TreatiseTreatise

Mergers, Acquisitions & Tender Offers: Law and Strategies - Corporate, Securities, Taxation, Antitrust, Cross Border

 by Samuel C Thompson
 
 Copyright: 2010-2014
 Last Updated: April 2014

 Product Details >> 

Product Details

  • ISBN Number: 9781402414435
  • Page Count: 6200
  • Number of Volumes: 5
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Watch author, Samuel Thompson, Jr. discuss the components of his new PLI treatise.

Written by one of the nation’s leading authorities on M&A transactions, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tender Offers: Law and Strategies provides comprehensive coverage of the key issues involved in M&A transactions:

  • Contract law—including acquisition agreements, confidentiality agreements, due diligence, and letters of intent
  • Corporate law—focusing on Delaware corporate law and the structuring of mergers and directors’ fiduciary duties
  • Federal Securities law—from the preparation of IPO registration statements, to negotiated acquisitions of publicly held companies, to the treatment of tender offers under the Williams Act amendments
  • Federal income tax, financial accounting, and valuation techniques—including income tax issues when structuring taxable and tax-free acquisitions of domestic targets by domestic acquirers
  • Antitrust and premerger notification—featuring antitrust analysis of M&As under the Clayton Act and premerger notification rules under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
  • Domestic M&As—from leveraged buyouts, to spin-offs, to the acquisition of bankrupt companies
  • Cross-border M&As—the gamut of issues involved in inbound and outbound cross-border M&A deals
  • Special topics—from state taxation of M&A transactions to tax, antitrust, partnership, and LLC aspects of joint ventures

This practical treatise’s well-stocked toolkit includes real-world acquisition agreements, a confidentiality agreement and letter of intent, annotated IPO on Form S-1, private offering memorandum, SEC disclosure documents for recent public company negotiated acquisitions, tender offer documents, required SEC reports, investment banker engagement letters, and recent M&A deal documents.

  Preface
  Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction
  • § 1:1 : Scope of Book1-2
  • § 1:2 : Scope of Chapter1-8
  • § 1:3 : Introduction to Consensual Transactions1-8
    • § 1:3.1 : The Starting Point: Valuation and Due Diligence1-8
    • § 1:3.2 : Structuring the Transaction: Tax and Corporate Law Considerations1-9
      • [A] : In General1-9
      • [B] : Stock Purchase Structure1-10
      • [C] : Asset Purchase Structure1-11
      • [D] : Direct Merger Structure1-11
      • [E] : Reverse Subsidiary Merger Structure1-12
      • [F] : Forward Subsidiary Merger Structure1-13
      • [G] : Compulsory Share Exchange Structure1-14
      • [H] : Short-Form Merger Structure1-15
    • § 1:3.3 : Drafting the Acquisition Agreement1-16
    • § 1:3.4 : Federal Securities Laws Considerations1-17
    • § 1:3.5 : Antitrust, Pre-Merger Notification, and Regulatory Considerations1-17
  • § 1:4 : Introduction to Tender Offers and Related Transactions1-18
  • § 1:5 : Do the Shareholders of the Target and Acquirer Benefit in Mergers and Acquisitions?1-21
    • § 1:5.1 : Introduction1-21
    • § 1:5.2 : Recent Evidence that Acquirer Shareholders Are Benefiting in More Mergers1-24
  • § 1:6 : Strategy for Approaching Mergers1-25
  • § 1:7 : The Current M&A Scene1-26
    • § 1:7.1 : Introduction1-26
    • § 1:7.2 : Strategic, Private Equity, and SPAC Deals1-27
    • § 1:7.3 : Past Trends in U.S. M&A Activity1-28
    • § 1:7.4 : Introduction to Recent Data on the M&A Marketplace1-30
    • § 1:7.5 : Recent Trends in U.S. M&A Activity1-31
    • § 1:7.6 : Recent Trends in U.S. and Worldwide M&A Activity1-35
    • § 1:7.7 : Recent U.S. M&A Volume Related to Aggregate GDP1-35
    • § 1:7.8 : Recent U.S. M&A Volume As a Percentage of Aggregate GDP1-36
    • § 1:7.9 : Recent U.S. M&A Volume Related to Investment Component of GDP1-37
    • § 1:7.10 : Recent U.S. M&A Volume Related to the S&P 5001-39
    • § 1:7.11 : Recent U.S. M&A Activity by Type of Transaction1-40
    • § 1:7.12 : Recent P:E Ratios and Premiums Paid in U.S. Public Deals1-41
    • § 1:7.13 : Recent U.S. Payment Trends: Cash, Stock, Mixed, and Other1-43
    • § 1:7.14 : Recent Data on Acquisitions of Publicly Traded Companies1-44
    • § 1:7.15 : Recent Data on Acquisitions of Privately Owned Companies1-46
    • § 1:7.16 : Recent Private Equity Capital Raising and Equity Contributions1-46
    • § 1:7.17 : Recent Data on U.S. Deal Size1-50
    • § 1:7.18 : Recent Data on U.S. Regional Buyer Activity1-51
    • § 1:7.19 : Recent Data on U.S. Regional Seller Activity1-52
    • § 1:7.20 : Recent Data on the Percentage of S&P 500 Companies with a Shareholder Rights Plan, Poison Pill1-53
    • § 1:7.21 : Recent Data on the Percentage of S&P 500 Companies with Various Types of Defensive Measures1-55
    • § 1:7.22 : Recent Data on U.S. Tender Offers, Contested and Uncontested1-57
    • § 1:7.23 : Recent Data on the Rise of Two-Step Transactions and the Top-Up Option1-58
    • § 1:7.24 : Recent Data on U.S. Termination Fees1-60
    • § 1:7.25 : Recent Data on Matching Rights in Negotiated Deals1-62
    • § 1:7.26 : Recent Data on Go-Shops in Negotiated Deals1-63
    • § 1:7.27 : Recent Information on Bankruptcies1-64
    • § 1:7.28 : Recent ABA Deal Point Studies1-64
    • § 1:7.29 : Recent Information on the Top Ten M&A Investment Banks and Law Firms Ranked by U.S. Deal Size1-64
    • § 1:7.30 : Proxy Contest for the Five Year Period, 2009 to 20131-66
    • § 1:7.31 : Recent Data on Cross-Border M&A Activity1-67
    • § 1:7.32 : Recent Data on the Top Ten Foreign Buyer Countries1-70
    • § 1:7.33 : Recent Data on the Top Ten Foreign Seller Countries1-70
    • § 1:7.34 : The Trapped Foreign Income Problem and M&A1-71
    • § 1:7.35 : The Inversion Problem, Pfizer and Beyond1-72
    • § 1:7.36 : Preliminary Report on M&A Activity in 20141-73
  • § 1:8 : Introduction to Corporate Governance Issues Generally1-73
    • § 1:8.1 : Background1-73
    • § 1:8.2 : Overview of Corporate Governance at the State Level1-75
    • § 1:8.3 : Overview of Corporate Governance at the Federal Level1-75
    • § 1:8.4 : Overview of Corporate Governance Provisions in SOX1-76
    • § 1:8.5 : Overview of Corporate Governance Provisions in Dodd-Frank1-77
  • § 1:9 : Guide to References1-78
Chapter 2: General Principles in Drafting an Acquisition Agreement—Merger Agreement, Asset Acquisition Agreement, and Stock Purchase Agreement
  • § 2:1 : Scope2-12
    • § 2:1.1 : References2-18
  • § 2:2 : Basic Principles of Contract Interpretation2-18
    • § 2:2.1 : In General2-18
    • § 2:2.2 : First Principle of Contract Interpretation: Clear Meaning2-19
    • § 2:2.3 : Second Principle of Contract Interpretation: Parol Evidence2-19
    • § 2:2.4 : Third Principle of Contract Interpretation: Forthright Negotiator2-19
    • § 2:2.5 : Summary of the Three Principles2-20
    • § 2:2.6 : Fourth Principle of Contract Interpretation: Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing2-21
    • § 2:2.7 : Related Concept of Tortious Interference2-26
      • [A] : Introduction2-26
      • [B] : Illustrations—NACCO and Guidant2-26
      • [C] : Tortious Interference with Prospective Advantage, Plus Punitive Damages—Ventas2-29
    • § 2:2.8 : Potential Fraud Claim—NACCO, Airborne, and Narrowstep2-36
    • § 2:2.9 : Reforming Contracts–Cambridge North2-41
    • § 2:2.10 : Consciously Leaving Gaps in a Contract2-43
    • § 2:2.11 : Amendment to the Delaware Code Extending the Time for Contract Claims2-44
  • § 2:3 : Introduction to Stock Purchase Agreements, Asset Acquisition Agreements, and Merger Agreements2-44
  • § 2:4 : Advantages and Disadvantages of Stock Purchase Agreements, Asset Acquisition Agreements, and Merger Agreements2-45
    • § 2:4.1 : Introduction2-45
    • § 2:4.2 : Stock Purchase Agreements2-45
    • § 2:4.3 : Asset Acquisition Agreements2-47
    • § 2:4.4 : Merger Agreements2-47
    • § 2:4.5 : Advantages of Ensuring That a Target Continues As a Subsidiary of the Acquirer2-48
  • § 2:5 : Outline of Common Provisions of Acquisition Agreements2-49
  • § 2:6 : The Parties to the Transaction2-50
  • § 2:7 : The Whereas Clauses2-51
  • § 2:8 : Defined Terms2-52
  • § 2:9 : Description of the Basic Purchase and Sale or Merger Transaction2-52
    • § 2:9.1 : Introduction2-52
    • § 2:9.2 : Purchase Price Considerations, Including the Exchange Ratio2-53
      • [A] : Introduction2-53
      • [B] : Structuring the Cash Payment or Exchange Ratio in Public Company Mergers: Caps, Floors, and Collars2-54
        • [B][1] : Cash Consideration2-54
        • [B][2] : Fixed Exchange Ratio2-54
        • [B][3] : Fixed Value Exchange Ratio2-55
        • [B][4] : Floating Value Exchange Ratio with a Collar2-56
        • [B][5] : Fixed Value Exchange Ratio with a Collar2-57
      • [C] : Inclusion of a “Ticking Fee” Payable If the Closing Is Delayed—Dow–Rohm and Haas2-58
      • [D] : Structuring the Purchase Price in a Stock Acquisition of a Closely Held Target2-59
      • [E] : Structuring the Purchase Price, Assets to Be Acquired, and Liabilities to Be Assumed in an Asset Acquisition of a Closely Held Target2-60
      • [F] : Post-Closing Purchase Price Adjustments, Escrows, and Earn-Outs2-63
        • [F][1] : In General and the ABA, 2009 Private Target Deal Point Study2-63
        • [F][2] : Working Capital and Net Worth Adjustments2-65
          • [F][2][a] : Working Capital Adjustments2-65
          • [F][2][b] : Net Worth Adjustments2-67
        • [F][3] : Earn-Outs2-68
          • [F][3][a] : In General2-68
          • [F][3][b] : Earn-Outs and the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing—Viacom2-70
        • [F][4] : Contingent Value Rights or CVRs2-71
          • [F][5] : Binding the Target’s Shareholders to the Post-Closing Adjustment Process—Aveta2-73
      • [G] : Addressing the Potential for Successor Liability for the Acquirer in an Asset Acquisition2-73
        • [G][1] : In General2-73
        • [G][2] : Successor Liability Under Bulk Sales Laws in Asset Acquisitions2-74
        • [G][3] : Successor Liability Under State Tax Laws in Asset Acquisitions2-76
        • [G][4] : Successor Liability for the Target’s Defective Products in Asset Acquisitions2-76
          • [G][4][a] : Introduction2-76
          • [G][4][b] : The Pennsylvania Approach2-77
          • [G][4][c] : The California Approach2-79
          • [G][4][d] : The New Jersey Approach2-80
          • [G][4][e] : The Florida Approach2-80
        • [G][5] : Successor Liability for the Target’s Environmental Torts in Asset Acquisitions2-81
        • [G][6] : Successor Liability for the Target’s General Torts in Asset Acquisitions2-84
        • [G][7] : Dealing with Potential Successor Liability in the Asset Acquisition Agreement2-86
        • [G][8] : Successor Liability Under the Labor Laws2-87
        • [G][9] : Determining the Applicable Law2-87
