Chapter 7

Corporate Compliance Programs Under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines

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(White Collar Deskbook, Rel. #4, 4/10) 7–1
§ 7:1 Introduction

November 1, 1991, was the effective date of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) of the U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC). One striking feature of the current Guidelines, effective as of the 2004 amendments, is their attempt to modify the behavior of law-abiding organizations by “rewarding” with more lenient sentences corporate offenders who, at the time of the offense, had implemented an “effective compliance and ethics program.”

The USSC’s apparent calculation is that organizations, fearing harsher fines as a result of criminal activities by employees in the unpredictable future, will adopt such programs as a precautionary measure. Of course, all companies hope never to have to face the Guidelines at sentencing after a criminal conviction. Moreover, the Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organisations and government leniency programs, discussed in chapters 1, 2 and 8, give company counsel many options and arguments in seeking to avoid conviction altogether. But even a law-abiding company needs to be aware of the requirements for an effective compliance program.

The “effective program” envisioned by the Guidelines is not a trivial matter. It involves significant self-policing procedures that will be costly and burdensome to implement. Indeed, the 2004 Amendments established additional criteria for a compliance program, including that the company promote “an organizational culture that encourages

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ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law” and that the organization’s “governing authority” be “knowledgeable about the content and operation of the compliance and ethics program and . . . exercise reasonable oversight with respect to the implementation and effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program.”

At the same time, in 2005 the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Booker held that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were not binding on the federal courts, although sentencing judges in the exercise of sentencing discretion could take the Guidelines into account. Viewed from a technical legal perspective, this meant that a sentencing court could decline to give an organization fine leniency even if the organization had adopted an effective compliance program. In 2007, in Kimbrough v. United States, the Supreme Court reemphasized that, although a district court must at least consider the Guidelines range as one of many possible factors to be weighed in sentencing, the Guidelines are still advisory under Booker and a sentencing judge may depart from them in his or her discretion. Furthermore, in Gall v. United States, the Supreme Court held that courts of appeal are to accord a high degree of deference to the sentencing decisions of district courts.

3. GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1.
5. Under Booker, a sentencing court in the exercise of its discretion must consider the following factors, which are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000):
   • “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”; id. § 3553(a)(1)
   • the need for the sentence imposed “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”; id. § 3553(a)(2)(A)
   • the need for the sentence imposed “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; id. § 3553(a)(2)(B)
   • the need for the sentence imposed “to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”; id. § 3553(a)(2)(C)
   • the need for the sentence imposed “to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner”; id. § 3553(a)(2)(D)
   • “the kinds of sentences available”; id. § 3553(a)(3)
   • the guidelines in effect at the date of sentencing and any pertinent policy statements; see id. §§ 3553(a)(4)–(5)
   • “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”; id. § 3553(a)(6); and
   • “the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.” Id. § 3553(a)(7).

6. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 89 (2007) [upholding a sentence where the judge considered but rejected the Guidelines range].
even those that fall outside the range prescribed in the Guidelines. These opinions reaffirm that an organization could be subject either to a harsher or more lenient sentence than the Guidelines dictate, perhaps based in part on a judge’s perception of a defendant’s compliance program. Until these decisions, at least in individual sentences following the Booker decision, federal courts, for the most part, have imposed sentences consistent with the Guidelines. It remains to be seen how these recent decisions will play out in federal sentencing but there clearly is no assurance that a court will follow the Guidelines in imposing a corporate criminal fine.

Moreover, aside from leniency in imposing fines, the reasons for implementing an effective compliance program remain compelling. First, such a program may deter criminal violations. Second, the existence of such a program may qualify the company for lenient treatment by prosecutors, in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Finally, the failure to implement such a program may expose directors to claims of breach of fiduciary duty.

This chapter examines the structure and methodology of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, with particular emphasis on the impact of the mitigating “prevention” program. The first task in understanding the significance of this remarkable feature of the Guidelines is to understand the calculations used to set organizational sentences.

§ 7:2 The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines Methodology

An organization’s fine under the Guidelines is a function of: (i) the severity of its offense; and (ii) the degree of its culpability. Although the Guidelines provide a multi-step process for determining an organization’s fine, the critical calculations involve the “Base Fine” and the “Culpability Score.” The Base Fine reflects the type and severity of the offense. The Culpability Score quantifies any aggravating or mitigating features of the offense.

The Culpability Score determines minimum and maximum multipliers that, when applied to the Base Fine, produce a sentencing fine range. Although the advisory nature of the Guidelines as a result of Booker create a far more flexible sentencing regime than previously

8. See infra section 7:14.
existed, the government will likely recommend a sentence within the range, and courts will likely impose such a sentence.

§ 7:2.1 Base Fine

As set forth in chapter two of the Guidelines, a “base offense level” is assigned to each offense governed by the Guidelines. The base offense level may be increased or decreased through application of “[s]pecific offense characteristics” reflecting the severity of the actual crime.9 Organizational fine amounts, ranging from $5,000 to $72,500,000, and corresponding to each offense level, are derived from the Offense Level Fine Table (“Table”).10

A defendant’s “Base Fine” is the greatest of:

(i) the appropriate fine amount from the Table;
(ii) the pecuniary gain to the organization from the offense; or
(iii) the pecuniary loss caused by the offense, to the extent that the loss was caused intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.11

The Guidelines instruct the court to use the amount from the Table as the Base Fine, where calculating pecuniary gain or loss would “unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.”12

§ 7:2.2 Culpability Score—Minimum/Maximum Multipliers

After determining a defendant’s Base Fine, the court calculates a “Culpability Score.” At the outset, the organizational defendant is assigned a Culpability Score of five points, from which subtractions or additions are made.13 Subtractions or additions depend on:

(i) the organization’s involvement in or tolerance of criminal activity;
(ii) its prior history;
(iii) whether it violated a judicial order or injunction in the course of the offense;
(iv) whether the organization obstructed justice in connection with the offense;

9. See GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1[4][f].
10. See id. § 8C2.4(d).
11. Id. § 8C2.4[a].
12. Id. § 8C2.4[c].
13. See id. § 8C2.5[a].
the existence of an effective compliance and ethics program; and

any “self-reporting, cooperation and acceptance of responsibility.”\(^14\)

For example, an organizational defendant’s Culpability Score will be increased five points if the organization had 5,000 or more employees and an individual with a substantial controlling or policy-making role in the organization participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the offense.\(^15\) Similarly, the Culpability Score increases one to two points if the organization had prior criminal or civil adjudications, based on similar misconduct, within specified periods of time before the offense.\(^16\) Moreover, if the commission of the instant offense violated a judicial order or injunction, the Culpability Score is increased by two points.\(^17\)

Two circumstances may reduce the Culpability Score. One is the existence of an effective compliance and ethics program. Such a program, described in detail below, may result in a reduction of three points in the Culpability Score.\(^18\) The reduction will not be available to the corporation, however, if: (i) it unreasonably delayed reporting the offense to appropriate governmental authorities; or (ii) among other things, an individual “within high-level personnel” of the organization or responsible for the compliance program, participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the offense.\(^19\)

