in Federal Courts Versus Administrative Proceedings6-4
      • [C] : Criminal Enforcement Through DOJ/Parallel Proceedings6-6
    • § 6:1.2 : How Investigations Arise/Whistleblower Program6-6
      • [A] : Origins of Investigations6-6
      • [B] : The Whistleblower Program6-7
      • [C] : Retaliation Against Whistleblowers6-9
      • [D] : Whistleblower Awards6-11
    • § 6:1.3 : Responding to Investigative Requests—Initial Considerations6-11
      • [A] : Initial Contact with the Staff6-11
      • [B] : Conducting an Inquiry into the Facts6-13
      • [C] : Assessing the Facts and Taking Appropriate Steps6-14
    • § 6:1.4 : The Investigative Process6-15
      • [A] : Informal Inquiries and Formal Investigations6-16
      • [B] : Document Preservation, Collection, Review, and Production6-17
      • [C] : Staff Interviews and Testimony6-19
    • § 6:1.5 : Privilege Issues6-21
      • [A] : Waiver of Privilege6-22
      • [B] : Fifth Amendment Privilege6-23
    • § 6:1.6 : Wells Submission Process6-24
    • § 6:1.7 : Cooperation and the Seaboard Factors6-25
    • § 6:1.8 : Charges and Remedies6-31
    • § 6:1.9 : Settlement6-37
    • § 6:1.10 : Recent Enforcement Trends6-43
      • [A] : Enforcement Policy Trends6-44
        • [A][1] : “Investigate to Litigate”6-44
        • [A][2] : Increasing Use of Data Analytics6-45
        • [A][3] : Increased Use of Whistleblowers6-45
        • [A][4] : Individual Accountability6-46
      • [B] : Enforcement Case Trends6-46
        • [B][1] : Issuer Financial Reporting Actions and Actions Against Gatekeepers6-46
        • [B][2] : Insider Trading and Cyber Fraud6-49
          • [B][2][a] : The SEC’s “Trader-Based Approach” to Insider Trading Enforcement6-49
          • [B][2][b] : Newman, Salman, and “The Personal Benefit Test”6-51
          • [B][2][c] : Cyber Fraud6-53
        • [B][3] : Investment Advisers and Private Equity Related Actions6-56
        • [B][4] : Market Structure Enforcement6-60
  • § 6:2 : Parallel Proceedings6-63
    • § 6:2.1 : General Strategic Issues and Considerations6-63
    • § 6:2.2 : Admissibility of Statements Made During Parallel Civil Proceedings6-64
    • § 6:2.3 : Wiretapping and Parallel Proceedings6-67
Chapter 7: Corporate Compliance Programs Under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
  • § 7:1 : Introduction7-2
  • § 7:2 : The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines Methodology7-4
    • § 7:2.1 : Base Fine7-4
    • § 7:2.2 : Culpability Score—Minimum/Maximum Multipliers7-5
    • § 7:2.3 : Applicable Fine Range7-7
    • § 7:2.4 : Determining the Actual Fine7-8
    • § 7:2.5 : Disgorgement7-9
    • § 7:2.6 : Fines for Antitrust Offenses7-9
  • § 7:3 : Remedial Sanctions and Probation Under the Guidelines7-10
  • § 7:4 : An Effective Program to Prevent and Detect Violations of Law7-11
    • § 7:4.1 : Practical Considerations7-11
    • § 7:4.2 : Requirements for an Effective Compliance and Ethics Program7-12
      • [A] : Section 8B2.1(b)(1)7-13
      • [B] : Section 8B2.1(b)(2)7-15
      • [C] : Section 8B2.1(b)(3)7-18
      • [D] : Section 8B2.1(b)(4)7-20
      • [E] : Section 8B2.1(b)(5)7-22
        • [E][1] : Internal Auditing7-22
        • [E][2] : Employee Hotlines and the Ombudsman7-23
        • [E][3] : Business Ethics Questionnaires7-24
        • [E][4] : Effectiveness Review7-26
      • [F] : Section 8B2.1(b)(6)7-27
        • [F][1] : Termination Under New York Law of Employees Implicated in or Under Suspicion of a Violation of Law7-28
        • [F][2] : Termination Under California Law of Employees Implicated in or Under Suspicion of a Violation of Law7-29
        • [F][3] : Termination Under New York Law of Employees Formally Accused (i.e., Arrested or Indicted) of a Violation of Law7-30
        • [F][4] : Termination Under California Law of Employees Formally Accused (i.e., Arrested or Indicted) of a Violation of Law7-30
