TreatiseTreatise

Deskbook on Internal Investigations Corporate Compliance and White Collar Issues

 by Kaye Scholer LLP
 
 Copyright: 2007-2012
 Last Updated: October 2012

 Product Details >> 

Product Details

  • ISBN Number: 9781402408120
  • Page Count: 585
  • Number of Volumes: 1
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Kaye Scholer LLP (list of authors)


”The book is breathtaking in scope. I can’t imagine a more important resource to have near at hand.”
 —John Feerick, Professor of Law and former Dean of Fordham Law School

”An excellent tool for the experienced, and an important guide for everyone to the pitfalls that await you.”
—Bart M. Schwartz, Former Chief, Criminal Division, U.S. Attorneys’ Office, Southern District of New York


At a time when companies are under greater legal scrutiny than ever before, executives and their legal counsel need practical, plain-English guidance on how to avoid potentially disastrous mistakes.

PLI’s Deskbook on Internal Investigations, Corporate Compliance and White Collar Issues provides that necessary information. Stocked with easy-to-follow checklists, the Deskbook shows you how to carry out internal investigations that spot and stop legal problems, protect the rights of employees when they’re subject to investigation or prosecution, and cooperate with government investigators in ways that help reduce legal and financial damage if wrongdoing is proved.

The Deskbook also gives you step-by-step instruction on how to put together a comprehensive compliance program that can prevent legal missteps and help companies qualify for federal leniency programs if legal violations are committed.

Updated at least once a year, Deskbook on Internal Investigations, Corporate Compliance and White Collar Issues is a vital reference for attorneys, executives, compliance officers, securities professionals, and regulators.