The other possible ground for reduction involves “[s]elf-reporting, [c]ooperation, and [a]cceptance of [r]esponsibility.”\(^20\) Reductions are afforded if the organization—prior to an “imminent” threat of disclosure or government investigation, and “within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the offense”—reported the offense to appropriate governmental authorities, cooperated in the investigation, and demonstrated affirmative acceptance of responsibility for the conduct.\(^21\) In such an instance, five points are deducted from the

\(^{14}\) Id. § 8C2.5.
\(^{15}\) See id. § 8C2.5(b)(1)(A)(i).
\(^{16}\) See id. § 8C2.5(c).
\(^{17}\) See id. § 8C2.5(d).
\(^{18}\) See id. § 8C2.5(f).
\(^{19}\) Id. High-level personnel are defined as “individuals who have substantial control over the organization or who have a substantial role in the making of policy within the organization.” Id. § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3[b].
\(^{20}\) Id. § 8C2.5(g).
\(^{21}\) Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1).
Culpability Score.\textsuperscript{22} But a plea of guilty alone, without cooperation or voluntary disclosure, merits only a one-point reduction.\textsuperscript{23}

Once the court calculates the Culpability Score, it determines the minimum and maximum multipliers from the table provided in section 8C2.6. For example, for offenses other than antitrust, if the Culpability Score is zero or less, the corresponding minimum multiplier is 0.05 and the maximum multiplier is 0.20. At the other end of the scale, if the Culpability Score is 10 or more, then the minimum multiplier is two and the maximum multiplier is four.\textsuperscript{24}

\section*{§ 7:2.3 Applicable Fine Range}

The court multiplies the Base Fine by the minimum and maximum multipliers to obtain a fine range.\textsuperscript{25} If the Culpability Score is five, then, according to the table in section 8C2.6, the minimum and maximum multipliers are one to two. Assuming a Base Fine of $10 million, the fine range will be $10 million to $20 million. If the Culpability Score is one (multipliers of .20 to .40)—perhaps because the company had an effective compliance program (minus three points) and acknowledged its responsibility (minus one point)—the fine range will be $2 million to $4 million.

\section*{§ 7:2.4 Determining the Actual Fine}

The court then determines the actual fine. In exercising discretion, the court considers the factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).\textsuperscript{26}

Even before the \textit{Booker} decision, the Guidelines did not change the statutory minimums and maximums. Section 8C3.1 provides that Guidelines’ fines must conform to the statutory minimums and maximums when and if the two conflict. Thus, for example, “[w]here the minimum guideline fine is greater than the maximum fine authorized by statute, the maximum fine authorized by statute shall be the guideline fine.”\textsuperscript{27}

The statutory maximum for a conviction on multiple counts, however, is the sum of the maximum fines for each count. For example, if an organizational defendant is convicted of ten counts of fraud on a financial institution,\textsuperscript{28} because each count carries a $1 million maximum, the organizational defendant’s maximum

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} \textit{See id.}
\item \textsuperscript{23} \textit{See id. § 8C2.5[g][3].}
\item \textsuperscript{24} \textit{See id. § 8C2.6.}
\item \textsuperscript{25} \textit{See id. § 8C2.7.}
\item \textsuperscript{26} \textit{See supra note 5.}
\item \textsuperscript{27} \textit{GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C3.1[b].}
\item \textsuperscript{28} \textit{See 18 U.S.C. § 1344.}
\end{itemize}
statutory fine will be $10 million. Moreover, an even greater statutory maximum may result from application of the Fines Enhancement Act, which allows imposition of a fine of twice the gross gain or loss caused by the offense.\textsuperscript{29}

\textbf{§ 7:2.5 Disgorgement}

The Guidelines provide that any gain to the organization not paid as restitution or by way of any other remedial measure must be added to the fine determined above.\textsuperscript{30}

\textbf{§ 7:2.6 Fines for Antitrust Offenses}

Regarding antitrust offenses, the Guidelines specify that, in lieu of determining actual pecuniary loss, courts must assume that pecuniary loss equals twenty percent of the volume of affected commerce.\textsuperscript{31} This percentage generally will be greater than either the fine amount under the Table or a defendant’s pecuniary gain. Accordingly, the Base Fine for antitrust offenses will usually be 20\% of the total volume of commerce “done by [the defendant] in goods or services that were affected by the violation.”\textsuperscript{32}

Moreover, organizational offenders who voluntarily disclose antitrust violations or implement compliance programs will not receive the same reduction in the Base Fine for antitrust offenses. Under a special exception for antitrust offenses, the minimum multiplier for those offenses is .75 (the minimum multiplier for all other offenses is .05) regardless of whether the corporation voluntarily disclosed the offense, cooperated, and accepted responsibility, or whether it had an effective compliance program.\textsuperscript{33}

\textbf{§ 7:3 Remedial Sanctions and Probation Under the Guidelines}

In addition to the imposition of a fine, the Guidelines state that “[a]s a general principle, the court should require that the organization take all appropriate steps to provide compensation to victims and otherwise remedy the harm caused or threatened by the offense.”\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{29} See id. § 3571[d]; GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C3.1 cmt.  
\textsuperscript{30} See GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.9.  
\textsuperscript{31} See id. § 8C2.4 cmt. n.5; see also id. § 2R1.1[d].  
\textsuperscript{32} See id. § 2R1.1 & cmt. n.3.  
\textsuperscript{33} See id. §§ 2R1.1 & 8C2.6 cmt. n.1. The Antitrust Division, however, has promulgated its own amnesty policy that, provided specific conditions are met, assures that there will be no criminal prosecution of an organization that voluntarily discloses wrongdoing. See discussion infra chapter 8.  
\textsuperscript{34} GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8, pt. B introductory cmt.
The Guidelines provide the court with four alternatives to compel organizational defendants to remedy the harm caused by their offenses:

(i) orders of restitution;
(ii) remedial orders;
(iii) community service; and
(iv) orders of notice to victims.\(^{35}\)

Orders of restitution are mandatory under the Guidelines unless the court finds that such an order is impractical due to the large numbers of victims or would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.\(^{36}\)

The court may impose a remedial order that requires the organizational defendant “to remedy the harm caused by the offense and to eliminate or reduce the risk that the instant offense will cause future harm.”\(^{37}\) The Guidelines provide that where “the magnitude of expected future harm can be reasonably estimated, the court may require the organization to create a trust fund sufficient to address that expected harm.”\(^{38}\) Where an order of restitution would prove impractical, however, the court may, but is not required to, order remediation through community service or other remedial orders.\(^{39}\)

The court also has the power to order defendants to give notice of the conviction and sentence to the victims of the offense, provided the cost of notice does not exceed $20,000.\(^{40}\)

The Guidelines authorize the court to impose a term of probation under a variety of circumstances. One circumstance concerns a corporation of more than fifty employees, or a corporation, which, at the time of sentencing, is “required under law to have an effective compliance and ethics program,” and the corporation “does not have such a program.”\(^{41}\) In these circumstances, the court can require the corporation to develop such a program and submit it to the court for approval. Even if the program is approved, the company must

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35. See id. §§ 8B1.1–8B1.4. See United States v. Kamadeen Idowu Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2006) (Booker does not apply to orders of restitution).
36. GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B1.1(b)(2).
37. Id. § 8B1.2[a].
38. Id. § 8B1.2[b].
39. See id. §§ 8B1.2–8B1.3.
40. See id. § 8B1.4; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3555; GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5F1.4.
41. GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8D1.1[a][3].
submit to court monitoring of the company’s adherence to its program, which includes “unannounced examinations of its books and records . . . by the probation officer or experts engaged by the court . . . and . . . interrogation of knowledgeable individuals within the organization.”