        • [F][5] : Executive Contract Issues7-31
        • [F][6] : Union Contract Issues7-31
        • [F][7] : Practical Considerations7-31
        • [F][8] : General Principles Governing Termination of Employees Convicted of a Crime (Misdemeanor or Felony)7-32
      • [G] : Section 8B2.1(b)(7)7-32
      • [H] : Section 8B2.1(c) (Risk Assessment)7-33
      • [I] : Other Guidance7-33
  • § 7:5 : Caremark Liability7-35
Chapter 8: Leniency Programs and Policies
  • § 8:1 : Introduction8-2
  • § 8:2 : The Road to Yates8-2
    • § 8:2.1 : Early Guidance8-2
    • § 8:2.2 : Deputy Attorney General Filip’s Revised “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations”8-5
    • § 8:2.3 : The Yates Memo8-7
      • [A] : Generally8-7
      • [B] : Clarifications of Yates Memo8-9
      • [C] : Recent Cases8-10
      • [D] : Self-Reporting8-12
  • § 8:3 : Department of Justice Guidelines for Self-Disclosure by Organizational Environmental Offenders8-13
    • § 8:3.1 : Introduction8-13
      • [A] : Factors for Leniency8-13
    • § 8:3.2 : EPA Audit Standards and Leniency Policies8-15
      • [A] : Generally8-15
      • [B] : New Owners8-17
      • [C] : eDisclosure8-18
    • § 8:3.3 : Compliance and Remediation Programs8-18
    • § 8:3.4 : DOJ Guidelines Hypothetical Scenarios8-19
      • [A] : The “Good” Company8-19
      • [B] : The “Bad” Company8-20
      • [C] : Companies Between the Extremes8-20
  • § 8:4 : Antitrust Division Corporate Leniency Policy8-21
    • § 8:4.1 : Pre-Investigation Amnesty8-22
    • § 8:4.2 : Alternative Grounds for Amnesty8-22
    • § 8:4.3 : Leniency for Corporate Directors, Officers, and Employees8-23
    • § 8:4.4 : Potential Benefits of “Second-In” Cooperation8-24
    • § 8:4.5 : “Leniency Plus”8-25
  • § 8:5 : SEC Leniency Policies8-25
    • § 8:5.1 : Cooperation Initiative8-25
    • § 8:5.2 : Leniency for Individuals8-27
Chapter 9: Deferred Prosecution Agreements
  • § 9:1 : Introduction9-1
  • § 9:2 : What Is a DPA?9-5
  • § 9:3 : Why Has Deferred Prosecution of Corporations Become So Common?9-9
  • § 9:4 : DPA or Declination?9-13
  • § 9:5 : The Terms of the Agreement9-15
  • § 9:6 : DOJ Guidance on the Use of Corporate Monitors9-17
  • § 9:7 : Judicial Review of DPAs9-21
  • § 9:8 : SEC’s Use of DPAs and NPAs9-24
  • § 9:9 : Antitrust DPAs9-27
  • § 9:10 : DPAs in the United Kingdom9-28
  • § 9:11 : Practical Considerations in Negotiating Deferred Prosecution Agreements9-30
Chapter 10: Representing the Drug or Medical Device Manufacturer in a Criminal Investigation
  • § 10:1 : Introduction10-2
  • § 10:2 : The Statutory and Regulatory Scheme10-2
    • § 10:2.1 : The FDCA10-2
    • § 10:2.2 : The Anti-Kickback Statute10-3
    • § 10:2.3 : The False Claims Act10-4
    • § 10:2.4 : The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act10-4
    • § 10:2.5 : Other Regulatory Tools10-5
      • [A] : Corporate Integrity Agreements10-5
      • [B] : Exclusion from Federal Healthcare Programs10-6
      • [C] : Fines10-7
  • § 10:3 : Recent Developments in Enforcement Actions10-8
    • § 10:3.1 : Enforcement Actions Against Pharmaceutical Manufacturers10-8
    • § 10:3.2 : Enforcement Actions Against Medical Device Manufacturers10-15
    • § 10:3.3 : Individual Accountability10-18
    • § 10:3.4 : Sorrell, Caronia, and First Amendment Challenges10-22
  • § 10:4 : FDA Warning and Untitled Letters to Pharmaceutical Companies Regarding Promotional Materials10-28
  • § 10:5 : Compliance Strategies10-32
  • § 10:6 : Conclusion10-33
Chapter 11: Government Investigations Under the False Claims Act and Its Qui Tam Provisions
  • § 11:1 : Introduction11-2
  • § 11:2 : The FCA Statute11-4
    • § 11:2.1 : Liability and Damages Provisions11-4
    • § 11:2.2 : Qui Tam Provisions11-8