      • [H] : Duty to Warn2-89
      • [I] : Dealing with the Treatment of a Target’s Outstanding Stock Options2-90
      • [J] : Special Issues in the Acquisition of a Division or Subsidiary2-92
        • [J][1] : Introduction2-92
        • [J][2] : Dealing with Financials of the Acquired Business2-92
        • [J][3] : Dealing with Assets and Liabilities and “Right-Sizing” the Acquired Business2-92
        • [J][4] : Properly Structuring the Seller’s Representations, Warranties, and Covenants2-93
        • [J][5] : Post-Acquisition Support Agreement2-93
        • [J][6] : Potential for Breach of Fiduciary Duty with Respect to a Support Agreement2-94
    • § 2:9.3 : Exclusion from Transferred Assets Attorney-Client Communications—Great Hill2-96
  • § 2:10 : The Representations and Warranties: The Snapshot2-96
    • § 2:10.1 : In General2-96
    • § 2:10.2 : Disclosure Schedules2-99
      • [A] : In General2-99
      • [B] : Disclosure Under One Representation Recognized Under Another Representation2-100
      • [C] : Post-Signing Amendments to the Disclosure Schedule2-102
    • § 2:10.3 : Materiality Qualification2-102
    • § 2:10.4 : Material Adverse Effect Qualifier and Relationship to Material Adverse Change2-103
    • § 2:10.5 : Knowledge Qualification2-105
      • [A] : In General2-105
      • [B] : Whose Knowledge?2-106
      • [C] : What Is Knowledge?2-106
      • [D] : Particular Importance in Private Deals2-107
      • [E] : Dueling Qualified and Non-Qualified Representations—DCV2-107
    • § 2:10.6 : Common Target Representations and Warranties2-110
      • [A] : Introduction2-110
      • [B] : Organization, Standing, and Power2-110
      • [C] : Capital Structure2-111
      • [D] : Authority to Enter the Agreement, No Conflict, and Required Consents2-112
        • [D][1] : In General2-112
        • [D][2] : Dealing with Change of Control Provisions in Contracts2-114
      • [E] : Financial Statements, SEC Documents, and SOX Issues2-115
        • [E][1] : In General: GAAP and Fairly Presents2-115
        • [E][2] : Impact of FIN 48 on GAAP Representation and Warranty2-116
        • [E][3] : Specific Representation Regarding Compliance with Internal Control and Disclosure Control Requirements of SOX2-117
        • [E][4] : The ABA Deal Point Studies2-118
      • [F] : No Undisclosed Liabilities2-118
        • [F][1] : In General2-118
        • [F][2] : The ABA Deal Point Studies2-119
      • [G] : Absence of Certain Changes: No MAC or MAE Since Last Financials2-120
      • [H] : Compliance with Applicable Laws and Reporting Requirements2-122
        • [H][1] : In General2-122
        • [H][2] : The ABA Deal Point Studies2-124
      • [I] : Litigation2-124
      • [J] : Taxes2-129
        • [J][1] : In General2-129
        • [J][2] : Dealing with the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act (FIRPTA) in Stock Purchase Agreements2-133
      • [K] : Material Agreements to Which the Target Is a Party2-135
      • [L] : Benefit Plans2-136
      • [M] : Labor and Employment Matters2-138
      • [N] : Subsidiaries2-139
      • [O] : Environmental2-140
      • [P] : Properties and Sufficiency of Assets2-141
      • [Q] : Intellectual Property2-142
      • [R] : Insurance2-143
      • [S] : Brokers or Finders2-144
      • [T] : Approval of the Agreement by the Target’s Board and No Takeover Statutes2-144
      • [U] : Shareholder Vote Required to Approve the Transaction2-145
      • [V] : Opinion of Financial Adviser2-146
      • [W] : Inapplicability of the Target’s Poison Pill2-146
      • [X] : No Restrictions on Business Activities2-146
      • [Y] : Certain Business Practices, Including Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 19772-147
      • [Z] : Addressing Receivables and Payables2-149
      • [AA] : List of Customers and Suppliers2-149
      • [AB] : No Power of Attorney2-150
      • [AC] : Complete Copies of Materials2-150
      • [AD] : The 10b-5—No Nondisclosure or Misrepresentation—Representation2-150
        • [AD][1] : In General2-150
        • [AD][2] : The ABA Deal Point Studies2-151
      • [AE] : No Other Representations or Warranties—The Anti-Reliance Clause2-152
        • [AE][1] : Introduction2-152
        • [AE][2] : Delaware Law Approach to “Anti-Reliance” Clauses—ABRY, RAA, and TransDigm2-154
        • [AE][3] : Rule 10b-5 Approach to “Non-Reliance” Clauses2-161
        • [AE][4] : The ABA Deal Point Studies2-162
      • [AF] : Representations Commonly Found in Stock Purchase Agreements2-163
        • [AF][1] : Introduction2-163
        • [AF][2] : Bank Accounts2-163
        • [AF][3] : Affiliated Transactions2-163
        • [AF][4] : Books and Records2-163
      • [AG] : Representations Commonly Found in Asset Acquisition Agreements2-164
        • [AG][1] : Introduction2-164
        • [AG][2] : Product Liability2-164
        • [AG][3] : Product Returns and Warranties2-164
        • [AG][4] : No Defaults in Agreements of the Target to Be Transferred to Acquirer; Novations2-165
      • [AH] : Additional Representations of Selling Shareholders in Stock Acquisition Agreements2-166
      • [AI] : Securities Law Representations from Selling Shareholders Where the Consideration Is Unregistered Securities of the Acquirer2-167
        • [AI][1] : Introduction2-167
        • [AI][2] : Selling Shareholder’s Representations Relating to Private Offering2-167
    • § 2:10.7 : Common Acquirer Representations and Warranties2-169
      • [A] : Introduction2-169
      • [B] : Common Representations Found in Both the Toys and Taleo–JobFlash Cash Consideration Agreements2-170
      • [C] : The Financing Representation2-170
      • [D] : The Solvency Representation2-171
      • [E] : Representation That Stock Is Purchased for Investment2-172
      • [F] : Delaware Section 203 Representation2-173
      • [G] : Acquirer’s Due Diligence Representation—Hudson’s Bay2-173
  • § 2:11 : Covenants: The Undertakings2-175
    • § 2:11.1 : Introduction2-175
    • § 2:11.2 : The “Efforts” Clause2-177
    • § 2:11.3 : Common Covenants by Targets and Selling Shareholders in the “Covenants Relating to the Conduct of the Business” Article2-180
      • [A] : Introduction2-180
      • [B] : Ordinary Course2-180
      • [C] : No Extraordinary Dividends and Other Adjustments2-181
      • [D] : No Issuances of New Securities2-182
      • [E] : No Amendments to Governing Documents2-182
      • [F] : No Major Acquisitions or Dispositions2-182
      • [G] : Indebtedness2-183
      • [H] : Other Actions Not to Cause Representations to Become Untrue2-184
      • [I] : Accounting Methods and Tax Matters2-184
      • [J] : Tax-Free Qualification of the Transaction2-185
      • [K] : Compensation and Benefit Plans2-185
      • [L] : No Liquidation2-186
      • [M] : Litigation2-186
      • [N] : No Restrictions on Business2-186
      • [O] : Other Agreements2-187
      • [P] : Requirement That Target Adopt a Poison Pill–Compellent2-187
    • § 2:11.4 : Common Covenants in the “Additional Agreements” Article2-188
      • [A] : Introduction2-188
      • [B] : Additional Covenants Generally Found in All Acquisition Agreements2-188
        • [B][1] : Access to Information2-188
        • [B][2] : Further Action and Reasonable Best Efforts, Specifically with Regard to Antitrust Approval2-190
          • [B][2][a] : Introduction2-190
          • [B][2][b] : The Case Law on Efforts—Huntsman, Narrowstep, and Wave2-193
        • [B][3] : Confidentiality2-196
      • [C] : Additional Covenants Relating to the Acquisition of a Publicly Held Target2-197
        • [C][1] : Covenant Relating to Preparation of the Form S-4 Registration Statement and Proxy Statements for the Acquisition by a Public Acquirer of a Public Target for Stock2-197
        • [C][2] : Covenant Relating to Preparation of the Proxy Statements for the Acquisition of a Public Target for Cash2-200
        • [C][3] : Covenant Relating to the Holding by a Public Target of a Shareholders’ Meeting2-202
        • [C][4] : “No Solicitation”: Acquisition Proposals and Break-Up Fees in Public Deals2-202
          • [C][4][a] : In General2-202
          • [C][4][b] : Breach of Acquisition Proposal—NACCO and Guidant2-203
        • [C][5] : “No Impairment” Covenant2-208
        • [C][6] : Governance Covenant in “Mergers of Equals”2-208
        • [C][7] : Target’s Covenant to Adopt a Poison Pill—Compellent2-208
        • [C][8] : Other Covenants Relating to the Acquisition of a Public Target2-209
      • [D] : “No Solicitation” Covenant in Stock Purchase Agreements and Asset Acquisition Agreements2-209
        • [D][1] : Introduction2-209
        • [D][2] : The Case Law on Private Company “No Solicitation” Covenants–Wave2-211
      • [E] : Resignation of Target’s Directors2-212
      • [F] : Covenant Relating to Notification of Changes and Amendments to Disclosure Schedule2-213
      • [G] : Covenants Relating to the Post-Closing Period2-214
        • [G][1] : Introduction2-214
        • [G][2] : Indemnification, Directors’ and Officers’ Insurance Post-Closing2-214
          • [G][2][a] : In General2-214
          • [G][2][b] : ABA Deal Point Studies Relating to D&O Insurance2-216
          • [G][2][c] : 2009 Amendment to DGCL Regarding Amendments to an Indemnification Provision2-216
        • [G][3] : Non-Competition Post-Closing Covenant2-217
          • [G][3][a] : California Approach to Covenants Not to Compete—Fillpoint2-219
        • [G][4] : Benefit and Labor Law Post-Closing Covenants2-220
          • [G][4][a] : In General2-220
          • [G][4][b] : The WARN Act Covenant2-221
      • [H] : Registration Rights Post-Closing Covenant2-222
      • [I] : Post-Closing Further Action2-222
      • [J] : Merger of Equals and Other Social Covenants2-223
  • § 2:12 : Conditions to Closing and the Closing2-225
    • § 2:12.1 : Introduction2-225
      • [A] : General Principles2-225
      • [B] : Acquirer Faced with What It Thinks Are Failed Conditions2-226
        • [B][1] : Actual Failed Condition and Acquirer Walks2-226
        • [B][2] : Actual Failed Condition but Acquirer Closes and Sues2-227
        • [B][3] : Acquirer Walks but Condition Found to Be Satisfied2-227
      • [C] : Target Faced with What It Thinks Are Failed Conditions2-228
        • [C][1] : Actual Failed Condition and Target Walks2-228
        • [C][2] : Target Walks but Condition Found to Be Satisfied2-228
      • [D] : Who Has the Burden of Proof That a Condition Failed?2-228
      • [E] : The Concept of “Anticipatory Repudiation”2-229
    • § 2:12.2 : Standard Conditions to Closing2-231
    • § 2:12.3 : The Accuracy of Representations and Warranties (Other than MAC or MAE) Condition2-232
      • [A] : Introduction2-232
      • [B] : The Bring-Down2-233
      • [C] : Reason for a Materiality Qualification2-235
      • [D] : The Avoidance of Double Materiality2-235
      • [E] : The “Back Door No” MAE or MAC2-236
      • [F] : Illustrations2-236
        • [F][1] : Damages Imposed on an Acquirer Who Walked on the Basis of Purported False Environmental Representation—Bay Industries2-236