§ 7:4 Criteria for an Effective Program to Prevent and Detect Violation of Law

Pursuant to the 2004 Amendments, section 8B2.1, a stand-alone guideline, describes the criteria for an effective “compliance and ethics program.” The 2004 Amendments require that organizations seeking fine leniency based on a compliance program must meet two overarching standards. The organization must “exercise due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct,” and it must “otherwise promote an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the law.”

As stated in the Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, dated October 7, 2003 (Advisory Committee Report), which led to the 2004 Amendments,

[a]n organizational culture that encourages a commitment to compliance with the law includes positive actions which demonstrate that law compliance is a key value within the organization. Such a culture is demonstrated by organizational actions which encourage employees to choose lawful behaviors and to expect that their conduct will be evaluated by others within the organization in terms of how well the employees have pursued lawful conduct.

Organizations are not expected, however, to do more than implement the seven criteria for an effective compliance program, discussed below:

The Advisory Group anticipates that organizations will carry out both of the key components of an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law—that is, the pursuit of due diligence in the prevention and detection of offenses and the creation of a positive culture valuing law compliance—by taking steps in the seven areas addressed in [then existing] § 8B1.2(b). By tailoring their efforts in

42. Id. § 8D1.4(c)(4).
43. Id. § 8B2.1(a)(1) & (2).
these seven areas to achieve both reasonable violation prevention and positive internal support for law compliance, organizations can attain both the compliance with law and organizational culture called for under the proposed guideline.\textsuperscript{45}

Section 8B2.1(b)(1)[7] specifies the seven characteristics of an effective program that the organization must “minimally” adopt to achieve such a culture. Each is discussed in turn below.

\textbf{\textsection 7:5 Section 8B2.1(b)(1)}

\textit{The organization shall establish standards and procedures to prevent and detect criminal conduct.}

Notably, the phrase “criminal conduct” does not mean that a compliance program should be confined to preventing and detecting only \textit{criminal} conduct. Also significant is that section 8B2.1(a)(2) requires an organizational culture that “encourages \textit{ethical} conduct and a commitment to compliance with the \textit{law}” without making a distinction between criminal and civil or regulatory law.\textsuperscript{46}

One interpretation of the Commission’s overall intent behind this criterion is to require corporations to establish comprehensive written procedures and codes of ethics. The written compliance blueprint is a standard for measuring the corporation’s commitment to compliance. In effect, this criterion establishes the proposition that, if a company is unwilling to commit comprehensive compliance procedures to writing and abide by them, it should not qualify for lenient treatment.

The documents that might form the core of the compliance blueprint include:

- \textit{Business code of conduct}. In a comprehensive form, a business code must do more than simply state the corporation’s commitment to compliance with laws and regulations. The code should address the areas in which the company’s business activities may be susceptible to violations; set forth the applicable law and penalties for violations; state the company’s policy that such violations will result in dismissal; and require

\textsuperscript{45} Id.  
\textsuperscript{46} See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 109 [2004] [synopsis accompanying compilation of unofficial text of amendments to the Guidelines submitted to Congress on April 30, 2004] (“An effective compliance and ethics program not only will prevent and detect criminal conduct, but also should facilitate compliance with all applicable laws”) [emphasis added], available at www.ussc.gov/2004guid/RFMay04.pdf.
employees to report violations, or even questionable business practices, that come to their attention. Once adopted, however, such a code becomes, as the Sentencing Commission apparently intends, a benchmark for judging the corporation’s compliance commitment. Therefore, in drafting such a code, the corporation should be careful not to set standards that it cannot meet or establish procedures that may conflict with other obligations, such as union contracts or employee rights derived from state law.

- **Auditing.** The company, if it has not done so already, should draft a comprehensive audit plan. Such a plan should reflect a commitment of resources to auditing that is consistent with the due diligence standard. The plan should focus on the areas of the company’s business susceptible to violations of law.

- **A written internal compliance structure.** The written evidence of compliance commitment should establish an organizational structure for compliance. The “compliance organization chart,” for example, might create a Compliance Committee of the Board of Directors that includes outside directors. Also, as required by other criteria for an effective program, the organizational chart should designate a day-to-day compliance officer who: (i) meets the standard of being from “high level personnel”; and (ii) has direct responsibility for the compliance program. In turn, the chart might assign division managers or their subordinates responsibility for implementing compliance programs on a division-by-division basis. The compliance organization chart might also create an internal compliance working group consisting of the chief executive officer, the chief financial officer (with jurisdiction over audit programs and procedures), the general counsel, active managers, labor and employment counsel (among other responsibilities, to identify conflicts between the compliance program and employees’ rights under law or contract), regulatory specialists, and public relations personnel.

- **Employee handbook/personnel policies.** In order to make available all investigative and compliance tools and techniques, the company should evaluate and revise, if appropriate, its Employee Handbook and/or personnel policies to expressly protect the company’s right, consistent with union contracts and applicable laws and regulations, to conduct comprehensive workplace searches, including desks, email, computer files, and lockers. In addition, the Employee Handbook and/or personnel policies should describe the compliance program and state clearly that employees are expected not only to comply with
all laws, regulations, and ethical standards (a reprint of the Code of Conduct should be included), but to cooperate in both ongoing and special audits, including interviews by accountants or attorneys, at which they are expected to answer all questions fully and truthfully. The Employee Handbook and/or personnel policies should also describe other compliance mechanisms and procedures, such as the Employee Hotline, discussed below.

§ 7:6 Section 8B2.1(b)(2)

(A) The organization’s governing authority shall be knowledgeable about the content and operation of the compliance and ethics program and shall exercise reasonable oversight with respect to the implementation and effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program.

(B) High-level personnel of the organization shall ensure that the organization has an effective compliance and ethics program, as described in this guideline. Specific individual(s) within high-level personnel shall be assigned overall responsibility for the compliance and ethics program.

(C) Specific individual(s) within the organization shall be delegated day-to-day operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program. Individual(s) with operational responsibility shall report periodically to high-level personnel and, as appropriate, to the governing authority, or an appropriate subgroup of the governing authority, on the effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program. To carry out such operational responsibility, such individual(s) shall be given adequate resources, appropriate authority, and direct access to the governing authority or an appropriate subgroup of the governing authority.