      • [A] : Complaint Filed Under Seal11-8
      • [B] : Provisions Allowing Relators to Share in Monetary Recovery11-11
      • [C] : Authority over Dismissal and Settlement11-12
  • § 11:3 : Steps of a Government Investigation11-13
    • § 11:3.1 : Agency Subpoenas11-14
    • § 11:3.2 : Civil Investigative Demands11-14
    • § 11:3.3 : The Government’s Decision to Intervene11-15
  • § 11:4 : Elements of FCA Liability11-16
    • § 11:4.1 : False Claim11-16
    • § 11:4.2 : Intent11-19
    • § 11:4.3 : Materiality11-21
    • § 11:4.4 : Causation11-26
  • § 11:5 : FCA Issues in the Healthcare Area11-27
    • § 11:5.1 : Off-Label Marketing11-27
      • [A] : Generally11-27
      • [B] : False Statements and First Amendment Issues11-29
    • § 11:5.2 : Anti-Kickback Violations11-33
    • § 11:5.3 : Pharmaceutical Pricing Cases11-35
    • § 11:5.4 : Concealment of Safety Data and Risk Minimization11-37
    • § 11:5.5 : Rule 9(b) Issues Involving Providers and Manufacturers11-40
    • § 11:5.6 : Causation, Individualized Proof, and Damage Issues Involving Providers and Manufacturers11-42
  • § 11:6 : FCA Issues Regarding Government Contractors11-44
    • § 11:6.1 : Government Contractor Risks11-44
    • § 11:6.2 : Combating Risk and Defending Claims11-49
    • § 11:6.3 : Confronting Concurrent Proceedings11-50
  • § 11:7 : Defenses11-52
    • § 11:7.1 : Statute of Limitations11-52
    • § 11:7.2 : Tax Code Cases11-55
  • § 11:8 : Special Defenses Against a Qui Tam Relator11-55
    • § 11:8.1 : Public Disclosure Bar11-55
    • § 11:8.2 : Original Source11-62
    • § 11:8.3 : First-to-File Bar11-66
  • § 11:9 : Protection of Whistleblower11-69
  • § 11:10 : Other Whistleblower Laws11-74
    • § 11:10.1 : Tax Whistleblower Law11-74
    • § 11:10.2 : Securities Whistleblower Law11-75
Chapter 12: Representation of Companies in Criminal Antitrust Investigations
  • § 12:1 : Introduction12-2
  • § 12:2 : Elements of a Sherman Antitrust Criminal Prosecution12-2
    • § 12:2.1 : Conspiracy12-3
    • § 12:2.2 : Criminal Intent12-4
    • § 12:2.3 : Interstate Nexus12-5
    • § 12:2.4 : Statute of Limitations12-5
  • § 12:3 : The Department of Justice Policy for Prosecution of Sherman Act Cases12-7
  • § 12:4 : Criminal Penalties12-9
    • § 12:4.1 : Individual Sentences12-10
      • [A] : Sentencing of Individuals12-10
      • [B] : Extradition of Foreign Executives12-12
      • [C] : DOJ Carve-Out Policy12-15
    • § 12:4.2 : Corporate Fines12-16
      • [A] : Calculation of Fines12-16
      • [B] : Recently Imposed Fines12-20
    • § 12:4.3 : Major Ongoing Antitrust Investigations12-23
      • [A] : Foreign Currency Exchange Investigation12-23
      • [B] : Auto Parts Investigation12-24
      • [C] : London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) Investigation12-29
      • [D] : Ocean Shipping Services Investigation12-32
      • [E] : Electrolytic Capacitors Investigation12-32
      • [F] : Generic Drugs Investigation12-33
  • § 12:5 : DOJ Corporate Leniency Policy12-34
    • § 12:5.1 : Pre-Investigation Amnesty12-36
    • § 12:5.2 : Alternative Grounds for Amnesty12-36
    • § 12:5.3 : Antitrust Division’s 2008 Model Conditional Leniency Letters and FAQ12-37
    • § 12:5.4 : Leniency for Corporate Directors, Officers, and Employees12-39
    • § 12:5.5 : Potential Benefits of “Second-In” Cooperation12-40
  • § 12:6 : Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws12-41
  • § 12:7 : State Antitrust Prosecutions12-45
  • § 12:8 : Antitrust Compliance Strategies12-48
Chapter 13: Asset Forfeiture and Debarment
  • § 13:1 : Asset Forfeiture13-2
    • § 13:1.1 : The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 200013-3
    • § 13:1.2 : Initiation of Civil Judicial Forfeiture13-4
      • [A] : Pre-Seizure Warrant “Freezing” of Assets13-4
      • [B] : Pre-Forfeiture Seizure of Assets13-5