        • [F][2] : Acquirer Who Walked on the Basis of Purported False Financial Representation Subject to Specific Performance—IBP2-238
    • § 2:12.4 : The “No Material Adverse Change (MAC) or Effect (MAE)” Condition2-238
      • [A] : Introduction2-238
      • [B] : ABA Deal Point Studies Relating to MACs and MAEs2-240
      • [C] : Survey of Cases Illustrating the Impact of the MAC/MAE Condition2-241
        • [C][1] : Finding That There Was a MAC Giving the Acquirer the Right to Walk—Katz2-241
        • [C][2] : Finding That There Was an MAE Giving a Target the Right to Walk—Allegheny2-242
        • [C][3] : Specific Performance Ordered Against an Acquirer Who Walked Because of an MAE Condition—IBP2-244
        • [C][4] : Alleged Breach of MAE Clause Relating to Environmental Liabilities—Frontier2-247
        • [C][5] : Finding of a Material Adverse Change, but the Change Was Covered by a Carve-Out—Genesco2-248
          • [C][5][a] : In General2-248
          • [C][5][b] : The Impact of the Carve-Out2-249
          • [C][5][c] : Did an MAE Occur?2-249
        • [C][6] : Finding of No Material Adverse Effect and Willful and Intentional Breach by Acquirer—Huntsman2-252
          • [C][6][a] : General Background2-252
          • [C][6][b] : The MAE Issue2-255
          • [C][6][c] : The “Knowing and Intentional” Issue2-258
          • [C][6][d] : The Solvency Issue and the Remedy2-261
          • [C][6][e] : Summary2-262
        • [C][7] : Two Polar Opposite Approaches to the Definition of “MAE” in 2008 Credit Crisis Deals, Mitsubishi–Morgan Stanley and Wells Fargo–Wachovia2-262
          • [C][7][a] : In General2-262
          • [C][7][b] : The Mitsubishi–Morgan Stanley Deal2-263
          • [C][7][c] : The Wells Fargo–Wachovia Deal2-263
        • [C][8] : The Carve-Out to the Carve-Out in Exxon–XTO2-264
      • [D] : The Market MAC2-266
      • [E] : The MAC and MAE Clauses in Osram2-267
    • § 2:12.5 : The Performance of Covenants Condition2-269
    • § 2:12.6 : The Confirming Certificate Condition2-270
    • § 2:12.7 : The Financing or Absence of Financing Conditions—Dow Contrasted with Pfizer2-270
      • [A] : Introduction2-270
      • [B] : Credit Rating System by Moody’s and S&P2-271
      • [C] : The Dow–Rohm and Haas “Ironclad” Agreement2-273
      • [D] : The Financing Condition in the Pfizer–Wyeth Deal2-282
    • § 2:12.8 : The Legal Opinion Condition2-286
      • [A] : Introduction2-286
      • [B] : Items Covered in Legal Opinions2-287
    • § 2:12.9 : Employment Contracts and Non-Competition Conditions2-289
    • § 2:12.10 : Other Conditions2-289
      • [A] : Due Diligence2-289
      • [B] : Bring-Down of Fairness Opinion2-290
      • [C] : Limit on Dissenting Shares2-290
    • § 2:12.11 : The Mechanics of Closing2-291
  • § 2:13 : Termination2-292
    • § 2:13.1 : In General2-292
    • § 2:13.2 : Illustration of Termination Provision with Break-Up Fee2-293
    • § 2:13.3 : Reverse Break-Up Fees2-295
      • [A] : Introduction2-295
      • [B] : How an Acquirer Should Not Draft “Reverse Break-Up” Fee Provisions—United Rentals and the Forthright Negotiator2-296
      • [C] : How to Draft an Ironclad “Reverse Break-Up” Fee Providing Optionality—The Mars–Wrigley Merger2-302
      • [D] : Will a Reverse Break-Up Fee Be the Only Remedy in the Face of a “Willful” or “Fraudulent” Breach?2-309
      • [E] : Target Is Unsuccessful in Requiring Acquirer to Pay a Reverse Termination Fee—ADS2-311
      • [F] : DynCorp’s Double Trigger Reverse Termination and Termination Fees2-315
      • [G] : ABA Deal Point Study Relating to Reverse Break-Up Fees2-318
      • [H] : The AT&T Reverse Termination Fee Paid as a Result of the Failed Acquisition of T-Mobile2-318
      • [I] : Reverse and Direct Breakup Fees in the ICE–NYSE Merger Agreement2-319
    • § 2:13.4 : Seeking Damages Above the Break-Up and Reverse Break-Up Fees—Willful, Knowing, Intentional Breaches—Guidant and Huntsman2-319
  • § 2:14 : Survival of Representations and Warranties2-321
    • § 2:14.1 : Introduction2-321
    • § 2:14.2 : What Is the Meaning of the Term “Survive”?2-323
      • [A] : General Principles and the California Approach2-323
      • [B] : How Should “Survival” Clauses Be Drafted?2-326
    • § 2:14.3 : What Impact Does a Survival Clause Have on a Fraud, Willful Misrepresentation, or Rule 10b-5 Claim?2-327
    • § 2:14.4 : Is “Reliance” an Element of a Post-Closing Claim That a Party Breached a Representation—The Sandbagging Issue2-328
    • § 2:14.5 : Illustration of Reliance Element in a Rule 10b-5 Action—Vivendi2-333
  • § 2:15 : Indemnification2-333
    • § 2:15.1 : Introduction2-333
    • § 2:15.2 : Period During Which an Indemnification Claim May Be Filed2-334
    • § 2:15.3 : The Basic Indemnification Requirement2-335
      • [A] : In General2-335
      • [B] : Materiality “Rub Off” or “Scrape”2-340
        • [B][1] : In General2-340
        • [B][2] : Illustration of the Materiality Scrape—Osram2-341
      • [C] : Meaning of the Term “Indemnification”—Ceradyne2-342
    • § 2:15.4 : Baskets, Thresholds and Ceilings2-344
      • [A] : In General2-344
      • [B] : Is a Severance Fee Covered by the General Capped Indemnification Provision or the Un-Capped Tax Indemnification Provision?—Innophos2-345
    • § 2:15.5 : Escrow Accounts, Holdbacks and Deferred Payment Notes2-347
      • [A] : In General2-347
      • [B] : Relationship Between Indemnification Provision and Working Capital Purchase Price Adjustment—Brim2-347
    • § 2:15.6 : Limitations on Liability2-348
      • [A] : In General2-348
      • [B] : Is an Exclusive Indemnification Provision with a Ceiling the Only Remedy in the Event of Fraud?—ABRY2-349
      • [C] : The Parallel, Breach of Contract, Indemnification and Fraud Claims in Osram2-352
    • § 2:15.7 : Procedural Aspects of Indemnification2-355
    • § 2:15.8 : ABA Deal Point Studies2-355
    • § 2:15.9 : Illustration of Interface Among Representations, Covenants, Conditions and Indemnification—Ameristar2-356
    • § 2:15.10 : Duty to Mitigate2-364
  • § 2:16 : General Provisions2-365
    • § 2:16.1 : In General2-365
    • § 2:16.2 : Third-Party Beneficiaries2-365
      • [A] : In General2-365
      • [B] : Specifically Providing That the Target’s Shareholders Are Entitled to the “Economic Benefit” of the Deal—InBev2-367
      • [C] : Rights of Retirees of Target to Enforce a Provision of the Merger Agreement Relating to a Retiree Medical Plan—Halliburton2-368
    • § 2:16.3 : Enforcement and Specific Performance2-369
      • [A] : “Irreparable Harm” Clauses and TROs2-372
    • § 2:16.4 : Possible Remedies2-373
    • § 2:16.5 : Arbitration2-374
    • § 2:16.6 : Possible Efficient Breach2-376
    • § 2:16.7 : Other General Provisions: Choice of Law; Jurisdiction; Waiver of Jury Trial; Enforcement Remedies; Entire Agreement; and Assignment2-377
      • [A] : Introduction2-377
      • [B] : Choice of Law2-377
      • [C] : Jurisdiction; Choice of Forum2-378
      • [D] : Waiver of Jury Trial2-379
      • [E] : Enforcement Remedies, Including Specific Performance2-380
      • [F] : The Merger or Integration Clause2-380
      • [G] : Anti-Assignment Provision2-381
  • § 2:17 : The Two-Step Tender Offer Followed by Merger Agreement2-381
    • § 2:17.1 : Introduction2-381
    • § 2:17.2 : Provisions of the Agreement Governing the Tender Offer2-382
    • § 2:17.3 : The “Top-Up Option”2-383
      • [A] : In General2-383
      • [B] : Potential Challenges to Top-Up Options—ev32-384
      • [C] : Impact of New Section 251(h) on Top-Ups2-386
    • § 2:17.4 : The Second-Step Merger2-387
    • § 2:17.5 : Illustration of a Transaction with a Top-Up Option—Metromedia2-388
    • § 2:17.6 : Alternative Two-Step, One-Step Burger King Merger Agreement2-389
    • § 2:17.7 : ABA Deal Point Studies2-390
  • § 2:18 : Merger Agreement Between a Corporation and a Limited Liability Company2-391
  • § 2:19 : Checklist of Provisions That Might Be Included in an Acquisition Agreement2-391
Chapter 3: Confidentiality Agreements, Due Diligence, Letters of Intent and Exclusivity Agreements
  • § 3:1 : Scope3-3
    • § 3:1.1 : References3-4
  • § 3:2 : Confidentiality Agreements3-4
    • § 3:2.1 : Introduction3-4
      • [A] : In General3-4
      • [B] : Keeping Your Eye on the Ball3-5
    • § 3:2.2 : Opening Paragraph3-5
    • § 3:2.3 : Defined Terms3-6
      • [A] : In General3-6
      • [B] : Addressing Antitrust and Attorney-Client Privilege Issues3-7
    • § 3:2.4 : Agreement to Keep “Information” Confidential3-8
    • § 3:2.5 : Nondisclosure of Negotiations3-8
    • § 3:2.6 : If No Agreement Is Reached, Destroy or Return Information3-9
    • § 3:2.7 : Information That Becomes Public or Independently Developed Information3-9
    • § 3:2.8 : No Representations—Anti-Reliance Clause3-9
      • [A] : In General3-9
      • [B] : Applicability of Abry to a Non-Reliance Provision of a Confidentiality Agreement—RAA3-10
    • § 3:2.9 : Legal Compulsion to Disclose3-10
    • § 3:2.10 : No Binding Contract; No Offer to Sell Securities3-10
    • § 3:2.11 : Information Remains Property of Provider3-10
    • § 3:2.12 : Termination of Acquirer’s Obligation: Sunset3-10
    • § 3:2.13 : To Whom Request for Information Should Be Directed3-11
    • § 3:2.14 : Access to Employees and No Recruitment of Employees3-11
    • § 3:2.15 : No Waiver, Successors, Equitable Relief, Choice of Law3-11
    • § 3:2.16 : Standstill Provision3-11
      • [A] : In General3-11
      • [B] : Standstills and Fiduciary Duties—Topps3-14
      • [C] : A Standstill Is Not a “No Shop”—Crane3-16
      • [D] : Even Without a Standstill, an Acquirer with Confidential Information May Not Be Able to Make a Tender Offer3-18
      • [E] : Delaware Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the “Stealth” Standstill in Vulcan3-19
      • [F] : Introduction to Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive (DADW)—Gellomics, Ancestry, and NetSpend3-23
    • § 3:2.17 : Relationship Between the Confidentiality Agreement and the Acquisition Agreement3-23
    • § 3:2.18 : Impact of Regulation FD3-25
    • § 3:2.19 : Most Favored Nation Clause3-25
    • § 3:2.20 : Non-Completion Fee3-25
    • § 3:2.21 : No Teaming Provision—Del Monte3-25
  • § 3:3 : Due Diligence Investigation in Connection with Acquisitions3-26
    • § 3:3.1 : Introduction3-26
    • § 3:3.2 : Planning for the Due Diligence Process3-28
      • [A] : Identifying Substantive Issues3-28
      • [B] : Addressing Change of Control Provisions in Indentures and Other Contracts3-29
        • [B][1] : In General3-29
        • [B][2] : Delaware Chancery Court Addresses Amylin’s Poison Put3-30
        • [B][3] : Dealing in Mergers with Anti-Assignment Clauses in Contracts3-33
        • [B][4] : Delaware Supreme Court’s Interpretation of a Successor Obligation Provision of an Indenture—Liberty Media3-34
      • [C] : Procedural Issues: The Due Diligence Report; Due Diligence Request List3-35
      • [D] : Addressing Risks Identified in the Due Diligence Process3-35
    • § 3:3.3 : Addressing the Fundamental Economics of the Deal3-36