The Guidelines as amended create a three-tier compliance structure. At the top tier is the company’s highest authority, typically the board of directors, which the Guidelines term “governing authority.” The members of a governing authority should have knowledge about such governance and compliance matters as: practical management information about the major risks of unlawful conduct facing their organization; the primary compliance program features aimed at counteracting those risks; and, the types of compliance problems that the organization and other parties with similar operations have encountered in the past. However, as suggested in the Advisory Committee Report,
[t]ypically, however, members of a governing authority will gain information on the features and operation of a program to prevent and detect violations of law through reports from senior organization managers or other experts [in large organizations], or through information about program features and operations gained in the course of day-to-day management and oversight of related organizational activities [in small organizations].

As to the next-tier, “high-level personnel,” the definitional section only states that such personnel includes “individuals who have substantial control over the organization or who have a substantial role in the making of policy within the organization.” As a general rule, the more senior the executive assigned overall compliance responsibility, the greater likelihood the compliance program will satisfy this criterion. Under the Guidelines, the general counsel should satisfy the “high-level personnel” requirement. These organizational leaders must be knowledgeable about the content and operation of compliance and ethics programs within their organizations. Such organizational leaders should gain information about these programs on a regular basis, act on this information to improve the programs, and be attentive to matters relating to compliance with the law and appropriate responses within the bounds of their area of leadership. Further, such organizational leaders should “periodically scrutinize the adequacy of program features in their areas of leadership, analyze gaps, if any, in those features, and appropriately alter compliance practices or other organizational conduct to eliminate reasonably foreseeable risks of future illegal conduct.”

At the third tier, the company should expressly designate an organizational official or officials with day-to-day responsibility for the operation of the organization’s compliance and ethics program. Their responsibilities, at a minimum, should include: establishing and supervising the compliance program, which includes responsibility for design and implementation of compliance mechanisms and procedures; notification to employees of the compliance standards; creation or revision of the compliance blueprint, including the corporation’s code of conduct; supervision and evaluation of auditing procedures; implementation of an employee hotline; investigation of questionable or illegal business practices; ongoing compliance reports to the “governing authority”; and employee training and education.

Necessarily, in a large company, this executive must delegate responsibility. In effect, therefore, the executive must establish the

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47. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, at 60.
48. GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3(b).
49. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, at 61.
50. See id. at 61–63.
corporation’s compliance infrastructure. In doing so, however, the logic of this criterion is that he should delegate responsibility to “high-level personnel” within a specific unit of the company. For example, if a company has several divisions and chooses to delegate compliance responsibility to each division, high-level personnel within each division must be assigned to supervise compliance within the division.

As stated in the Advisory Committee Report, the activities of this executive, and the operation of the program as a whole, “must be supported by the organization with reasonable resources sufficient to ensure due diligence on the part of the organization to prevent and detect violations of law and to otherwise promote an organizational culture that encourages a commitment to compliance with the law.” The concept is that unless such resources are committed, the company’s compliance efforts will be no more than a paper program.

Finally, the person or persons in high-level personnel with direct, overall responsibility for an organization’s program to prevent and detect violations of law should periodically report on the nature, progress, and success of that program to the governing authority of the organization or some appropriate subgroup (such as an audit committee) within the governing authority. The aim of this reporting is to convey information directly from the head of the program to the members of the governing authority without the potential filtering or censuring influence of senior organization managers.

§ 7:7 Section 8B2.1(b)(3)

The organization shall use reasonable efforts not to include within the substantial authority personnel of the organization any individual whom the organization knew, or should have known through the exercise of due diligence, has engaged in illegal activities or other conduct inconsistent with an effective compliance and ethics program.

This criterion suggests that the corporation must implement procedures to identify persons who have violated the law or engaged in conduct incompatible with a commitment to the law. One procedure is to screen applicants for employment at all corporate levels.

51. Id. at 62.
52. See id.
53. See GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 cmt. n.3 (suggesting annual reporting obligations to the governing authority on implementation and effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program).
Such procedures must, however, take into account applicable state law, which, in some jurisdictions, limits background checks of employees. Subject to those limitations, a corporation should consider including, if it has not done so already, the following inquiries on its employment applications:

- Whether the applicant has changed his name, which allows for more comprehensive background checks, including criminal records.

- Whether the applicant has been convicted of a crime, including the court and place of conviction, the nature of the offense, and the disposition. Information in addition to the mere fact of conviction facilitates criminal records checks. See the discussion below regarding termination of employees who have been arrested or convicted for violations of law.

- The applicant’s social security number, which, unknown even to corporations that routinely request social security numbers, identifies (in the first three digits) the issuing geographic region. Thus, obtaining the social security number, which facilitates a reasonable background check, better assures that a prior criminal history will be uncovered.

- A provision for the applicant’s consent for the corporation to obtain an “investigative consumer report,” at least for those applicants seeking sensitive (for example, accountants, payroll personnel) and/or high-level positions in the company. An investigative consumer report contains, in addition to the normal credit information, information as to an applicant’s character, general reputation, personal characteristics, and mode of living, which may be obtained through personal interviews with neighbors, friends, associates, etc. Because investigative consumer reports are significantly more intrusive than a simple credit check, some states, such as New York and California, require notice to the applicant and the applicant’s consent.

In addition, where appropriate and warranted, the company should consider performing a drug screen, in conformance with state and federal law, on those applicants to whom the company makes a conditional offer of employment.

§ 7:8 Section 8B2.1(b)(4)

(A) The organization shall take reasonable steps to communicate periodically and in a practical manner its standards and procedures, and other aspects of the
compliance and ethics program, to the individuals referred to in subdivision (B) by conducting effective training programs and otherwise disseminating information appropriate to such individuals’ respective roles and responsibilities.

(B) The individuals referred to in subdivision (A) are the members of the governing authority, high-level personnel, substantial authority personnel, the organization’s employees, and, as appropriate, the organization’s agents.

The Guidelines as amended require both dissemination of compliance materials and training. A variety of techniques are available for employee notification and training. Among them: employee bulletins and newsletters, distributing compliance policy statements directly to employees, wall posters, email, compliance seminars (discussed below), and business ethics questionnaires. Depending on company size and resources, an effective means to assure employee notification often is the distribution of compliance policy statements, with a request that the employee sign a certification that he has read and understands the policy. Subject-specific policy statements—for example, antitrust or environmental statements—should be directed to departments or divisions that are particularly susceptible to violations of these respective bodies of law and regulation. The company should periodically review, revise, and redistribute its compliance policy statements to reflect changes in the law.

Training, typically compliance seminars and/or computer simulation programs, requires a substantial commitment of company resources. Moreover, in a company engaged in diverse business activities, separate subject matter seminars may be necessary. An antitrust seminar for purchasing or sales personnel might cover such topics as the antitrust laws and their meaning, penalties for violations (both to the individual and the company), guidelines for avoiding even the appearance of bid or price collusion, and, as an adjunct, laws and ethical standards that prohibit payment or receipt of gratuities and kickbacks.

A seminar for employees of the chemical products division, by contrast, should cover such topics as environmental law and regulations, penalties for violation, chemical and chemical waste handling procedures, responding to a government inspection, worker health and safety, record keeping, and disclosure required by law. To the extent the company is operating under an environmental consent decree, the seminar can also discuss compliance with the consent decree’s terms and the penalties for noncompliance.
These seminars and e-training programs need not deal only with criminal law violations. It may be to the company’s benefit if the compliance seminar addresses other sensitive workplace and legal issues, such as policies to avoid sexual and other types of workplace harassment and discrimination.