      • [C] : Pre-Trial Procedures Under Supplemental Rule G13-5
    • § 13:1.3 : Civil Trial Procedure13-10
      • [A] : Initial Burden on the Government13-10
      • [B] : Innocent Owner Defense13-10
      • [C] : Bona Fide Purchaser or Seller for Value13-12
      • [D] : Knowledge or Reason to Believe Property Subject to Forfeiture13-13
        • [D][1] : Willful Blindness13-14
        • [D][2] : Knowledge in the Law Firm Fee Context13-15
      • [E] : The Department of Justice Policy on Forfeiture of Attorney Fees13-17
      • [F] : Use of Potentially Forfeitable Assets to Retain and Pay Counsel13-19
        • [F][1] : Criminal Forfeitures13-19
        • [F][2] : Civil Forfeitures13-20
    • § 13:1.4 : Civil Judicial Forfeiture of Transferred Traceable Assets13-21
    • § 13:1.5 : Seizure of Fungible Assets13-22
    • § 13:1.6 : Awards of Attorney Fees to Prevailing Claimants13-23
  • § 13:2 : Debarment13-25
    • § 13:2.1 : Overview of Suspension and Debarment13-25
    • § 13:2.2 : Consequences of Suspension and Debarment13-29
    • § 13:2.3 : Term of Suspension or Debarment13-30
    • § 13:2.4 : Grounds for Imposing Debarment or Suspension13-31
    • § 13:2.5 : Factors Informing Agency Discretion to Debar or Suspend13-34
    • § 13:2.6 : Debarment or Suspension Based on Imputation or Affiliation13-36
      • [A] : Imputation13-36
      • [B] : Affiliation13-37
  • § 13:3 : Practical Considerations in Addressing Debarment and Suspension for a Firm13-39
Chapter 14: Money Laundering and Financial Institutions
  • § 14:1 : Obligations of Financial Institutions in Combating Money Laundering14-2
    • § 14:1.1 : Overview: Regulatory Framework14-2
    • § 14:1.2 : The Money Laundering Control Act14-4
      • [A] : Section 1956(a)(1): Conducting Certain Financial Transactions14-4
      • [B] : Section 1956(a)(2): Transporting Funds into or out of the United States14-5
      • [C] : Section 1956(a)(3): “Sting” Operations14-6
      • [D] : Section 1957: Money Transactions in “Criminally Derived Property”14-6
      • [E] : Penalties for Violations14-7
    • § 14:1.3 : The Bank Secrecy Act14-8
      • [A] : Financial Institutions Are Required to Implement AML Compliance Programs14-8
      • [B] : Financial Institutions Are Required to Implement Adequate Customer Identification Programs14-9
      • [C] : Financial Institutions Are Required to File Suspicious Activity Reports14-11
      • [D] : Financial Institutions Are Required to File Currency Transaction Reports14-12
      • [E] : Penalties for Violations14-14
    • § 14:1.4 : The Emergence of the New York Department of Financial Services as a Prominent Regulatory Force14-15
    • § 14:1.5 : Interagency Money Laundering Guidance14-17
      • [A] : Account Opening14-18
      • [B] : Account Transaction Scrutiny14-20
      • [C] : Suspicious Activity Reporting14-21
    • § 14:1.6 : Special Issues for U.S. Financial Institutions Relating to Foreign Banks Utilizing U.S. Correspondent Accounts14-21
      • [A] : Money Laundering Risks of Correspondent Accounts14-21
      • [B] : Payable-Through Accounts14-24
  • § 14:2 : Money Laundering Enforcement, Penalties, and Trends14-25
    • § 14:2.1 : Overview and Recent Developments14-25
    • § 14:2.2 : Penalties for Failing to Maintain an Adequate AML Program14-25
      • [A] : DFS Leads Recent AML Enforcement Efforts Against Foreign Banks14-26
      • [B] : DOJ’s Focus on Money Services Businesses14-28
      • [C] : Increased Scrutiny of Broker-Dealers14-30
      • [D] : Personal Liability for BSA/AML Violations14-32
      • [E] : Penalties for Structuring to Avoid CTRs14-34
      • [F] : The Panama Papers14-34
    • § 14:2.3 : Money Laundering by Corrupt Foreign Leaders: Kleptocracy Initiative14-35
    • § 14:2.4 : Combating Terrorism Financing14-36