    • § 3:3.4 : Addressing Items Related to Legal Mechanics and Risks in the Deal3-36
      • [A] : Introduction3-36
      • [B] : Purpose of Corporate Review by Acquirer’s Counsel3-37
      • [C] : Procedures for Corporate Review3-38
      • [D] : Corporate Review Memorandum3-40
    • § 3:3.5 : Illustration of Target’s Due Diligence on Acquirer—Vivendi3-41
  • § 3:4 : Letters of Intent3-42
    • § 3:4.1 : Introduction3-42
    • § 3:4.2 : When Does a Letter of Intent Become a Binding Contract?3-43
      • [A] : General Principles Governing Preliminary Contracts3-43
      • [B] : Illustrative Case Law—American Cyanamid, Texaco, Skycom, and Global Asset3-45
        • [B][1] : Introduction3-45
        • [B][2] : American Cyanamid3-45
        • [B][3] : Texaco3-48
        • [B][4] : Skycom3-49
        • [B][5] : Global Asset3-51
      • [C] : Binding and Non-Binding Provisions3-54
      • [D] : The Duty to Negotiate in Good Faith3-54
    • § 3:4.3 : The Deal3-54
    • § 3:4.4 : Exclusive Dealing3-55
    • § 3:4.5 : Break-Up Fees3-55
    • § 3:4.6 : Access to Information3-55
    • § 3:4.7 : Confidentiality3-55
    • § 3:4.8 : Standstill Provisions3-56
  • § 3:5 : Exclusivity Agreements3-56
Chapter 4: Structuring Mergers, Asset Acquisitions, and Compulsory Share Exchanges
  • § 4:1 : Scope4-4
    • § 4:1.1 : References4-6
  • § 4:2 : Voting and Dissenting Rights in Stock Acquisitions4-6
  • § 4:3 : Stock Exchange Voting Requirements4-6
    • § 4:3.1 : Approval by Acquirer’s Shareholders4-6
    • § 4:3.2 : Approval by Target’s Shareholders on the Issuance of Target’s Stock to Acquirer As a Deal Protection Measure4-7
  • § 4:4 : Mergers Between Corporations and Other Entities Such As Limited Liability Companies4-8
  • § 4:5 : Delaware Long-Form Merger Provisions: Acquisition of a Non-90% Controlled Target by Merger4-9
    • § 4:5.1 : Introduction4-9
    • § 4:5.2 : Direct Merger of Domestic Delaware Corporations4-9
      • [A] : In General4-9
      • [B] : Alternative Transaction Structures4-10
    • § 4:5.3 : Legal Effect in Delaware of a Merger on the Merging Corporations with Illustration4-10
      • [A] : Introduction4-10
      • [B] : Dealing in Mergers with Anti-Assignment Clauses for Patents, Copyrights, and Other Intellectual Property—PPG, SQL, Meso Scale, and Cincom4-12
      • [C] : Attorney-Client Privilege Passes Over in a Merger—Great Hill4-16
    • § 4:5.4 : Required Provisions of a Merger Agreement and Board Approval with Illustrations4-18
    • § 4:5.5 : Terms Dependent Upon Facts Outside the Merger Agreement4-23
    • § 4:5.6 : Required Shareholder Approval4-24
      • [A] : General Shareholder Voting Rule4-24
      • [B] : No Shareholder Vote for Acquirer’s Shareholders in Certain Mergers4-26
      • [C] : Generally No Class Vote4-27
      • [D] : No Shareholder Vote on Formation of Certain Holding Companies4-28
      • [E] : Setting of Record Date for Notice of Meeting and Record Date for Vote4-28
    • § 4:5.7 : “Force the Vote” Provisions4-29
    • § 4:5.8 : The Filing Requirement with Illustration4-30
    • § 4:5.9 : Provisions Relating to Amendments to and Termination of the Merger Agreement with Illustration4-32
    • § 4:5.10 : Triangular (or Subsidiary) Mergers in Delaware4-33
      • [A] : Introduction4-33
      • [B] : Illustration of a Reverse Subsidiary Merger with Stock As the Consideration4-34
      • [C] : Illustration of a Reverse Subsidiary Merger with Cash As the Consideration4-37
      • [D] : Amending the Certificate of Incorporation and By-Laws of the Survivor in a Reverse Triangular Merger and Replacing Its Officers and Directors4-38
    • § 4:5.11 : Mergers of Delaware and Non-Delaware Corporations4-40
    • § 4:5.12 : Dissenters’ Rights in Long-Form Mergers Under Delaware Law4-41
      • [A] : When Appraisal Is Available in a Long-Form Merger4-41
        • [A][1] : General Rule4-41
        • [A][2] : Do Preferred Shareholders Have Appraisal Rights?4-42
        • [A][3] : The 20% Stock Issuance Exception4-43
        • [A][4] : The “Market-Out” Exception4-43
          • [A][4][a] : In General4-43
          • [A][4][b] : Use of Long-Form Merger to Avoid Dissenters’ Rights in a Short-Form Merger4-45
          • [A][4][c] : The Market-Out Exception to Appraisal Rights in a Cash/Stock Election Merger, Wesco4-45
        • [A][5] : Appraisal Rights in a Certificate of Incorporation4-47
      • [B] : How Does a Shareholder Seek Appraisal?4-47
        • [B][1] : General Rules4-47
        • [B][2] : Elaboration on the Record Holder Requirement4-48
        • [B][3] : Perfection of Appraisal Rights4-49
          • [B][3][a] : Introduction4-49
          • [B][3][b] : Pre-Merger Shareholder Notice Requirement4-50
          • [B][3][c] : Pre-Merger Shareholder Demand and “No” Vote Requirement4-50
          • [B][3][d] : Post-Merger Notice to Shareholder Requirement4-50
        • [B][4] : No Votes or Dividends on Appraisal Shares4-51
      • [C] : What Are the Procedures After Demand for Appraisal Has Been Made?4-51
      • [D] : What Are the Standards for Determining the “Fair Value” of the Shares?4-52
        • [D][1] : The Exclusivity Condition4-52
        • [D][2] : The All Relevant Factors Condition4-53
        • [D][3] : Do Not Consider Minority or Marketability Discounts; Focus on Going Concern Value4-55
        • [D][4] : Recent Approaches to Determine Fair Value—AXA Financial, Hanover, and Golden Telecom4-55
      • [E] : Determining a “Fair Rate of Interest”4-60
      • [F] : Other Procedural Aspects of Appraisal Proceedings4-60
      • [G] : Characterization of Unissued Shares of Surviving Corporation4-61
      • [H] : Exclusivity of Appraisal Proceedings in Delaware4-61
      • [I] : Disclosure Standard in Transaction with Appraisal Rights4-63
      • [J] : Illustration of Proxy Statement Disclosure of Appraisal Rights Under the DGCL4-64
      • [K] : Activists Hedge Funds and Appraisal4-68
    • § 4:5.13 : Section 251(h), Facilitating Two-Step Transactions, a 2013 Amendment to Delaware Corporate Law4-68
      • [A] : In General4-68
      • [B] : 2014 Amendments to Section 251(h)4-70
      • [C] : Illustration of the Use of Section 251(h)4-70
    • § 4:5.14 : Conversion of Preferred before Merger—Omneon4-71
  • § 4:6 : The MBCA Long-Form Merger and Share Exchange Provisions: Acquisition of a Non-90% Controlled Target by Merger4-72
    • § 4:6.1 : Introduction4-72
    • § 4:6.2 : Essential Differences Between the MBCA and the DGCL4-73
      • [A] : Vote of Shareholders of Acquiring Corp Parent in Certain Triangular Reorganizations Under the MBCA4-73
      • [B] : Class Vote Required Under the MBCA4-74
      • [C] : Quorum and Voting Rule Under the MBCA4-74
      • [D] : The Market-Out Exception to Appraisal Rights Under the MBCA4-75
    • § 4:6.3 : The Compulsory Plan of Share Exchange Under MBCA § 11.034-75
  • § 4:7 : The Delaware Sale of “All or Substantially All” of Assets Provision4-76
    • § 4:7.1 : Introduction4-76
    • § 4:7.2 : Sale of Assets Provisions Under the DGCL4-77
    • § 4:7.3 : No Impact on Acquirer4-78
    • § 4:7.4 : Dissolution Following Sale of Assets Under the DGCL4-78
    • § 4:7.5 : Tax Impact Determined by Consideration Paid4-79
    • § 4:7.6 : No Dissenters’ Rights Under the DGCL4-80
    • § 4:7.7 : Determination of Meaning of “Substantially All” of the Assets Under the DGCL4-80
      • [A] : In General4-80
      • [B] : Sale of Assets of a Subsidiary4-84
      • [C] : Delaware Supreme Court’s Interpretation of “Substantially All” Provision of an Indenture—Liberty Media4-84
    • § 4:7.8 : Illustration of Treatment of the Voting Requirement Under the DGCL in an Asset Acquisition Agreement4-84
  • § 4:8 : The MBCA Analogue to Sale of “Substantially All” of the Assets Provision4-85
    • § 4:8.1 : Introduction4-85
    • § 4:8.2 : Sales Leaving the Corporation “Without a Significant Continuing Business” Under the MBCA4-86
    • § 4:8.3 : The Required Shareholder Vote Under the MBCA4-87
    • § 4:8.4 : Sales in Connection with Dissolutions Under the MBCA4-87
    • § 4:8.5 : Dissenters’ Rights Under the MBCA4-87
  • § 4:9 : The De Facto Merger Doctrine4-88
    • § 4:9.1 : Introduction4-88
    • § 4:9.2 : Absence of a De Facto Merger Principle in Delaware and Many Other Jurisdictions4-89
  • § 4:10 : Short-Form Mergers4-91
    • § 4:10.1 : Introduction4-91
    • § 4:10.2 : Short-Form Mergers Under Section 253 of the DGCL4-92
      • [A] : In General and Roam-Tel4-92
      • [B] : Elaboration on the Disclosure Requirement in Short-Form Mergers4-94
        • [B][1] : General Principles4-94
        • [B][2] : The Quasi-Appraisal Remedy—Gilliland and Berger4-96
      • [C] : Inapplicability of the Entire Fairness Doctrine in Short-Form Mergers—Glassman4-98
      • [D] : Disclosure Claim After Seeking Appraisal—Aristotle4-99
      • [E] : Short-Form Merger with Parent Non-Corporate Entity4-99
    • § 4:10.3 : Short-Form Mergers Under the MBCA4-99
Chapter 5: Fiduciary Duties of Directors, Officers, and Controlling Shareholders
  • § 5:1 : Scope5-9
    • § 5:1.1 : References5-11
  • § 5:2 : Directors’ Fiduciary Duties Under Delaware Law5-11
    • § 5:2.1 : Introduction5-11
    • § 5:2.2 : The Duty of Loyalty—Guth v. Loft5-11
    • § 5:2.3 : The Duty of Care—Lutz v. Boas5-12
    • § 5:2.4 : The Business Judgment Rule—Van Gorkom5-13
    • § 5:2.5 : The Disclosure Duty5-15
      • [A] : Introduction—Arnold, Checkfree, Skeen, Ganter, and Malone5-15
      • [B] : Disclosure Issues Involving Investment Bankers5-17
        • [B][1] : Introduction5-17
        • [B][2] : General Obligation to Disclose Regarding the Fairness Opinion—Pure Resources and Checkfree5-18
        • [B][3] : Different Views on the Need to Disclose Management’s Projections Used by Investment Bankers—3Com, Maric, and Orchid5-18
        • [B][4] : Disclosure of Previous Work Done by the Target’s Investment Banker for the Acquirer—Art Technologies5-22
        • [B][5] : Disclosure of Investment Banker’s Conflicts and Compensation—Hammons, Del Monte, and Atheros5-22
    • § 5:2.6 : Guide to Satisfying Board’s Fiduciary Duties in M&A Transactions5-24
      • [A] : Introduction5-24
      • [B] : Satisfying the Duties of Loyalty and Good Faith5-25
        • [B][1] : In General5-25
        • [B][2] : Use of Special Committees5-25
        • [B][3] : The Benefit of Exculpation Under Section 102(b)(7)5-30
      • [C] : Satisfying the Duty of Care5-30
      • [D] : Satisfying the Duty of Disclosure5-31
      • [E] : Impact of Shareholder Ratification—Gantler5-31
      • [F] : Vote of Majority-of-the-Outstanding-Minority in Interested Transactions5-33
      • [G] : Summary5-35
    • § 5:2.7 : Do Officers Have the Same Fiduciary Duties As Directors?5-35
    • § 5:2.8 : Forum Selection for Intra-Company Disputes5-36
      • [A] : In General5-36
      • [B] : The LinkedIn Choice of Forum Provision in Its Certificate of Incorporation5-38
      • [C] : The California Federal District Court’s View on Oracle’s Board-Adopted Forum Selection Bylaw—Galaviz5-39
      • [D] : Director-Adopted Forum Selection Bylaw Upheld—Chevron5-40