  Emerging Trends in Corporate White Collar Criminal and Regulatory Law--A Twenty-Year Overview
Chapter 1: Internal Investigation of Suspected Wrongdoing by Corporate Employees
  • § 1:1 : Introduction1-2
  • § 1:2 : Steps to Take at the Outset of an Investigation1-3
    • § 1:2.1 : Who Conducts the Investigation— In-House Counsel or Outside Attorneys?1-3
    • § 1:2.2 : Defining the Scope of the Investigation1-4
    • § 1:2.3 : Doing a Conflicts Check1-5
    • § 1:2.4 : Expertise of Counsel1-6
  • § 1:3 : Investigative Tools1-7
    • § 1:3.1 : Document Review1-7
    • § 1:3.2 : Recovering Expenses Incurred During Internal Investigations1-8
    • § 1:3.3 : Employee Interviews1-9
      • [A] : Presence of In-House Counsel at the Interview1-9
      • [B] : Conducting the Interview1-10
      • [C] : Separate Counsel for the Employee1-12
    • § 1:3.4 : Whether or Not to Prepare a Written Report1-14
    • § 1:3.5 : Polygraph Testing1-14
    • § 1:3.6 : Workplace Searches1-16
    • § 1:3.7 : Workplace Surveillance1-16
    • § 1:3.8 : Drug and Alcohol Testing1-17
  • § 1:4 : Special Issues in Internal Investigations1-18
    • § 1:4.1 : The Current Financial Market Meltdown and Global Economic Crisis1-18
      • [A] : The Origins of a Financial Market Meltdown and Global Economic Crisis1-18
      • [B] : The Law Enforcement Response1-25
        • [B][1] : The SEC1-26
        • [B][2] : The Department of Justice1-30
        • [B][3] : The New York State Attorney General1-35
      • [C] : Special Considerations in Internal Investigations of Subprime Debt Portfolios and Credit Default Swaps1-37
    • § 1:4.2 : Obstruction of Justice1-38
      • [A] : Obstruction of Justice Statutes1-38
      • [B] : Document Retention Policies1-42
      • [C] : Liability of Attorneys1-43
      • [D] : Guidelines for Counsel1-44
    • § 1:4.3 : Indemnification and Advancement of Legal Fees1-44
      • [A] : Mandatory Indemnification1-45
      • [B] : Permissive Indemnification1-47
      • [C] : Advancement of Legal Fees and Expenses1-47
      • [D] : Constitutional Issues1-48
    • § 1:4.4 : Protection for Whistleblowers Against Retaliation1-50
      • [A] : Under Sarbanes-Oxley1-50
        • [A][1] : Civil Penalties1-50
        • [A][2] : Criminal Penalties1-51
        • [A][3] : Dodd-Frank Amendments Expanding Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Protections1-52
        • [A][4] : Retaliation Policies1-52
        • [A][5] : Disciplining Whistleblowers1-53
      • [B] : Under Dodd-Frank1-53
      • [C] : Potential Impact on Internal Investigations and Other Considerations1-57
  • § 1:5 : Practitioner’s Checklist for Conducting Internal Investigations1-58
Chapter 2: The Attorney-Client Privllege, Work-Product Protection, and Self-Critical Privilege In Internal Investigations
  • § 2:1 : Introduction2-2
  • § 2:2 : The Attorney-Client Privilege2-2
    • § 2:2.1 : Elements of the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege2-3
    • § 2:2.2 : Applicability to Experts, Attorney Agents, and the Corporation’s Former Employees2-4
    • § 2:2.3 : Attorney’s Duty to Assert Privilege2-4
    • § 2:2.4 : What the Privilege Does Not Cover2-4
    • § 2:2.5 : The Crime-Fraud Exception2-6
    • § 2:2.6 : Authority to Waive the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege2-7
    • § 2:2.7 : Effect of Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Information on Waiver2-7
  • § 2:3 : Work-Product Protection2-10
    • § 2:3.1 : Work-Product Protection Qualified2-10
    • § 2:3.2 : Applicability to Materials from an Internal Investigation2-11
    • § 2:3.3 : Materials Protected by the Work-Product Doctrine2-11
  • § 2:4 : The Department of Justice’s Waiver Policy and the Sentencing Guidelines2-12
    • § 2:4.1 : The Holder Memorandum2-12
    • § 2:4.2 : The Thompson Memorandum2-14