§ 7:9  

Section 8B2.1(b)(5)  
The organization shall take reasonable steps—

(A) to ensure that the organization’s compliance and ethics program is followed, including monitoring and auditing to detect criminal conduct;  

(B) to evaluate periodically the effectiveness of the organization’s compliance and ethics program; and  

(C) to have and publicize a system, which may include mechanisms that allow for anonymity or confidentiality, whereby the organization’s employees and agents may report or seek guidance regarding potential or actual criminal conduct without fear of retaliation.

More than any other, this criterion tests whether the company is sincere in its commitment to compliance. In a variety of ways, the company is expected to engage in vigorous self-policing. Three principal corporate self-policing techniques are:

(i) internal auditing;  

(ii) an employee hotline and ombudsman; and  

(iii) business ethics questionnaires.

§ 7:9.1  

Internal Auditing  
There are three aspects to effective internal auditing: commitment of resources, focus, and periodic re-assessment. As discussed above, the company is expected to devote substantial resources to auditing and to focus audits on areas of the company’s business activities susceptible to violations of law.

For example, if a company with 30,000 employees, offices in twelve cities in the United States and six foreign countries, and a volume of sales in the billions has a written plan that assigns three auditors to compliance work, the company may not meet this criterion. Any audit plan, moreover, must be tailored to the company’s business activities. If the company handles chemical wastes, and therefore is susceptible to environmental infractions, its environmental auditing must, at a minimum, satisfy the Environmental Protection Agency’s Audit
Policy, which established standards governing environmental auditing compliance programs. This is because the written environmental audit plan and written waste handling procedures should meet state-of-the-art standards. As stated in Application Note 2[B] to section 8B2.1, “[a]n organization’s failure to incorporate and follow applicable industry practice or the standards called for by any applicable governmental regulation weighs against a finding of an effective compliance and ethics program.”

In some cases, with a modest effort, existing auditing procedures can be upgraded in a manner that emphasizes the company’s commitment to compliance. For example, where a company’s purchasing policy specifies that purchases above a certain amount require multiple bids, the company might consider auditing multiple purchases of similar goods from the same vendor that, while individually less than the threshold for multiple bids, in the aggregate total more than the threshold. Evasion of bidding requirements, if done systematically, indicates a disregard for company policy, possible preferential treatment of a vendor, and possible receipt of a gratuity or kickback. Importantly, such upgrades of auditing procedures furnish convincing evidence of the company’s commitment to an effective program to deter and detect violations of law.

§ 7:9.2 Employee Hotlines and the Ombudsman

Employee hotlines are now in widespread use and misuse. Such lines typically are toll-free and anonymous, with such names as “Help-line,” “Guideline,” and “We Care Hotline.” While some companies use an investigative service to answer hotline calls, having an attorney monitor hotline disclosures will better afford attorney-client and work product protections. An opinion of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York State Bar Association sets forth an approved script for an attorney to follow in responding to hotline disclosures. The script includes, however, suggested advice by an attorney to employees that may discourage some disclosures. If a company chooses to record hotline telephone calls, it should warn callers that the call is being taped, as some states prohibit non-consensual recording of telephone calls.

55. GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 cmt. n.2[B].
56. See N.Y.S. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 650 [1993] [attached as Appendix J].
57. Indeed, the Opinion cautions that the script is not “the only means available to corporate counsel to comply with [state ethical obligations] . . . it
The company must do more than simply listen to, or record, hotline messages. Unless the information reported consists of obviously unsubstantiated rumor or gossip, the disclosure must be investigated by a compliance officer. At the conclusion of the investigation, the compliance officer should recommend appropriate action to the senior executive in charge of the compliance program.

A related compliance technique is the company ombudsman. An ombudsman is appointed specifically to receive disclosures from employees of suspected violations of law or unethical business practices. He might report directly to the senior executive in charge of the compliance program or to the compliance or audit committees of the Board of Directors. The ombudsman can be empowered to withhold names of employees who contact him, make recommendations for investigative action, and review personnel records and procedures to ensure that disclosure of criminal activities does not result in retaliation against the employee for making the disclosure.

Some federal courts have recognized an ombudsman privilege against disclosure of employee tips. For example, in Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., the district court held that confidential communications made to a company ombudsman, a non-attorney, were protected from disclosure in a suit by a former employee alleging employment discrimination. The court, relying on Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, stated that “it is important that . . . employees have an opportunity to make confidential statements and to receive confidential guidance, information, and aid to remedy workplace problems to benefit themselves and possibly the nation.”

A number of courts, however, have rejected such a privilege.

§ 7:9.3 Business Ethics Questionnaires

Another monitoring/employee communication technique is the distribution of “business ethics questionnaires” to mid- and senior-level employees. It is possible that other approaches can satisfy ethical requirements without deterring the desired communication to the extent that may occur with implementation of the particular adverse interest script reviewed here.”

Id. at J-3.


60. See, e.g., Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1997) [refusing to create the “wholly new evidentiary [ombudsman] privilege”]; see also Miller v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., No. 98-1012, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16712, at *42 (10th Cir. July 19, 1999) (“It is clear that neither Colorado law nor federal law, including the decisions of this circuit, recognize an ombudsman privilege”).
employees. Such questionnaires, which must be completed, signed, and returned by the employee, ask such questions as:

- Do you have knowledge of any direct or indirect payoff or kickback received directly or indirectly by ABCo, its employees (including yourself) or any other party on behalf of ABCo?
- Do you have knowledge of any direct or indirect payment made by ABCo, its employees (including yourself) or any other party on behalf of ABCo, of any discount or rebate to any customer which may violate applicable minimum price or price-posting laws (for example, state statutes, laws or regulations that directly or indirectly establish prices or require the filing of pricing information for any regulated product)?
- Do you have knowledge of any individual (including yourself) or group inflating an expense account for the purpose of enriching the individual or individuals?

To maintain the corporate attorney-client and work product protections to the maximum possible extent, the questionnaire should be sent under cover of a letter from the company’s general counsel. The letter should state, among other things, that:

(i) it is intended that the responses will be protected by the attorney-client and work product privileges;
(ii) the employee should not keep a copy of the questionnaire; and
(iii) the company reserves the right to decide to furnish the completed questionnaire, or disclose information contained in it, to one or more governmental agencies or in private litigation.\(^{61}\)

As with hotline tips, any disclosures on the questionnaires must be investigated by the compliance program.

Once such questionnaires are created, however, circumstances arise which may force the company to waive the protection of any privilege. \(\textit{In re John Doe Corp.}\)\(^{62}\) illustrates this peril. There, a corporation conducted an internal investigation using business ethics review

\[^{61}\text{See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 394–96 [1981] (holding that the attorney-client privilege applied to business ethics review questionnaires where the information sought was not available from upper-level executives and was needed to enable the company’s attorneys to give legal advice).}\]

\[^{62}\text{In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482 [2d Cir. 1982].}\]
questionnaires sent to hundreds of mid- and upper-level managers and officers. Although several of the questionnaires disclosed the existence of a bribery payment in the form of a $96,500 legal fee to a New York City Councilman, the internal report of the investigation to the audit committee of the board of directors, entitled the “Business Ethics Review,” made no mention of the bribery scheme and stated that there were no improper practices in the company’s business activities.