      • [E] : Problems with Multijurisdictional Litigation5-42
    • § 5:2.9 : Direct and Derivative Actions in Delaware5-43
      • [A] : Introduction5-43
      • [B] : Chancellor Strine’s Decision on the Treatment in a Merger of a Derivative Action Against a Target’s Directors—Massey5-48
    • § 5:2.10 : Shareholder Access to Books and Records5-50
  • § 5:3 : Directors’ Fiduciary Duties Under the ALI’s Corporate Governance Project5-50
  • § 5:4 : The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms in Corporate Governance5-51
  • § 5:5 : The Delaware Law Governing the Fiduciary Duties of a Target’s Directors in M&A5-51
    • § 5:5.1 : Introduction5-51
    • § 5:5.2 : Tender Offer Defensive Tactics—Including Introduction to Poison Pills5-52
      • [A] : The Unocal Enhanced Business Judgment Standard with Unitrin Gloss5-52
      • [B] : The Preferred Defensive Tactic—Poison Pills5-54
        • [B][1] : Introduction5-54
        • [B][2] : Adoption of a Pill5-56
        • [B][3] : Board’s Redemption Right5-57
        • [B][4] : Board’s Right to Amend the Pill5-58
        • [B][5] : When the Pill Becomes Exercisable5-58
        • [B][6] : Definition of “Acquiring Person,” “Beneficial Ownership”5-60
        • [B][7] : Exception to the Definition of “Acquiring Person” for “Qualifying Tender Offer”5-63
        • [B][8] : The Flip-In Right5-66
        • [B][9] : The Flip-Over Right5-67
        • [B][10] : Exchange Right5-69
        • [B][11] : The Validity of the Poison Pill in Delaware—Moran and Hilton5-71
        • [B][12] : No Dead Hand and Similar Provisions in Delaware, Quickturn, and Other States5-76
        • [B][13] : Application of Unocal to the Combination of a Poison Pill and Staggered Board5-79
        • [B][14] : Reaction of Proxy Advisory Firms to Poison Pills5-80
          • [B][14][a] : In General5-80
          • [B][14][b] : The NOL Poison Pill5-82
          • [B][14][c] : The NOL Bylaw and Charter Provision5-83
        • [B][15] : Triggering of Selectica’s NOL Pill5-83
          • [B][15][a] : Introduction5-83
          • [B][15][b] : The Chancery Court Opinion in Selectica5-88
        • [B][16] : Supreme Court Opinion in Selectica5-92
        • [B][17] : Adoption of a Pill with Two Different Thresholds: 20% for New Shareholders, 30% for Old Shareholders—Yucaipa5-95
        • [B][18] : Adoption of a Pill by a Closely Held Corporation—eBay5-102
        • [B][19] : Airgas: The Poison Pill Decision5-106
          • [B][19][a] : Introduction to Airgas5-106
          • [B][19][b] : The Basic Facts in Airgas5-107
          • [B][19][c] : The Issue in Airgas5-109
          • [B][19][d] : The Standard of Review in Airgas5-110
          • [B][19][e] : A Brief Poison Pill Primer from Airgas5-111
          • [B][19][f] : Note on TW Services from Airgas5-113
          • [B][19][g] : Analyzing the Threat Prong of Unocal in Airgas5-114
          • [B][19][h] : Analyzing the Proportionate Prong of Unocal in Airgas5-114
          • [B][19][i] : Pills, Policy and Professors (and Hypotheticals) from Airgas5-115
          • [B][19][j] : Chancellor Chandler’s Lament in Airgas5-116
          • [B][19][k] : The Reaction to Airgas of the Pill’s Inventor, Martin Lipton5-118
          • [B][19][l] : Some Thoughts on Airgas5-118
        • [B][20] : Target’s Covenant to Adopt a Poison Pill—Compellent5-120
        • [B][21] : Two Trigger Pill, 10% for 13D Filers; 20% for 13G Filers—Third Point5-121
        • [B][22] : Constitutionality of the Poison Pill5-122
          • [B][22][a] : The Babchuk, Jackson Position5-122
          • [B][22][b] : Martin Lipton’s Response5-122
          • [B][22][c] : My Take5-124
      • [C] : “Just Saying No” Under Unocal—Moore5-124
      • [D] : Other Defensive Tactics5-125
        • [D][1] : White Knights and Self Tenders5-125
        • [D][2] : Super-Majority Voting, Classified Boards, and Tenured Voting5-126
          • [D][2][a] : In General5-126
          • [D][2][b] : Removal of Directors5-128
          • [D][2][c] : Tenured Voting5-130
          • [D][2][d] : Airgas Issue with the Staggered Board5-131
          • [D][2][e] : Addressing the Ambiguity in the Airgas Charter5-134
        • [D][3] : Eliminating the Right of Shareholders to Call Special Meetings or Act by Consent5-135
        • [D][4] : The Pac Man Defense5-136
        • [D][5] : Actions Affecting Shareholder Voting5-137
        • [D][6] : Closing the Section 13(d) Loophole5-137
        • [D][7] : Golden Parachute Payments5-137
        • [D][8] : Greenmail5-138
        • [D][9] : Poison or Putable Debt5-138
        • [D][10] : LinkedIn’s Charter Defensive Measures5-139
      • [E] : The Intersection of Unocal with the Revlon Duty to “Auction” Standard5-140
      • [F] : Illustration of the Limits of Revlon and the Application of Unocal—Time-Warner5-143
      • [G] : Time-Warner’s Questions Regarding Cases Requiring Redemption of Poison Pills5-144
      • [H] : Elaboration on Revlon: Obligation to Get the Best Price Reasonably Available Where There Is a Change of Control—QVC5-147
      • [I] : Summary of Situations in Which Revlon Applies—Arnold, Lukens,NYMEX, and Smurfit-Stone5-149
      • [J] : The Corporation’s Attorney-Client Privilege5-153
      • [K] : The “White Knight” or Business Strategy Privilege5-156
    • § 5:5.3 : Interference with Voting Rights—Blasius, Liquid Audio, and Mercier5-158
    • § 5:5.4 : Arm’s-Length M&A—Including Impact of Deal Protection Devices5-162
      • [A] : The Business Judgment Rule (BJR) As Applied in Van Gorkom5-162
      • [B] : The Legislative Reaction to Van Gorkom—The Section 102(b)(7) Exculpation Provision5-165
      • [C] : Entire Fairness Standard Applies If BJR Not Applicable—Technicolor5-168
      • [D] : Determining Director Liability on a Director-by-Director Basis—Emerging Communications5-168
      • [E] : The Good Faith Element of the BJR—Disney, Caremark, Stone, Sidhu, AIG, Citigroup, and Dow5-169
      • [F] : The Duty to Get the Best Price Reasonably Available—Applicability of Revlon in Negotiated Mergers5-178
      • [G] : Satisfying Revlon Duties with a Post-Signing Market Check—Barkan, Pennaco, and MONY5-180
      • [H] : The Applicability of Revlon and Unocal to Deal Protection Devices in Arm’s-Length M&A5-182
        • [H][1] : Introduction5-182
        • [H][2] : No Vested Rights in Deal Protection Devices Where Revlon Applies —QVC5-183
        • [H][3] : Theoretical Basis of Applying Unocal to Deal Protection Devices in Non- Revlon Cases5-184
        • [H][4] : Unocal Standard Applies and No Fait Accompli with Deal Protection Devices in Non-Revlon Case— Omnicare5-185
          • [H][4][a] : Background on Omnicare5-185
          • [H][4][b] : The Limits of Omnicare—Orman5-188
          • [H][4][c] : The Continuing Validity of Omnicare—Optima5-190
          • [H][4][d] : Rejection of Omnicare in California—Monty5-190
          • [H][4][e] : Vice Chancellor Nobel’s Decision Regarding Consents Given After Signing of Merger Agreement—Openlane5-192
        • [H][5] : Illustration of Standard Deal Protections: No Solicit, Superior Proposal, Fiduciary Out, Matching Right, Force the Vote, and Termination Fee—MCI–Verizon Merger5-193
          • [H][5][a] : Introduction5-193
          • [H][5][b] : The “No Solicitation” Provision5-194
          • [H][5][c] : MCI Can Provide Information to Third-Party Bidders5-195
          • [H][5][d] : Negotiation with Bidder Making “Superior Proposal”5-196
          • [H][5][e] : Notice to Verizon of Receipt of Any “Takeover Proposal”5-198
          • [H][5][f] : Change in Shareholder Recommendation or Entering Alternative Agreement—Fiduciary Out with Matching Rights5-198
          • [H][5][g] : Force the Vote5-201
          • [H][5][h] : MCI’s Disclosure Obligations5-201
          • [H][5][i] : Termination and Fee5-202
          • [H][5][j] : No Termination Fee If “Naked No Vote”5-205
          • [H][5][k] : ABA Deal Point Study—Deal Protection Devices5-206
        • [H][6] : Illustrative Analysis of Standard Superior Proposal Provision, Fiduciary Out, Matching Right and Termination Fee5-206
          • [H][6][a] : Deal Protection in Toys “R” Us5-206
          • [H][6][b] : Deal Protection and Reverse Termination Fee in Dollar Thrifty5-209
          • [H][6][c] : Measuring the Termination Fee Against Enterprise Value or Equity Value—Cogent5-214
          • [H][6][d] : The Cumulative Effect of Deal Protection Provisions—Orchid5-215
        • [H][7] : Go-Shops—TXU, Topps, and Lear5-217
          • [H][7][a] : Introduction5-217
          • [H][7][b] : The TXU Go-Shop Period5-218
          • [H][7][c] : The TXU No-Shop Period5-219
          • [H][7][d] : TXU Fiduciary Out for a Superior Proposal5-220
          • [H][7][e] : TXU Change in Shareholder Recommendation5-222
          • [H][7][f] : TXU Disclosure Obligations and Notice to Acquirer5-224
          • [H][7][g] : TXU Termination Provisions5-224
          • [H][7][h] : Delaware’s Approach to Go-Shops5-226
        • [H][8] : “No Impairment” Covenant and Relation to Deal Protection—Energy Partners5-231
        • [H][9] : Asset or Crown Jewel Options As Deal Protection Measures5-234
        • [H][10] : Stock Options or Share Exchanges As Deal Protection Devices5-234
          • [H][10][a] : In General5-234
          • [H][10][b] : The Stock Options in J.P. Morgan–Bear Stearns and Wells Fargo–Wachovia5-235
          • [H][10][c] : Courts’ Analyses of Stock Options and Other Deal Protection Devices in J.P. Morgan–Bear Stearns and Wells Fargo–Wachovia5-237
      • [I] : Does the Board’s Passive Approach Satisfy Revlon?—Lyondell,Bernal, and Brown5-240
      • [J] : Power of Board to Reject a Proposed Merger—TW Services5-250
      • [K] : Sale of Target Where Preferred Shareholders Receive All the Consideration—Trados5-251
      • [L] : The “Last Period” Problem—Steinhardt and Reis5-253
      • [M] : Investment Banker’s Manipulation of the Sales Process, Stapled Financing—Del Monte and Rural5-258
      • [N] : Chancellor Strine’s Opinion in El Paso5-264
      • [O] : Allegation of Violation of the Duty of Loyalty and Aiding and Abetting in a Revlon Sale Transaction—Answers5-268
      • [P] : The Fight in Delaware Chancery Over “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” (DADW)—Genomics, Ancestry, and NetSpend5-269
        • [P][1] : Introduction to Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive (DADW) Provisions5-269
        • [P][2] : Vice Chancellor Laster’s Transcript Ruling in Genomics5-270
        • [P][3] : Chancellor Strine’s Transcript Ruling in Ancestry5-272
        • [P][4] : Vice Chancellor Glasscock’s Decision in NetSpend5-274
        • [P][5] : My Take on DADWs5-276
      • [Q] : Flawed Single Bidder Process, Including a DADW, but No Injunction–NetSpend5-276
      • [R] : Exculpation on Revlon Claim But Not on Disclosure Claim—Chen5-278
    • § 5:5.5 : Freezeout Mergers5-279
      • [A] : Introduction5-279
      • [B] : General Principles—Weinberger, Lynch, and Cox5-280
      • [C] : Does the Entire Fairness Standard Apply in a Tender Offer by Controlling Shareholder for the Minority Held Shares of Its Subsidiary?—Pure Resources and CNX5-285