    • § 2:4.3 : The 2004 Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines2-15
    • § 2:4.4 : The McCallum Memorandum2-16
    • § 2:4.5 : The McNulty Memorandum2-16
    • § 2:4.6 : The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations2-17
  • § 2:5 : Disclosure to the Government and Its Impact on Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Protection2-21
    • § 2:5.1 : Attorney-Client Privilege and Selective Waiver2-21
    • § 2:5.2 : Work-Product Protection and Selective Waiver2-22
  • § 2:6 : The Common Interest Privilege2-27
    • § 2:6.1 : Applicability of the Common Interest Privilege2-27
  • § 2:7 : Self-Critical Privilege2-29
    • § 2:7.1 : Recognition of the Self-Critical Privilege2-29
    • § 2:7.2 : Rejection of the Self-Critical Privilege2-30
  • § 2:8 : Additional Practical Waiver Problems in Internal Investigations2-31
    • § 2:8.1 : Internal Investigations Because of Business Necessities2-31
    • § 2:8.2 : Investigation by and for Management2-32
    • § 2:8.3 : Use of Regularly Employed Auditor2-33
    • § 2:8.4 : The Pseudo-Hypothetical2-34
    • § 2:8.5 : Disclosures to Public Relations Consultants2-34
  • § 2:9 : Practitioner’s Checklist for Obtaining Benefits of Cooperation Without Waiver2-35
Chapter 3: Grand Jury Investigations and Multiple Representations of Witnesses
  • § 3:1 : Overview of the Grand Jury Process3-1
    • § 3:1.1 : Responding to a Grand Jury Subpoena3-3
    • § 3:1.2 : Computer Records and Electronic Documents3-4
    • § 3:1.3 : Motions to Dismiss Grand Jury Indictments3-5
  • § 3:2 : Ethical Issues in Multiple Representations Before a Grand Jury3-7
    • § 3:2.1 : Ethical Considerations and Conflicts of Interest3-7
    • § 3:2.2 : New York’s New Attorney Ethics Rules3-13
    • § 3:2.3 : The Prosecutor’s Response3-15
    • § 3:2.4 : A Carefully Thought-Out Decision3-17
    • § 3:2.5 : The Judicial Response3-17
  • § 3:3 : Practical Considerations When Considering Multiple Representation3-18
Chapter 4: Representing the Target in an SEC Investigation and in Parallel Proceedings
  • § 4:1 : SEC Investigations4-1
    • § 4:1.1 : The Formal Investigation4-3
    • § 4:1.2 : Cooperation Considerations4-4
    • § 4:1.3 : The Impact of Whistleblower Information4-7
    • § 4:1.4 : Asserting Privilege in an SEC Investigation4-11
    • § 4:1.5 : Asserting the Fifth Amendment Privilege4-12
    • § 4:1.6 : Multiple Representation Issues in SEC Proceedings4-14
    • § 4:1.7 : Ground Rules for Testifying Before the Staff4-14
    • § 4:1.8 : Rules of Evidence4-16
    • § 4:1.9 : Wells Submission4-17
    • § 4:1.10 : The Seaboard Factors4-18
    • § 4:1.11 : SEC Guidelines for Financial Penalties4-21
    • § 4:1.12 : SEC Settlements Under Scrutiny4-24
  • § 4:2 : Parallel Proceedings4-26
    • § 4:2.1 : Admissibility of Statements Made During Parallel Civil Proceedings4-28
    • § 4:2.2 : Wiretapping and Parallel Proceedings4-31
Chapter 5: Responding to Searches and Seizures
  • § 5:1 : Specifics of the Warrant5-1
  • § 5:2 : Execution of the Warrant5-2
  • § 5:3 : Searching and Seizing Electronic Data5-3
    • § 5:3.1 : Warrantless Computer Searches5-4
    • § 5:3.2 : Computer Searches with a Warrant5-5
  • § 5:4 : Searching and Seizing Other Electronic Communications5-8
  • § 5:5 : Protecting Privileged Documents During a Search5-9
  • § 5:6 : Practitioner’s Checklist for Responding to Searches and Seizures5-10
Chapter 6: Asset Forfeiture and Debarment
  • § 6:1 : Asset Forfeiture6-2
    • § 6:1.1 : The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act6-3
    • § 6:1.2 : Initiation of Civil Judicial Forfeiture6-4
      • [A] : Pre-Seizure “Freezing” of Assets6-4
      • [B] : Pre-Forfeiture Seizure of the Assets6-4
      • [C] : Pre-Trial Procedures Under Supplemental Rule G6-5
    • § 6:1.3 : Civil Trial Procedure6-8
      • [A] : Initial Burden on the Government6-8