    • § 14:2.5 : Violations of Export Controls and Economic Sanctions Can Lead to Money Laundering Issues for Financial Institutions14-40
Chapter 15: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the International Conventions on Bribery
  • § 15:1 : Introduction15-1
    • § 15:1.1 : Enforcement Statistics15-2
    • § 15:1.2 : Trends in Enforcement Policies, Priorities, and Practices15-7
  • § 15:2 : The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act15-10
    • § 15:2.1 : Who Is Subject to the FCPA?15-10
    • § 15:2.2 : Anti-Bribery Provisions15-11
    • § 15:2.3 : Penalties for Anti-Bribery Provision Violations15-13
    • § 15:2.4 : Exceptions and Defenses15-15
    • § 15:2.5 : Accounting Violations15-18
    • § 15:2.6 : The Resource Guide15-22
  • § 15:3 : International Cooperation and Anti-Corruption Enforcement15-25
    • § 15:3.1 : International Conventions on Bribery15-26
    • § 15:3.2 : The U.K. Bribery Act of 2010 and U.K. Enforcement15-28
    • § 15:3.3 : Brazilian Anti-Corruption Laws and Enforcement15-31
    • § 15:3.4 : Recent Anti-Corruption Law Enactment15-34
Chapter 16: Prosecutions for Violations of U.S. Export Controls and Trade Sanctions
  • § 16:1 : Introduction16-2
  • § 16:2 : Export Controls and Economic Sanctions: Regulatory Framework16-3
    • § 16:2.1 : Office of Foreign Assets Control Regulations16-3
      • [A] : U.S. Economic Sanctions: History and Statutory Authority16-3
      • [B] : Types of OFAC Regulations and Prohibitions16-5
      • [C] : OFAC Jurisdiction: Who Should Comply?16-9
      • [D] : OFAC Exemptions and Licensing Procedures16-11
      • [E] : Challenging an OFAC Designation16-13
    • § 16:2.2 : International Traffic in Arms Regulations16-16
      • [A] : Overview of ITAR Prohibitions16-20
      • [B] : Licensing Process and Exemptions16-21
      • [C] : Summary of Part 130 Requirements16-22
      • [D] : Summary of Section 126.1 Requirements16-24
      • [E] : Treatment of Dual Nationals/Third-Country Nationals16-25
    • § 16:2.3 : Export Administration Regulations16-25
      • [A] : Overview of EAR Prohibitions16-27
      • [B] : Licensing Process and Exceptions16-28
      • [C] : Anti-Boycott Regulations16-31
    • § 16:2.4 : Determining Appropriate Jurisdiction16-32
      • [A] : Sanctions or Export?16-34
      • [B] : EAR or ITAR Classification?16-34
  • § 16:3 : Enforcement16-38
    • § 16:3.1 : OFAC Violations: Penalties and Trends16-39
    • § 16:3.2 : ITAR Violations: Penalties and Trends16-44
    • § 16:3.3 : EAR Violations: Penalties and Trends16-47
  • § 16:4 : Compliance with Export Control Regulations16-52
    • § 16:4.1 : Corporate Compliance Programs16-52
    • § 16:4.2 : “Know Your Customer”16-54
  • § 16:5 : Responding to Violations16-56
    • § 16:5.1 : Voluntary Disclosure Prior to Commencement of a Government Investigation16-56
      • [A] : Notification and Documentation Requirements16-57
      • [B] : Penalty Enforcement and Mitigation16-57
      • [C] : The Decision to Disclose Voluntarily16-58
    • § 16:5.2 : Defending Export Control Violations in a Government Investigation16-60
    • § 16:5.3 : Due Diligence in Mergers and Acquisitions16-61
  Appendices
Appendix A: Yates Memo
Appendix B: Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
Appendix C: NYCBA Formal Opinion 2004-02
Appendix D: DOJ/SEC FCPA Resource Guide
Appendix E: The Fraud Section’s FCPA Enforcement Plan and Guidance
Appendix F: Guidance on Enhanced Security for Transactions That May Involve Proceeds of Foreign Official Corruption
Appendix G: Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Chapter 8: Sentencing of Organizations
Appendix H: DOJ Corporate Leniency Policy
Appendix I: DOJ Leniency Policy for Individuals
Appendix J: SEC Enforcement Manual, Chapter 6: Cooperation
  Index

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