      • [D] : Vice Chancellor Laster Applies the CNX Unified Standard of Review in Wesco5-289
      • [E] : CNX Business Judgment Rule Applied by Chancellor Strine in MFW Controlling Shareholder Acquisition5-290
      • [F] : The Delaware Supreme Court’s MFW Decision5-292
      • [G] : Footnote 9 of the MFW Opinion5-293
      • [H] : The Consequences of MFW: Do Revlon and Unocal Apply in a MFW-BJR Transaction?5-294
    • § 5:5.6 : Management Buyouts5-295
      • [A] : Introduction5-295
      • [B] : Applicability of Entire Fairness Standard of Review Due to Breach of Duty of Loyalty—Mills5-295
      • [C] : Traditional Business Judgment Rule Analysis Where Directors Are Independent—RJR Nabisco5-296
      • [D] : The Impact of Revlon Duty to Auction—Barkan5-297
      • [E] : Impact of Target’s Decision to Seek a Private Equity, and Not a Strategic, Buyer—Netsmart5-298
      • [F] : The Procedural Defects in the Health Grades MBO5-299
      • [G] : The Special Committee in the J. Crew MBO5-301
    • § 5:5.7 : Issues Arising with Controlling Shareholders in M&A5-307
      • [A] : Introduction5-307
      • [B] : Sale by Controlling Shareholder of Its Controlling Position5-309
        • [B][1] : The View of Most Courts: No Equal Opportunity Doctrine—Zetlin5-309
        • [B][2] : The Minority View—Ahmanson5-309
        • [B][3] : Exception for Sale of Corporate Opportunity—Perlman v. Feldmann5-310
        • [B][4] : Exception for Sale of Office—Lionel and Essex5-311
        • [B][5] : Exception for Sale to Known Looter—Gerdes, Keebler, Insuranshares, and Harris5-311
      • [C] : Controlling Shareholder’s Responsibility in Structuring the Acquisition by a Third Party of Its Partially Owned Controlled Subsidiary—McMullin5-317
      • [D] : Controlling Shareholder Receives Premium for High Vote Stock—TCI5-319
      • [E] : Controlling Shareholder Attempts to Sell Its Shares Rather Than Sale of a Subsidiary of Controlled Corporation—CERBCO5-324
      • [F] : Controlling Shareholder Sells Itself Rather Than Subsidiary—Digex5-325
      • [G] : Use of Poison Pill to Prevent Sale of Stock of Controlled Subsidiary Held by Controlling Shareholder—Hollinger5-326
      • [H] : Controlling Shareholder Rejects Sale of Target in Favor of Investment by Third Party in Target—Paxson5-327
      • [I] : Controlling Shareholder Increases Its Interest to a Blocking Interest—Loral5-327
      • [J] : Challenge to Controlling Shareholder’s Increase in Its Interest, Direct or Derivative—Gatz, Tri-Star, and Rossette5-330
      • [K] : Sale of Valuable Subsidiary to Controlling Shareholder at a Bargain Price Followed by Resale by Shareholder at a High Price—McPadden5-331
      • [L] : To Entrench Itself Board Rejects Sale of Target and Causes Target to Pursue a Recapitalization—Gantler5-333
        • [L][1] : Introduction5-333
        • [L][2] : Count I, Flawed Sale Process5-335
        • [L][3] : Count II, Failure to Disclose All Material Information5-337
        • [L][4] : Count III, Breach of Duty of Loyalty and Ratification5-338
      • [M] : Controlling Shareholder Participates on the Buy Side—Hammons5-338
      • [N] : Reverse Stock Splits—Reis5-342
      • [O] : Controlling Shareholder/Creditor Increases Equity Position in a Recapitalization—Hallmark5-344
      • [P] : Controlling Shareholder Causes Controlled Corporation to Acquire in Exchange for Its Stock the Stock of a Sister Controlled Corporation—Southern Peru5-345
      • [Q] : Southern Peru Affirmed by Delaware Supreme Court5-346
      • [R] : Controlling Shareholder Receives Same Consideration as Other Target Shareholders, Potential Liquidity Trap—Synthes5-347
        • [R][1] : Introduction to Synthes5-347
        • [R][2] : The Entire Fairness and Potential “Liquidity Trap” Issue in Synthes5-348
        • [R][3] : The Revlon and “End Stage” Issue in Synthes5-350
        • [R][4] : The Unocal Issue in Synthes5-351
      • [S] : Structuring the Sale of a Partially Owned Portfolio Company—Morton’s5-351
      • [T] : Constituency Directors and Sale of Portfolio Company where PE Firm Holds Preferred Stock—Trados5-353
    • § 5:5.8 : Summary of Current Delaware Law Governance Rules for M&A5-355
    • § 5:5.9 : “Directors,” Duties in the “Zone of Insolvency”5-357
    • § 5:5.10 : The Uncertainty in Delaware M&A Law5-363
      • [A] : General Principles5-363
      • [B] : Uncertain Deference to Independent and Disinterested Directors—Caremark, Netsmart, Topps, and Lear5-364
  • § 5:6 : ALI Rules Governing Fiduciary Duties of Target’s Directors in M&A5-365
    • § 5:6.1 : Introduction5-365
    • § 5:6.2 : Arm’s-Length M&A5-365
    • § 5:6.3 : Management Buyouts5-366
    • § 5:6.4 : Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers5-367
    • § 5:6.5 : Freezeouts5-368
    • § 5:6.6 : Summary of ALI Governance Rules for M&A5-369
    • § 5:6.7 : Comments on ALI Approach5-371
  • § 5:7 : Delaware Law Governing Fiduciary Duties of Acquirer’s Directors in M&A5-371
  • § 5:8 : ALI Rules Governing the Fiduciary Duties of an Acquirer’s Directors in M&A5-374
Chapter 6: Introduction to the ’33 and ’34 Acts and Exemptions in Acquisitions of Closely Held Targets
  • § 6:1 : Scope6-8
    • § 6:1.1 : References6-11
  • § 6:2 : Applicability of ’33 and ’34 Acts to “Securities” and in Mergers and Acquisitions6-11
  • § 6:3 : Materiality Under the ’33 and ’34 Acts6-13
    • § 6:3.1 : Introduction6-13
    • § 6:3.2 : Materiality Under Rule 14a-9 of the ’34 Act6-13
    • § 6:3.3 : Materiality Under Rule 10b-5 of the ’34 Act6-14
    • § 6:3.4 : Materiality Under the ’33 Act6-15
    • § 6:3.5 : Materiality in Financial Statements6-15
    • § 6:3.6 : Illustration of Materiality Under Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9—The DaimlerChrysler Merger of Equals6-17
    • § 6:3.7 : Materiality in BOA–Merrill: The Role of the Lawyers6-18
  • § 6:4 : Introduction to the Liability Provisions of the ’33 Act and ’34 Act6-21
    • § 6:4.1 : In General6-21
    • § 6:4.2 : Section 12(a)(1) of the ’33 Act6-22
    • § 6:4.3 : Section 11 of the ’33 Act6-22
      • [A] : Introduction6-22
      • [B] : The Due Diligence and Reliance Defenses6-24
        • [B][1] : In General6-24
        • [B][2] : Due Diligence and Reliance Defenses of Underwriters6-26
        • [B][3] : Due Diligence and Reliance Defenses of Directors6-33
    • § 6:4.4 : Section 12(a)(2) Under the ’33 Act6-34
      • [A] : In General6-34
      • [B] : Inapplicability of Section 12(a)(2) to Non-Public Offerings6-36
    • § 6:4.5 : Rule 10b-5 Under the ’34 Act6-38
      • [A] : Introduction6-38
      • [B] : Rule 10b-5 in FreezeOut Mergers6-41
      • [C] : Trading on Non-Public Information Regarding Mergers and Acquisitions—Misappropriation Theory Under Rule 10b-5—Sokol6-42
      • [D] : Impact of Rule 10b-5 on Disclosure of Merger Negotiations6-45
        • [D][1] : Authorities Dealing with Denial of Merger Negotiations That Are in Fact Taking Place6-45
        • [D][2] : Authorities Addressing When Merger Negotiations Must Be Included in Disclosure Documents6-51
      • [E] : Impact of Rule 10b-5 Upon the Purchase of Stock of a Closely Held Corporation by the Corporation or a Controlling Shareholder6-54
      • [F] : Corporation Not Liable for Acquiring Shareholder’s Stock Two Years before Acquisition—Phipps6-56
      • [G] : Impact of Rule 10b-5 in Vivendi’s Acquisition of a Subsidiary of Liberty Media in Exchange for Stock of Vivendi—The Reliance Issue6-57
      • [H] : The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory Survives with a Modification—Halliburton6-62
    • § 6:4.6 : Rule 14a-9 Under the ’34 Act6-63
      • [A] : In General6-63
      • [B] : Is Scienter Required in an Action Under Rule 14a-9?6-64
      • [C] : The “Essential Link” Requirement in a Rule 14a-9 Action6-65
      • [D] : Is Evil Intent Without a Material Misrepresentation Actionable Under Rule 14a-9?6-68
      • [E] : Loss Causation Under Section 14(a)(9)—Atheros6-69
      • [F] : To Be Actionable Under Rule 14a-9, There Must Be a False or Misleading Statement–Gottlieb6-71
    • § 6:4.7 : Rule 9(b) and PSLRA Pleading Standards6-72
  • § 6:5 : Introduction to the Registration Requirements Under Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 As Amended by the 2005 Securities Offering Reforms6-82
    • § 6:5.1 : In General6-82
    • § 6:5.2 : Types of Underwritings6-83
    • § 6:5.3 : Introduction to the SEC’s 2005 Securities Offering Reform Rules6-86
    • § 6:5.4 : Introduction to the Registration Requirement of Section 56-87
      • [A] : Introduction6-87
      • [B] : The Pre-Filing Period6-88
        • [B][1] : General Principles and Rule 1356-88
        • [B][2] : The Thirty-Day Bright-Line Exemption for All Issuers in Rule 163A Adopted by the 2005 Securities Offering Reform6-90
        • [B][3] : The Factual Information Exemption for Non-Reporting Issuers in Rule 169 Adopted by the 2005 Securities Offering Reform6-90
        • [B][4] : The Factual Business Information and Forward-Looking Statement Exemption for Reporting Issuers in Rule 168 Adopted by the 2005 Securities Offering Reform6-92
        • [B][5] : The Unrestricted Exemption for WKSIs in Rule 163 Adopted by the 2005 Securities Offering Reform6-93
      • [C] : Waiting Period6-96
        • [C][1] : Introduction6-96
        • [C][2] : Changes to the Waiting Period Rules Adopted in the 2005 Securities Offering Reform6-98
          • [C][2][a] : Rule 134 As Amended by the 2005 Securities Offering Reform6-98
          • [C][2][b] : Use of Free Writing Prospectuses During the Waiting Period Under Rules 164 and 433, Adopted by the 2005 Securities Offering Reform6-102
            • [C][2][b][i] : Introduction6-102
            • [C][2][b][ii] : What Type of Information About the Offering May Be Included in a Free Writing Prospectus6-105
            • [C][2][b][iii] : The Seasoned Issuer and WKSI Class; IPO Issuer and Unseasoned Issuer Class6-105
            • [C][2][b][iv] : Conditions Applicable to the IPO Issuer and Unseasoned Issuer Class6-106
            • [C][2][b][v] : Conditions Applicable to the Seasoned Issuer and WKSI Class6-108
            • [C][2][b][vi] : Conditions Applicable to Road Shows of Both the IPO Issuer and Unseasoned Issuer Class and the Seasoned Issuer and WKSI Class6-109
            • [C][2][b][vii] : Treatment of Information on or Hyperlinked from the Issuer’s Website6-113
      • [D] : The Post-Effective Period6-113
        • [D][1] : Introduction and Use of Rule 430A to Go Effective6-113
        • [D][2] : Changes Made by the 2005 Securities Offering Reform Regarding Completion of Sales: Access Equals Delivery6-116
      • [E] : Summary of the Operation of the Three Periods Governed by Section 56-120
      • [F] : The JOBS Act: An Introduction and Applicability to Registered Offerings6-121
      • [G] : Attempting to Avoid Section 5 Through Reverse Mergers and Similar Transactions6-122
  • § 6:6 : Compliance with State Law6-123
  • § 6:7 : Introduction to Registration Statements on Forms S-1 and S-36-124
    • § 6:7.1 : In General6-124