      • [B] : Innocent Owner Defense6-8
      • [C] : Bona Fide Purchaser or Seller for Value6-9
      • [D] : Knowledge or Reason to Believe Property Subject to Forfeiture6-9
      • [E] : The Department of Justice Policy on Forfeiture of Attorney Fees6-12
    • § 6:1.4 : Civil Judicial Forfeiture of Transferred Traceable Assets6-14
    • § 6:1.5 : Seizure of Fungible Assets6-15
    • § 6:1.6 : Awards of Attorney Fees to Prevailing Claimants6-16
  • § 6:2 : Debarment6-18
    • § 6:2.1 : Overview of Suspension and Debarment6-18
    • § 6:2.2 : Consequences of Suspension and Debarment6-20
    • § 6:2.3 : Term of Suspension or Debarment6-22
    • § 6:2.4 : Grounds for Imposing Debarment or Suspension6-23
    • § 6:2.5 : Factors Informing Agency Discretion to Debar or Suspend6-25
    • § 6:2.6 : Debarment or Suspension Based on Imputation or Affiliation6-27
      • [A] : Imputation6-27
      • [B] : Affiliation6-28
  • § 6:3 : Practical Considerations in Addressing Debarment and Suspension6-30
Chapter 7: Corporate Compliance Programs Under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
  • § 7:1 : Introduction7-2
  • § 7:2 : The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines Methodology7-5
    • § 7:2.1 : Base Fine7-5
    • § 7:2.2 : Culpability Score—Minimum/Maximum Multipliers7-6
    • § 7:2.3 : Applicable Fine Range7-8
    • § 7:2.4 : Determining the Actual Fine7-8
    • § 7:2.5 : Disgorgement7-9
    • § 7:2.6 : Fines for Antitrust Offenses7-9
  • § 7:3 : Remedial Sanctions and Probation Under the Guidelines7-9
  • § 7:4 : Criteria for an Effective Program to Prevent and Detect Violation of Law7-11
  • § 7:5 : Section 8B2.1(b)(1)7-12
  • § 7:6 : Section 8B2.1(b)(2)7-14
  • § 7:7 : Section 8B2.1(b)(3)7-17
  • § 7:8 : Section 8B2.1(b)(4)7-18
  • § 7:9 : Section 8B2.1(b)(5)7-19
    • § 7:9.1 : Internal Auditing7-20
    • § 7:9.2 : Employee Hotlines and the Ombudsman7-21
    • § 7:9.3 : Business Ethics Questionnaires7-22
    • § 7:9.4 : Gap Analysis7-24
  • § 7:10 : Section 8B2.1(b)(6)7-25
    • § 7:10.1 : Termination Under New York Law of Employees Implicated in or Under Suspicion of a Violation of Law7-26
    • § 7:10.2 : Termination Under California Law of Employees Implicated in or Under Suspicion of a Violation of Law7-28
    • § 7:10.3 : Termination Under New York Law of an Employee Formally Accused (i.e., Arrested or Indicted) of a Violation of Law7-30
    • § 7:10.4 : Termination Under California Law of an Employee Formally Accused (i.e., Arrested or Indicted) of a Violation of Law7-30
    • § 7:10.5 : Executive Contract Issues7-31
    • § 7:10.6 : Union Contract Issues7-31
    • § 7:10.7 : Practical Considerations7-32
    • § 7:10.8 : General Principles Governing Termination of an Employee Convicted of a Crime (Misdemeanor or Felony)7-32
  • § 7:11 : Section 8B2.1(b)(7)7-33
  • § 7:12 : Section 8B2.1(c) (Risk Assessment)7-33
  • § 7:13 : Waiver of Privilege7-34
  • § 7:14 : Caremark Liability7-35
Chapter 8: Leniency Programs and Policies
  • § 8:1 : Introduction8-2
  • § 8:2 : Comparison Between the McNulty Memorandum and the Revised Principles8-2
    • § 8:2.1 : The McNulty Memorandum8-2
    • § 8:2.2 : Deputy Attorney General Filip’s Revised “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations”8-7
  • § 8:3 : Department of Justice Guidelines for Prosecuting Organizational Environmental Offenders8-10
    • § 8:3.1 : Introduction8-10
      • [A] : Factors for Leniency8-11
    • § 8:3.2 : EPA Audit Standards and Leniency Policies8-13
    • § 8:3.3 : Compliance and Remediation Programs8-15
    • § 8:3.4 : DOJ Guidelines Hypothetical Scenarios8-15
      • [A] : The “Good” Company8-15
      • [B] : The “Bad” Company8-16
      • [C] : Companies Between the Extremes8-16
  • § 8:4 : Department of Defense Voluntary Disclosure Program8-17