The corporation’s outside accountants discovered the legal fee during an audit and asked the general counsel whether it was an improper payment. The accountant was told that the company had investigated the payment and other possibly improper practices at the company, that while earlier drafts referred to the payment, the final business ethics review report made no mention of the payment to the city councilman, and that “nothing was irregular.” Separately, an underwriter’s counsel asked for, and was given, the business ethics review report—after threatening not to proceed with a public offering.

Subsequently, after a grand jury investigation began, the Second Circuit held that, by disclosing the business ethics review report to the outside parties, the corporation had waived any claim of privilege, and ordered production to the grand jury not only of the report, but also the business ethics questionnaires and attorneys’ notes of interviews. The questionnaires and notes were used to convict the corporation.

Consistent with the Second Circuit In re John Doe Corp., the First Circuit in United States v. Textron revised a district court opinion holding that “disclosure of information to an independent auditor does not waive the work-product privilege because it does not substantially increase the opportunity for potential adversaries to obtain the information.” The Textron court held that the work-product protection, in fact, was waived when Textron disclosed to an auditor its tax accrual analysis developed with counsel in anticipation of future litigation with the IRS. The First Circuit based its decision on the fact that the documents at issue were tax documents “prepared to support financial filings and gain auditor approval” and not in

63. See id. at 484.
64. See id. at 488–89.
65. See id. at 485–86.
66. Id. at 486, 489.
67. See id. at 485.
68. See id. at 488.
preparation for litigation. The court stated that “the work product privilege is aimed at protecting work done for litigation, not in preparing financial statements,” and ordered the disclosure of the documents.

§ 7:10 Section 8B2.1(b)(6)

The organization’s compliance and ethics program shall be promoted and enforced consistently throughout the organization through (A) appropriate incentives to perform in accordance with the compliance and ethics program; and (B) appropriate disciplinary measures for engaging in criminal conduct and for failing to take reasonable steps to prevent or detect criminal conduct.

This criterion requires the company to punish employees who violate the company’s compliance standards. While a range of disciplinary measures is available—suspension, loss of pay, reduction in position, transfer, and termination—the Guidelines’ emphasis on “due diligence” often leaves a company little choice but to fire employees whose proved or conceded criminal acts force the company to plead for leniency on the basis of a commitment to compliance. Further, the reference to “incentives” recognizes that a “culture of compliance can be promoted where organizational actors are judged by, and rewarded for, their positive compliance performance.”

The difficult question arises when the company only has circumstantial evidence of an employee’s misdeeds—enough, perhaps, to establish probable cause—but the employee denies any wrongdoing. In the event of a subsequent prosecution and conviction of the employee and the corporation, the company’s failure to have fired the employee may result in the company losing a reduction in fine under the compliance provisions of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. On the other hand, the company may not want to be in the position of adjudicating an employee’s guilt or innocence, particularly when it lacks the tools available to prosecutors such as grand jury subpoenas, immunity powers, eavesdropping authority, and vast investigative resources. In that situation, the company might opt for suspending the employee with pay (and, depending on indemnity obligations, indemnifying the employee’s attorney fees). But, in the

71. 577 F.3d at 31.
72. Id.
73. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, at 86.
absence of case authority, there is no legal guidance as to whether the company will still qualify for a fine reduction.\(^{74}\)

Moreover, in considering disciplinary measures, the company must be mindful of limitations imposed by state law or contract. The following section discusses some basic principles of New York and California law regarding termination of employees who are under suspicion of violation of law, formally accused (but not convicted), and convicted.

**§ 7:10.1 Termination Under New York Law of Employees Implicated in or Under Suspicion of Violation of Law**

Under New York law, a private employer may discharge an employee “at-will” (that is, at the employer’s option, without recourse),\(^ {75}\) except in the following circumstances:

- **Express employment contract.** The employee is covered by an express employment contract containing protection against termination without cause (typically high-level or executive officers);
- **Union contract.** The employee is covered by a union contract, typically requiring “just cause” for discharge, disputes over which are determined by recourse to arbitration:
  - In general, mere suspicion, unless well-substantiated, is unlikely to be viewed as “just cause” under a union contract;
  - Suspension (typically with pay) during the course of a comprehensive investigation by the employer is likely to be an acceptable intermediate measure;
  - Transfer to a less sensitive position may also be viewed as a reasonable response;
  - Severe disciplinary consequences for damage negligently or intentionally caused by employees will aid in proceedings before an arbitrator;

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74. In any such circumstance, the company should be sensitive to the risks of defamation and wrongful termination claims by the employee.

• **Employee handbook exception.** The employee is covered by an employee handbook or other employment document that expressly restricts the employer’s right to discharge. This “handbook” exception is extremely narrow in New York;76

• **Whistleblower law.** The employee has engaged in whistleblowing and his discharge would be in retaliation for such activity:
  
  • He has complained or threatened to disclose to a supervisor of the employer itself or to a “public body” (for example, public agency, prosecutorial office, police, etc.) an employer practice that: (i) violates law or regulations; and/or (ii) creates a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety;77
  
  • Alternatively, he has provided information or testified, or objected to or refused to participate in a practice violating law and/or creating a substantial public danger;78

• **Discrimination law.** Employees of a different race, age, sex, or national origin, and other protected characteristics under the civil rights laws, under similar suspicion have received lesser discipline in similar circumstances, suggesting that the discharge in question is discriminatory; and

• **Federal false claims whistleblower law.** Federal false claims whistleblower law79 prohibits retaliation against employees who lawfully report or assist in the investigation of fraud upon the government (which includes a “false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay money or transmit money or property to the Government”). The law includes a double backpay remedy.

Under New York law, the remedy for discharge in violation of a contractual restriction is normally backpay minus mitigation [and

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77. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740(1)–(7) (McKinney 2002).

78. Id.

possibly reinstatement); the remedies for violations of the civil rights law are broader and may include front and backpay, compensatory damages and, under federal law, punitive damages, plus attorney fees in appropriate cases. In discharging an employee based on suspicion of wrongdoing, the employer must guard against creating a basis for a defamation claim by nonprivileged disclosure of defamatory statements concerning the matter.