    • § 6:7.2 : The Interface Between Forms S-1 and S-3 and Regulations S-K and S-X6-125
    • § 6:7.3 : Requirement for Additional Disclosures If Material: Rule 408(a) and Rule 12b-206-126
    • § 6:7.4 : Presentation of Information in a Registration Statement6-127
    • § 6:7.5 : The “Plain English” Requirement6-127
  • § 6:8 : Preparation of the S-1 Registration Statement for an IPO—The EverCore IPO6-128
    • § 6:8.1 : Introduction6-128
    • § 6:8.2 : The Delaying Amendment to the Registration Statement6-129
    • § 6:8.3 : S-1, Item 1, Forepart of the Registration Statement and Outside Front Cover Page of Prospectus, Reg. S-K, Item 5016-130
    • § 6:8.4 : S-1, Item 2, Inside Front and Outside Back Cover Pages of Prospectus, Reg. S-K, Item 5026-130
    • § 6:8.5 : Rule 408 Additional Disclosure: Prospectus Only Source of Information6-130
    • § 6:8.6 : Terms Used in the Prospectus6-130
    • § 6:8.7 : S-1, Item 3, Summary Information, Risk Factors and Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges, Reg. S-K, Item 5036-130
    • § 6:8.8 : Reliance on the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine for Forward-Looking Information6-130
    • § 6:8.9 : Rule 408 Additional Disclosure: Organizational Structure6-134
    • § 6:8.10 : S-1, Item 4, Use of Proceeds, Reg. S-K, Item 5046-134
    • § 6:8.11 : S-1, Item 5, Determination of Offering Price, Reg. S-K, Item 5066-134
    • § 6:8.12 : S-1, Item 6, Dilution, Reg. S-K, Item 5066-134
    • § 6:8.13 : S-1, Item 7, Selling Shareholders, Reg. S-K, Item 5076-134
    • § 6:8.14 : S-1, Item 8, Plan of Distribution, Reg. S-K, Item 5086-135
    • § 6:8.15 : S-1, Item 9, Description of Securities to Be Registered, Reg. S-K, Item 2026-135
    • § 6:8.16 : S-1, Item 10, Interest of Named Experts and Counsel, Reg. S-K, Item 5096-135
    • § 6:8.17 : S-1, Item 11(a), Description of Business, Reg. S-K, Item 1016-135
    • § 6:8.18 : S-1, Item 11(b), Description of Property, Reg. S-K, Item 1026-135
    • § 6:8.19 : S-1, Item 11(c), Legal Proceedings, Reg. S-K, Item 1036-135
    • § 6:8.20 : S-1, Item 11(d), Market Price, Dividends and Related Matters, Reg. S-K, Item 2016-135
    • § 6:8.21 : S-1, Item 11(e), Financial Statements Required by Reg. S-X, Including the Pro Forma Financial Statements Required by Article 11 of Reg. S-K6-135
    • § 6:8.22 : S-1, Item 11(f), Selected Financial Data, Reg. S-K, Item 3016-136
    • § 6:8.23 : S-1, Item 11(g), Supplementary Financial Information, Reg. S-K, Item 3026-136
    • § 6:8.24 : S-1, Item 11(h), Management Discussion and Analysis, Reg. S-K, Item 3036-136
      • [A] : Introduction6-136
      • [B] : Determining if the Issuer Has Complied with the MD&A Disclosure—Blackstone6-137
    • § 6:8.25 : S-1, Item 11(i), Disagreements with Accountants, Reg. S-K, Item 3046-139
    • § 6:8.26 : S-1, Item 11(j), Qualitative and Quantitative Disclosure About Market Risk, Reg. S-K, Item 3056-139
    • § 6:8.27 : S-1, Item 11(k), Directors and Executive Officers, Reg. S-K, Item 4016-139
    • § 6:8.28 : S-1, Item 11(l), Executive Compensation and Compensation Committee Interlocks, Reg. S-K, Items 402 and 407(e)(4)6-139
    • § 6:8.29 : S-1, Item 11(m), Security Ownership of Certain Beneficial Owners and Management, Reg. S-K, Item 4036-140
    • § 6:8.30 : S-1, Item 11(n), Transactions with Related Persons, Reg. S-K, Item 4046-140
    • § 6:8.31 : S-1, Item 11(n), Corporate Governance, Reg. S-K, Item 407(a)6-140
    • § 6:8.32 : Rule 408 Additional Disclosure6-140
      • [A] : In General6-140
      • [B] : Capitalization Table6-140
      • [C] : Material Federal Income Taxes6-141
    • § 6:8.33 : Information Not Required in Prospectus6-141
  • § 6:9 : Special Purpose Acquisition Companies and Rule 4196-141
  • § 6:10 : Reporting Requirements of a ’34 Act Company6-144
    • § 6:10.1 : Introduction6-144
    • § 6:10.2 : The Form 10-K Annual Report6-145
      • [A] : Introduction6-145
      • [B] : Form 10-K, Item 9A, Controls and Procedures; Regulation S-K, Item 307, Disclosure Controls and Procedures, and Item 308, Internal Control Over Financial Reporting6-146
        • [B][1] : Introduction6-146
        • [B][2] : The SOX Origin of Internal Controls, Disclosure Controls and Officer Certification6-147
          • [B][2][a] : Introduction6-147
          • [B][2][b] : Management Assessment of Internal Controls6-147
            • [B][2][b][i] : In General6-147
            • [B][2][b][ii] : Applicability of Internal Controls Report Regarding a Newly Acquired Target6-148
          • [B][2][c] : Disclosure Controls and Procedures6-149
          • [B][2][d] : Illustration of Representation and Warranty in an Acquisition Agreement Concerning Internal Controls and Disclosure Controls6-149
          • [B][2][e] : Officer Certification of Financial Reports: Including Internal Controls and Disclosure Controls6-150
          • [B][2][f] : Officer’s Certification Under Section 906 of SOX, Section 1350 of Title 18, U.S.C.6-154
        • [B][3] : Disclosure Controls Under Item 307 of Regulation S-K6-155
        • [B][4] : Internal Controls and Accountant’s Attestation Under Item 308 of Reg. S-K6-155
      • [C] : Form 10-K, Item 10, Corporate Governance; Regulation S-K, Item 406, Code of Ethics, Item 407(d)(4), Audit Committee, and Item 407(d)(5), Audit Committee Financial Expert6-156
        • [C][1] : Reg. S-K, Item 406, Code of Ethics6-156
        • [C][2] : Reg. S-K, Item 407(d)(4), Standing Audit Committee6-157
        • [C][3] : Reg. S-K, Item 407(d)(5), Audit Committee Financial Expert6-158
      • [D] : Form 10-K, Item 13, Director Independence, Regulation S-K, Item 407(a)6-159
    • § 6:10.3 : The Form 10-Q Quarterly Report6-159
    • § 6:10.4 : The Form 8-K Periodic Report6-160
      • [A] : In General6-160
      • [B] : The Non-Disclosure of Conditions and Other Provisions of Public Company Acquisition Agreements6-162
    • § 6:10.5 : The Annual Proxy Statement6-163
      • [A] : In General6-163
      • [B] : Final Dodd-Frank Say on Pay and Golden Parachute Rules6-164
        • [B][1] : The Dodd-Frank Provisions on Say on Pay and Golden Parachutes6-164
        • [B][2] : Introduction to the SEC’s Final Say on Pay Rules6-166
        • [B][3] : Introduction to the SEC’s Final Golden Parachute Rules6-167
    • § 6:10.6 : The Annual Report to Shareholders6-170
    • § 6:10.7 : 2010 Financial Reform Act Impact on Proxy System6-170
    • § 6:10.8 : Other Proxy Initiatives6-171
    • § 6:10.9 : The JOBS Act and the ’34 Act Reporting Requirements for Emerging Growth Companies6-173
  • § 6:11 : Preparation of a Registration Statement on Form S-36-173
    • § 6:11.1 : Introduction6-173
    • § 6:11.2 : Shelf Registrations Under Rule 4156-174
      • [A] : Introduction6-174
      • [B] : Impact of 2005 Securities Offering Reform: The Automatic Shelf Registration for WKSIs6-174
      • [C] : Illustration of an Automatic Shelf Registration Offering, IBM’s Note Offering in October 20086-175
  • § 6:12 : Introduction to Section 16 and Its Role in Acquisition Transactions6-176
    • § 6:12.1 : Section 16(a) Ownership Reports6-176
    • § 6:12.2 : Section 16(b) Strict Liability6-177
      • [A] : Introduction6-177
      • [B] : Regulatory Exemptions Under Section 16(b)6-178
      • [C] : The Exemption in Rule 16b-3(d) by the Acquirer6-181
        • [C][1] : In General6-181
        • [C][2] : Illustration of the Use of Rule 16b-3(d) in the Sirius–XM Transaction6-183
      • [D] : The Exemption in Rule 16b-3(e) by the Target6-184
      • [E] : Rule 16b-7 Exemption for Certain Mergers That Are Continuations6-185
      • [F] : Judicially Developed Exemption for Unorthodox Transactions6-186
  • § 6:13 : Exemptions from ’33 Act Registration6-187
    • § 6:13.1 : Introduction6-187
    • § 6:13.2 : The JOBS Act, $50 Million and Crowdfunding Exemptions6-189
  • § 6:14 : Guide for Completing a Statutory Section 4(2) Private Placement6-189
  • § 6:15 : Rule 506 of Reg. D—Exemptions for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales6-192
    • § 6:15.1 : Introduction6-192
    • § 6:15.2 : The Concept of “Accredited Investor”6-193
      • [A] : In General6-193
      • [B] : Impact of Dodd-Frank Act on Definition of Accredited Investor6-194
      • [C] : SEC Revision of the Definition of Accredited Investor6-194
    • § 6:15.3 : Rule 502 Conditions6-195
      • [A] : Introduction6-195
      • [B] : Integration6-195
      • [C] : Information6-196
      • [D] : Limitation on the Manner of the Offering6-198
        • [D][1] : The General Prohibition Against Advertising in Rule 502(c)6-198
        • [D][2] : Goldman’s Facebook Private Offering6-198
        • [D][3] : JOBS Act Relaxation of General Solicitation Ban6-199
        • [D][4] : Proposed Rules on JOBS Act General Solicitation Provision6-199
      • [E] : Limitation of Resale6-200
    • § 6:15.4 : Specific Conditions Under Rule 506(b)(2)6-201
      • [A] : Introduction6-201
      • [B] : Restriction on the Number of Purchasers6-202
      • [C] : Nature of the Purchasers6-202
    • § 6:15.5 : General Observations on the Use of Rule 5066-203
      • [A] : Overlap with the Statutory 4(2) Exemption6-203
      • [B] : Procedural Matters6-203
  • § 6:16 : Resale of Restricted Securities Under Rule 1446-204
    • § 6:16.1 : Introduction6-204
    • § 6:16.2 : Sales by Non-Affiliates of Reporting Companies: Public Acquirer Acquires Closely Held Target6-205
    • § 6:16.3 : Sales by Non-Affiliates of Non-Reporting Companies: Closely Held Acquirer Acquires Closely Held Target6-207
    • § 6:16.4 : Sales by Affiliates: Target Shareholder Becomes Affiliate of the Acquirer6-208
    • § 6:16.5 : Negotiation for a Registration Rights Agreement6-209
  • § 6:17 : Resale of Restricted Securities Under Section 4(1½)6-210
  • § 6:18 : Introduction to Rule 144A6-212
  • § 6:19 : The Exxon Capital A/B Exchange Offering6-213
Chapter 7: Impact in Negotiated Public Company M&A of the ’33 and ’34 Acts
  • § 7:1 : Scope7-3
    • § 7:1.1 : References7-4
  • § 7:2 : Practical Considerations in Negotiated Public Company Mergers7-4
    • § 7:2.1 : Introduction7-4
    • § 7:2.2 : Acquirer’s Perspective7-4
    • § 7:2.3 : Target’s Perspective7-5
  • § 7:3 : Discussion of Merger Negotiations: Impact of Rule 10b-57-5
  • § 7:4 : Announcing the Consummation of a Merger Agreement: Form 8-K7-6
  • § 7:5 : Impact of ’33 and ’34 Acts in Cash and Stock Business Combinations7-7
    • § 7:5.1 : Basic Principles Under Rule 1457-7
      • [A] : Rule 145(a) and (b), Business Combinations As Sales and Communications7-7
      • [B] : The Presumptive Underwriter Provisions of Rule 145(c) and (d)7-10
    • § 7:5.2 : Basic Principles Under the ’34 Act Proxy Rules7-12
    • § 7:5.3 : SEC’s Summary of the Regulatory Structure for Business Combinations and Tender Offers7-14
  • § 7:6 : 1999 M&A Release: Relaxation of the M&A Gun Jumping Rules Under (1) Section 5(c) of the ’33 Act, and (2) the Proxy Rules Under the ’34 Act7-16
    • § 7:6.1 : Traditional Gun Jumping Under Section 5(c) in M&A Transactions7-16
    • § 7:6.2 : Traditional Gun Jumping Under the Proxy Rules in M&A Transactions7-17
    • § 7:6.3 : Impact of Rules 165 and 14a-12 on Pre-Filing Communications Regarding M&A Transactions7-17
      • [A] : Rule 1657-17
      • [B] : Rule 14a-127-21
  • § 7:7 : Overview of Regulation M-A Adopted by the 1999 M&A Release7-24
  • § 7:8 : Overview of Proxy Rules in Arm’s-Length Mergers7-25
  • § 7:9 : Overview of Schedule 14A in Arm’s-Length Mergers7-30
    • § 7:9.1 : In General7-30
    • § 7:9.2 : Unbundling of Merger Related Proxy Proposals7-31
      • [A] : Unbundling in Greenlight v. Apple7-32
  • § 7:10 : Overview of the Use of Form S-4 in Arm’s-Length Mergers7-34
  • § 7:11 : Overview of the Use of Schedule 14C in Certain Acquisitions and Distributions7-38
  • § 7:12 : Drafting a Form S-4 for a Stock Merger and a Schedule 14A Proxy Statement for a Cash Merger: A Comparison7-38
    • § 7:12.1 : Introduction7-38
    • § 7:12.2 : Comparison of Provisions of the S-4 for the Sirius–XM Stock Merger with the Schedule 14A for the Toys Cash Merger7-39
  • § 7:13 : Treatment Under the ’33 Act of Agreements Pursuant to Which Certain Target Shareholders Agree to Vote Their Shares for a Proposed Merger—Lock-Ups7-51
  • § 7:14 : Restrictions on Market Activity in Connection with a Merger: Regulation M and Rule 10b-187-51
    • § 7:14.1 : Introduction7-51
    • § 7:14.2 : Regulation M7-52
    • § 7:14.3 : Rule 10b-187-56
  • § 7:15 : The JOBS Act and M&A7-60
  • § 7:16 : SEC Guidance on Emerging Growth Companies (EGCs) Engaging in M&A7-61
    • § 7:16.1 : Introduction7-61
    • § 7:16.2 : EGCs’ Use of Test the Waters in Exchange Offers and Mergers7-62
    • § 7:16.3 : EGCs’ Use of the Confidential Submission Process7-63
    • § 7:16.4 : EGCs’ Filing Obligations in Connection with a Confidential Submission7-63
    • § 7:16.5 : Can a Subsidiary That Is Spun Off Qualify As an EGC?7-64
Chapter 8: Tender Offers, Open Market Purchases, and Going Private Transactions
  • § 8:1 : Scope8-7
    • § 8:1.1 : References8-8
  • § 8:2 : Issues Before Initiating a Hostile Tender Offer8-9
    • § 8:2.1 : In General8-9
    • § 8:2.2 : Strategic Rationale for the Acquisition8-9
    • § 8:2.3 : Special Due Diligence Issues8-9
    • § 8:2.4 : Financing the Acquisition8-10
    • § 8:2.5 : Assessing Acquirer’s Vulnerability to Counterattack or Third-Party Attack8-10
    • § 8:2.6 : Establishing a “Toehold” in the Target’s Shares8-11
    • § 8:2.7 : Before It All Begins: The “Bear Hug”—Microsoft–Yahoo!8-12
    • § 8:2.8 : Planning for a Possible Proxy Contest to Unseat the Target’s Board8-13
    • § 8:2.9 : Planning for the Second-Step Merger8-13
  • § 8:3 : Introduction to the Williams Act8-14
    • § 8:3.1 : In General8-14
    • § 8:3.2 : General Applicability of Sections 13(d) and (e), and Sections 14(d) and (e)8-14
    • § 8:3.3 : Purposes of Sections 13(d) and (e), and 14(d) and (e)8-16
  • § 8:4 : Regulation of Open Market Purchases Under Section 13(d)8-20
    • § 8:4.1 : Scope8-20
    • § 8:4.2 : The Filing Requirement in Section 13(d)(1)8-21
    • § 8:4.3 : Interface Between the 5% Limit, the Ten-Day Window, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, and Poison Pills8-22
    • § 8:4.4 : Standing and Remedies Under Section 13(d)8-24
    • § 8:4.5 : Applicability of Section 13(d) to Groups8-27
    • § 8:4.6 : Determination of Beneficial Ownership8-29
      • [A] : In General8-29
      • [B] : The CSX Decision8-31
        • [B][1] : The U.S. District Court’s Decision in CSX8-31
        • [F][2] : Second Circuit’s Written Opinion in CSX8-38
      • [C] : The Private Ordering in Response to CSX: Changing Definition of Beneficial Ownership in Poison Pills and Advance Notice By-Laws8-39
      • [D] : Approach of the U.K.’s Financial Services Authority to Derivative Disclosures8-40
      • [E] : 2010 Amendments to Section 13 Relating to Security-Based Swaps8-40
      • [F] : SEC Review of the Section 13(d) Beneficial Ownership Rules8-44
    • § 8:4.7 : The Information Required in Schedule 13D8-46
    • § 8:4.8 : Material Changes and the Prompt Filing Requirement8-48
    • § 8:4.9 : Brief Introduction to Schedules 13G and 13F—Perry8-51
      • [A] : In General8-51
      • [B] : Perry8-54
    • § 8:4.10 : Activist Shareholders and Section 13(d)8-55
  • § 8:5 : The Meaning of the Term “Tender Offer”8-55
    • § 8:5.1 : Scope8-55
    • § 8:5.2 : Definition of Tender Offer: The Case Law8-56
      • [A] : Organized Solicitation, the Wellman Factors8-56
      • [B] : Open Market Purchases—Carter Hawley8-57
      • [C] : Purchase After Termination of Tender Offer—Hanson Trust and the SEC’s Response to Market Sweeps8-58
    • § 8:5.3 : SEC’s Proposed (and Withdrawn) Definition of Tender Offer8-59
    • § 8:5.4 : Discussion of SEC’s Position on Definition of “Tender Offer” in 1999 M&A Release8-60
  • § 8:6 : State Regulation of Tender Offers8-61
    • § 8:6.1 : Scope8-61
    • § 8:6.2 : The First Generation Statutes: The Supreme Court’s View of the Illinois Statute—MITE8-61
    • § 8:6.3 : The Second Generation Statutes: The Supreme Court’s View of the Indiana Control Share Statute—CTS8-62
    • § 8:6.4 : Third Generation Business Combination Statutes—Amanda8-65
    • § 8:6.5 : Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law8-68
      • [A] : The General Rules8-68
        • [A][1] : Constitutionality8-68
        • [A][2] : Corporations Subject to Section 2038-68
        • [A][3] : The Three-Year Moratorium on Mergers8-68
        • [A][4] : The “Interested Stockholder” and Ownership Concept8-69
        • [A][5] : The Business Combination8-71
        • [A][6] : The Board Approval, the 85%, and the 66-2/3% Exceptions8-72
          • [A][6][a] : The Board Approval Exception—Digex8-72
          • [A][6][b] : The 85% Exception8-73
          • [A][6][c] : The 66-2/3% Exception8-73
      • [B] : Dealing with Section 203 and Other Possible Baby Williams Acts in Tender Offers—The Oracle Tender Offer for PeopleSoft8-74
        • [B][1] : Introduction8-74
        • [B][2] : Why the Acquirer Will Unlikely Be Willing to Live with a Three-Year Moratorium8-74
        • [B][3] : The Oracle Tender Offer for PeopleSoft8-74
  • § 8:7 : Third-Party Tender Offers8-77
    • § 8:7.1 : Scope8-77
    • § 8:7.2 : Practical Aspects of Tender Offers: The Parties Involved8-78
      • [A] : Introduction8-78
      • [B] : Specialized Professionals on the Acquirer’s Side8-78
        • [B][1] : Acquirer’s Dealer Manager8-78
        • [B][2] : Acquirer’s Information Agent8-79
        • [B][3] : Acquirer’s Depositary or Exchange Agent and the Tender Documents8-80
    • § 8:7.3 : Sections 14(d) and (e) and the Substantive Rules Affecting the Bidder8-81
      • [A] : Introduction to Section 14(d)8-81
      • [B] : Introduction to Section 14(e)8-81
        • [B][1] : In General8-81
        • [B][2] : Applicability of Section 14(e) to Non-Conventional and Non-Public Tender Offers8-86
      • [C] : Transactions Covered, Section 14(d)(1)8-87
      • [D] : What Is “Beneficial Ownership”?8-88
      • [E] : Who Is the Bidder?8-88
      • [F] : Information Required, Section 14(d)(1)8-90
      • [G] : The Group Concept, Section 14(d)(2)8-90
      • [H] : Substantive Provisions of Tender Offers in the Statute and Rules8-91
        • [H][1] : Twenty Business Days and Other Time Requirements, Rule 14e-18-91
        • [H][2] : Extending the Twenty-Business-Day Period8-92
        • [H][3] : Subsequent Offering Period, Rule 14d-118-92
        • [H][4] : Withdrawal Rights, Section 14(d)(5) and Rule 14d-78-93
        • [H][5] : Pro Rata Purchases, Section 14(d)(6) and Rule 14d-88-94
        • [H][6] : “All Holders, Best Price Rule,” Section 14(d)(7) and Rule 14d-108-94
          • [H][6][a] : In General8-94
          • [H][6][b] : Integration of Separate Tender Offers—Trump8-96
          • [H][6][c] : Integration of Side Deal into the Tender Offer—Epstein8-97
          • [H][6][d] : The Bright Line Rule—Lerro8-100
          • [H][6][e] : The Amended Rule 14d-108-100
        • [H][7] : Prohibition Against Purchases Outside the Tender Offer, Rule 14e-58-103
        • [H][8] : Prompt Payment or Return of Securities, Rule 14e-1(c)8-104
      • [I] : Conditions to a Tender Offer8-104
    • § 8:7.4 : Bidder’s Pre-Commencement Communications8-106
    • § 8:7.5 : Bidder’s Commencement of a Tender Offer8-108
      • [A] : Why “Commencement” Matters8-108
      • [B] : The Commencement Rules8-108
    • § 8:7.6 : Bidder’s Filing and Transmission Requirements, Rule 14d-38-109
      • [A] : In General8-109
      • [B] : Material Changes8-110
    • § 8:7.7 : Bidder’s Dissemination Requirements, Rule 14d-48-110
      • [A] : In General8-110
      • [B] : All Cash Tender Offer8-110
      • [C] : Exchange Offers8-111
        • [C][1] : General Principles8-111
        • [C][2] : Impact of Material Changes on Exchange Offer8-113
        • [C][3] : SEC Guidance on Emerging Growth Companies (EGCs) Engaging in Exchange Offers8-115
    • § 8:7.8 : Bidder’s Distribution of Tender Offer Materials to Target’s Shareholders, Rule 14d-58-115
    • § 8:7.9 : Bidder’s Disclosure of Tender Offer Information to Target’s Stockholders, Rule 14d-68-117
      • [A] : In General8-117
      • [B] : Summary Advertisement8-118
      • [C] : Offer to Purchase8-118
      • [D] : Schedule TO8-119
    • § 8:7.10 : Target’s Solicitations and Recommendations, Section 14(d)(4) and Rules 14d-9 and 14e-28-122
      • [A] : General Principles8-122
      • [B] : Rules 14e-2 and 14d-98-122
      • [C] : Rule 14d-98-123
        • [C][1] : Applicability8-123
        • [C][2] : Stop, Look, and Listen Statements8-123
        • [C][3] : Pre-Commencement Communications8-124
        • [C][4] : Post-Commencement Communications8-124
        • [C][5] : The Schedule 14D-9 and Recommendation to Shareholders8-125
        • [C][6] : Material Changes in the Schedule 14D-9—Kern8-126
    • § 8:7.11 : Purchases by a Target During a Third-Party Tender Offer, Rules 13(e)(1) and 10b-188-127
    • § 8:7.12 : Trading on the Basis of Material Non-Public Information in the Context of Tender Offers, Rule 14e-38-127
    • § 8:7.13 : Prohibition Against Short and Hedged Tendering, Rule 14e-48-130
    • § 8:7.14 : Stock Exchange Rules Regarding Tender Offers8-130
  • § 8:8 : Negotiated Tender Offers and Second-Step Mergers with “Top-Up” Options8-132
  • § 8:9 : Issuer Tender Offers8-132
  • § 8:10 : Going Private Transactions, Rule 13e-38-133
    • § 8:10.1 : Scope8-133
    • § 8:10.2 : Definition of Affiliate, Rule 13e-3(a)(1)8-134
    • § 8:10.3 : Transactions Covered, Rule 13e-3(a)(3)8-135
      • [A] : In General8-135
      • [B] : Determining If Management of the Target Causes Acquirer to Be an Affiliate of the Target8-135
      • [C] : Exception for Two-Step, Tender Offer Followed by Merger8-138
      • [D] : Other Exceptions8-139
    • § 8:10.4 : The Antifraud Provision for Rule 13e-3 Transactions, Rule 13e-3(b) and (c)8-139
    • § 8:10.5 : Material Required to Be Filed, Schedule 13E-3, Rule 13e-3(d)8-140
      • [A] : In General8-140
      • [B] : Treatment of Investment Bankers’ Valuation Reports8-143
    • § 8:10.6 : Disclosure of Informat