§ 7:10.2 Termination Under California Law of Employees Implicated in or Under Suspicion of a Violation of Law

Under California law, a private employer may discharge an employee on an “at-will” basis, but this rule is subject to additional exceptions not present in New York:

- **Express employment contract.** Either written or oral. See discussion above of New York law;
- **Union contract.** See discussion above of New York law;
- **Discrimination law.** See discussion above of New York law;
- **Whistleblower law.** California law broadly prohibits retaliation against an employee for disclosing information to a government or law enforcement agency (even if the information is inaccurate) where the employee had “reasonable cause” to believe he was disclosing a violation of state or federal law or regulations, unless the disclosure reveals company trade secrets or violates the attorney-client privilege (this California law applies to retaliatory discharges and disciplinary actions short of discharge);^81
- **Federal false claims whistleblower law.** See discussion above of New York law;
- **Wrongful discharge.** California employees are protected from “wrongful discharge” where the employee was discharged for a reason which violates a “firmly established, fundamental and substantial [public policy]” intended to benefit the public at large (for example, discharge for refusing to lie to an investigator; discharge for refusing to destroy evidence, etc.);^82

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82. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 376–80 (Cal. 1988) [defining parameters of public policy and other state-law exceptions to at-will rule]; Phillips v. Gemini Moving Specialists, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 29,
• **Employer rules.** An employer’s handbook, termination guidelines, or other writings, conduct, and practices (in light of the “totality of circumstances”) may provide an implied contract restriction on the employer’s right to terminate where the employee “reasonably relies” on those policies. Normally, an employer can avoid such actions by a clear handbook disclaimer preserving his right to discharge at will; and

• **Employer bad faith.** An employer may violate California’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, typically by failing to follow its own policies or procedures in terminating an employee, or by acting upon a malicious or impermissible motive.

Under California law, the remedy for breach of an employment contract or for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is normally an award of backpay, less mitigation (and possibly reinstate-ment or front pay). Wrongful discharge actions, however, can also lead to punitive damage awards.

Risks of defamation, “false light in the public eye,” and invasion of privacy actions are especially serious under California law.

§ 7:10.3 **Termination Under New York Law of an Employee Formally Accused (i.e., Arrested or Indicted) of a Violation of Law**

In New York, discharge of an arrested employee (or the refusal to hire an applicant with a pending arrest) does not violate state

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85. See Foley, 765 P.2d at 389–90.

discrimination laws, which exempt employment actions based on “pending” arrests.\textsuperscript{87} Generally, an employer is only prohibited from basing decisions solely on an employee’s or applicant’s prior arrest that did \textit{not} result in a conviction. An employer may, however, refuse to hire an applicant on the basis of a prior conviction, provided there is a “direct relationship” between the conviction and the employment sought or where the granting of employment would involve “unreasonable risk” to property or to the safety of other employees or the general public.\textsuperscript{88} For existing employees who are convicted while employed, arguably the “job related” or “unreasonable risk” limitations are satisfied.\textsuperscript{89}

\textbf{§ 7:10.4 Termination Under California Law of an Employee Formally Accused (i.e., Arrested or Indicted) of a Violation of Law}

California state law prohibits basing any condition of employment, including the refusal to hire or discharge, on any “record” of arrest “that did not result in conviction.”\textsuperscript{90} Convictions include pleas, verdicts, or other findings of guilt, regardless of sentence.\textsuperscript{91} There is, therefore, unlike in New York State, no exception for discharging an employee because of a pending arrest, although the employer may legitimately inquire into the fact of the arrest and the underlying circumstances.\textsuperscript{92}

An employer may find, however, a basis for discharge independent of the arrest itself:

- The employer’s own internal investigation may reveal violations of company policies or procedures that form an independent basis for discharge. Indeed, the company’s personnel policies should provide that any action or conduct which would constitute a criminal offense [or give that appearance], committed at work or away from work (if work-related) will be grounds for dismissal and criminal prosecution. Under such a policy, the underlying conduct, rather than the fact of the arrest alone, may lead to discharge.

\textsuperscript{87} See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(16) (McKinney 2007).
\textsuperscript{88} N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(15); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 751–55 (McKinney 2007).
\textsuperscript{90} CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7.
\textsuperscript{91} \textit{Id}.
Attendant adverse publicity may create a reasonable loss of confidence in the continued capability of an employee, or leave him unable to perform his duties adequately.

If the employee is jailed awaiting trial and thus cannot perform his job duties, discharge also may be permissible.

§ 7:10.5 Executive Contract Issues

A pending arrest or indictment, along with the underlying conduct, may constitute “cause” under an executive employment contract. Employment agreements should be negotiated to provide, as with personnel policies generally, that any action or conduct that would constitute a criminal offense (or give that appearance, such as arrest or indictment), committed at work or away from work (if work-related) is cause for discharge.

Thus, adverse publicity and public loss of confidence, or violations of company policies and procedures could constitute bases for “cause.” Ultimate vindication of most or all criminal charges, however, does not necessarily negate the existence of contractual “cause” for discharge. Cause is predicated on business concerns and adherence to internal policies. Proof of criminal conduct requires a higher standard of proof than is necessary to prove contractual “cause.”

§ 7:10.6 Union Contract Issues

Arrest or indictment, along with the underlying conduct, may constitute “just cause” under a union contract, especially where an internal investigation reveals violations of company rules and policies. Labor contract arbitrators, however, are likely to take mitigating factors into account in determining the propriety of discharge (for example, employee’s culpability, seniority, level of authority, severity of offense, its job-relatedness, the employee’s overall work record). In close cases, suspension pending investigation may be a viable alternative to immediate dismissal. (In California, the suspension must be predicated on matters other than the arrest itself (for example, suspected violation of company rules).)

§ 7:10.7 Practical Considerations

Terminating an employee who acted within the scope of his authority could be construed as an admission of wrongdoing by the company, under the doctrine of respondeat superior. This is especially true where the company must contend that it terminated an executive employee under contract for “cause.” Moreover, terminated employees might become witnesses against the company.
There are, however, also significant advantages; in particular, firing an employee found to have violated the law demonstrates the company’s commitment to compliance and ethical standards. For example, if the company seeks to qualify for more lenient treatment under the Guidelines on the basis of its compliance program, it must demonstrate an adequate response to violations of law by its employees. Terminating such employees is one way to satisfy this element.

If the decision is made to terminate an employee, the employer should take immediate steps to prevent the employee from gaining access to any documents or computer files, as well as to bar further access to the company’s premises.

§ 7:10.8 General Principles Governing Termination of an Employee Convicted of a Crime (Misdemeanor or Felony)

In the case of an executive contract, conviction (and attendant publicity) will typically constitute “cause.” Indeed, as mentioned above, the executive’s contract may specifically provide that a conviction, or even an arrest or indictment, whether or not for work-related conduct, may constitute cause for discharge.

The conviction itself need not be the only basis for cause (for example, loss of public confidence, inability to perform, violation of company policies). Vindication on certain criminal charges does not preclude a finding of contractual “cause” for termination.

In the case of a union contract, a conviction stemming from conduct at the workplace will almost certainly constitute “just cause” because it will have also constituted a violation of company rules, unless significant mitigating circumstances are present.

§ 7:11 Section 8B2.1(b)(7)

After criminal conduct has been detected, the organization shall take reasonable steps to respond appropriately to the criminal conduct and to prevent further similar criminal conduct, including making any necessary modifications to the organization’s compliance and ethics program.

This criterion plainly overlaps with the prior one. By redundancy, the Guidelines demonstrate an emphasis on substantial discipline, if not termination, of employees who violate the company’s compliance standards. As well, a company should re-evaluate and, if appropriate, revise a compliance program that fails to deter or detect a serious offense. The company should consider increased auditing and employee training, changes in compliance personnel and procedures,
and replacement of supervisors who, although not involved in or aware of the offense, nonetheless bore responsibility for the business activity where the violation took place.

§ 7:12 Section 8B2.1(c) (Risk Assessment)

In implementing subsection (b), the organization shall periodically assess the risk of criminal conduct and shall take appropriate steps to design, implement, or modify each requirement set forth in subsection (b) to reduce the risk of criminal conduct identified through this process.

The 2004 Amendments to the Guidelines also direct a corporation periodically to assess the effectiveness of how it implements each of these seven requirements and modify them, if necessary, to reduce the risk of any potential criminal conduct. The Commentary following section 8B2.1(c) clarifies that “an organization shall” periodically assess the nature and seriousness of any criminal conduct and the likelihood that criminal conduct may occur because of “the nature of the organization’s business.” If “there is a substantial risk” of illegal conduct, the organization is required to “take reasonable steps to prevent and detect that type of criminal conduct.”

§ 7:13 Waiver of Privilege

The 2004 Amendments to the Guidelines amended section 8C2.5 by providing that a corporation is not required to waive the attorney-client privilege or the protection of the work product doctrine in order to receive a reduction in its culpability score “unless such waiver is necessary in order to provide timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent information known to the organization.” This amendment, however, proved tremendously controversial.

As mentioned in chapter 2, as a result of such criticism, the U.S. Sentencing Commission proposed an amendment, which became

93. See GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 cmt. n.6[A][ii].
95. See Stanton D. Anderson, Senior Counsel to the President and Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Testimony to the U.S. Sentencing Commission 1–2 [Nov. 15, 2005] (“[N]o one should believe a company’s decision to waive the attorney-client privilege in the current environment is voluntary. The practical effect of current policies [in light of the amendment to § 8C2.5] is to force companies to waive the privilege any time that prosecutors request it.”), available at www.ussc.gov/corp/11_15_05/Anderson.pdf; Henry W. Asbill, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Testimony to the U.S. Sentencing Commission 4
effective on November 1, 2006, deleting the above language in Application Note 12 to section 8C2.5. The sentiment against seeking waiver is likewise reflected in legislation pending before Congress to eliminate the issue of waiver as a factor in decisions by prosecutors to charge corporations or evaluate their cooperation. 96

§ 7:14  Proposed Amendments to the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines’ Commentary

The USSC recently proposed amendments to the commentary to section 8B2.1 of the Guidelines addressing how organizations should “respond appropriately after criminal conduct is detected.” 97 Under the proposed amendments, for example, when the victim is “identifiable,” the organization would have to take reasonable steps to provide restitution to the victim and “otherwise remedy the harm resulting from the criminal conduct.” 98 Other “appropriate responses may include self-reporting, cooperation with authorities, and other forms of remediation.” 99 The proposed amendments further require that

96. See supra chapter 2.
98. Id. at 3,535.
99. Id.
organizations assess their compliance and ethics programs and “make modifications necessary to ensure the program is more effective.”

The amendments also address document retention programs. For example, the proposed amendments specifically require that high-level personnel “should be aware of the organization’s document retention policies.” As well, as part of its periodic assessment of the risk of criminal conduct, the organization must ensure that all employees are aware of such policies and conform those policies to meet the goals of an effective compliance program. Under the proposed amendment, in effect, the Commission now demands that an organization’s document retention program be as robust as the rest of the compliance program.

Finally, the Commission announced that it was opening for comment the issue whether it should encourage companies to provide compliance personnel with direct access to the board of directors by offering substantially lower culpability scores to organizations that provide compliance personnel with such access (even if the criminal conduct in question involves high-level personnel).

Overall, the proposed amendments, if adopted, would have a significant impact on corporate governance by requiring that companies implement additional dynamic compliance techniques and procedures if the company wants to be eligible for fine leniency in the event of a conviction.

§ 7:15 Caremark Liability

In the seminal case In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware Court of Chancery recognized that a corporate director’s fiduciary duties include an obligation to “assure that a corporate information and reporting system” exists and is adequate. In that case, Caremark International had paid out $250 million in civil and criminal fines as a result of alleged violations of numerous federal and state healthcare laws. Shareholders then brought a derivative lawsuit to recover this loss from the company’s board of directors. Although recognizing the potential for liability in the course of approving a settlement, the court also stated that plaintiff’s theory of a director duty to implement compliance programs “is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.” Indeed, the court found a “very low probability” that

100. Id.
101. Id.
103. Id. at 960–61.
104. Id. at 967.
directors “breached any duty to appropriately monitor and supervise” their employees.\textsuperscript{105}

Nonetheless, the \textit{Caremark} court stated that directors may be found liable for breach of their fiduciary duties if they are ignorant of potential liability as a result of “a systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight,” whether their ignorance results from the absence of a compliance program or the failure to ensure an existing one is adequate.\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Caremark} rests explicitly, in part, on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: “Any rational person attempting in good faith to meet an organizational governance responsibility would be bound to take into account . . . the enhanced penalties and the opportunities for reduced sanctions” under the Guidelines.\textsuperscript{107} The implication is that a director would be acting in bad faith if he did not implement an appropriate compliance program.\textsuperscript{108}

Nearly a decade later, in \textit{Stone v. Ritter},\textsuperscript{109} the Delaware Supreme Court expressly affirmed \textit{Caremark} and summarized the circumstances giving rise to liability as either: “(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.” One recent decision explained this standard further, stating that: “Courts look to see if there were ‘red flags’ that should have put defendants on notice of the offensive conduct or weakness of the corporation’s internal controls.”\textsuperscript{110}

Directors are not the only individuals susceptible to liability for failure to adequately monitor. In \textit{In re World Health Alternatives, Inc.},\textsuperscript{111} the bankruptcy court held the \textit{Caremark} standard applicable to corporate officers, rather than directors alone, including in-house general counsel. The bankruptcy trustee had sued the corporate directors and officers of World Health for, among other things, breach of their fiduciary duties, including “failing to implement any internal

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{105} Id. at 961.
\item \textsuperscript{106} Id. at 971.
\item \textsuperscript{107} Id. at 970.
\item \textsuperscript{108} Good faith is tied to the duty of loyalty: “A director cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in the good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation’s best interest.” Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003).
\item \textsuperscript{109} Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
\item \textsuperscript{110} \textit{In re Brocade Commc’ns Sys. Derivative Litig.}, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 295, at *58 [N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2009].
\item \textsuperscript{111} \textit{In re World Health Alternatives, Inc.}, 385 B.R. 576, 592–93 [Bankr. D. Del. 2008].
\end{enumerate}
monitoring system.” The general counsel for World Health moved to dismiss the claims against him on the grounds that the Caremark standard was only applicable to directors. In denying the motion, the court noted that the general counsel was obligated under section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to report breaches of fiduciary duty. Furthermore, the court held that, under Caremark, contrary to what a narrow reading of prior Delaware case law may suggest, “it is clear that . . . both officers and directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation.”

Notwithstanding the high standard for proving liability, Caremark and its progeny provide additional incentive for directors and officers alike to ensure the presence of a functional monitoring and compliance program.

112. Id. at 591.
113. Id. at 592–93.