    • § 8:4.1 : Recognition As a Volunteer8-18
    • § 8:4.2 : The Voluntary Disclosure Process8-18
      • [A] : Preliminary Acceptance8-19
      • [B] : Agreement to Cooperate with the Investigation—The XYZ Agreement8-19
      • [C] : Contractor’s Disclosure8-19
      • [D] : The Government’s Investigation8-20
      • [E] : Collateral Use of Disclosed Material8-21
      • [F] : Payments by Contractors8-21
    • § 8:4.3 : Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct8-21
    • § 8:4.4 : Display of Hotline Poster(s)8-22
  • § 8:5 : Antitrust Division Corporate Leniency Policy8-23
    • § 8:5.1 : Pre-Investigation Amnesty8-24
    • § 8:5.2 : Alternative Grounds for Amnesty8-24
    • § 8:5.3 : Leniency for Corporate Directors, Officers, and Employees8-25
    • § 8:5.4 : Potential Benefits of “Second-In” Cooperation8-26
  • § 8:6 : SEC Leniency Policies8-27
    • § 8:6.1 : The Seaboard Guidelines8-27
    • § 8:6.2 : Leniency for Individuals8-29
Chapter 9: Deferred Prosecution Agreements
  • § 9:1 : Introduction9-1
    • § 9:1.1 : What Is a DPA?9-3
    • § 9:1.2 : Why Has Deferred Prosecution of Corporations Become So Common?9-6
    • § 9:1.3 : DPA or Declination?9-8
    • § 9:1.4 : The Terms of the Agreement9-10
    • § 9:1.5 : DOJ Guidance on the Use of Corporate Monitors9-11
  • § 9:2 : Practical Considerations in Negotiating Deferred Prosecution Agreements9-12
Chapter 10: Representing the Drug or Medical Device Manufacturer in a Criminal Investigation
  • § 10:1 : Introduction10-1
  • § 10:2 : The Statutory and Regulatory Scheme10-2
    • § 10:2.1 : The FDCA10-2
    • § 10:2.2 : The Anti-Kickback Statute10-5
    • § 10:2.3 : The False Claims Act10-5
    • § 10:2.4 : Other Regulatory Tools10-5
  • § 10:3 : Recent Developments in Enforcement Actions10-8
    • § 10:3.1 : Enforcement Actions Against Pharmaceutical Manufacturers10-8
    • § 10:3.2 : Enforcement Actions Against Medical Device Manufacturers10-13
    • § 10:3.3 : Sorrell and First Amendment Challenges10-16
  • § 10:4 : Recent FDA Warning Letters10-16
    • § 10:4.1 : To Pharmaceutical Companies Regarding Promotional Materials10-16
    • § 10:4.2 : To Medical Device Manufacturers Concerning Good Manufacturing Practices10-20
  • § 10:5 : Compliance Strategies10-21
  • § 10:6 : Responding to a Criminal Investigation10-23
Chapter 11: Prosecutions for Violations of U.S. Export Controls
  • § 11:1 : Introduction11-2
  • § 11:2 : The Export Control Regulatory Framework11-3
    • § 11:2.1 : International Traffic in Arms Regulations11-3
    • § 11:2.2 : Export Administration Regulations11-5
    • § 11:2.3 : Determining Appropriate Jurisdiction11-6
  • § 11:3 : Enforcement11-7
    • § 11:3.1 : Penalties for ITAR Violations11-10
    • § 11:3.2 : Penalties for EAR Violations11-11
  • § 11:4 : Compliance with Export Control Regulations11-11
    • § 11:4.1 : Corporate Compliance Programs11-11
    • § 11:4.2 : Agency Guidance11-12
    • § 11:4.3 : “Know Your Customer”11-13
  • § 11:5 : Responding to Violations11-15
    • § 11:5.1 : Voluntary Disclosure Prior to Commencement of a Government Inves-tigation11-15
      • [A] : Notification and Documentation Requirements11-16
      • [B] : Penalty Enforcement and Mitigation11-17
      • [C] : The Decision to Disclose Voluntarily11-17
    • § 11:5.2 : Defending Export Control Violations in a Government Investigation11-19
Chapter 12: Money Laundering
  • § 12:1 : Introduction12-1
    • § 12:1.1 : The Money Laundering Statutes12-2
    • § 12:1.2 : Suspicious Activity Reports12-7
    • § 12:1.3 : Currency Transaction Reports12-9
      • [A] : Requirements12-9
      • [B] : Structuring to Avoid CTRs12-10
  • § 12:2 : Money Laundering by Corrupt Foreign Leaders12-11
    • § 12:2.1 : Interagency Money Laundering Guidance12-11
      • [A] : Account Opening12-14
      • [B] : Account Transaction Scrutiny12-15
      • [C] : Suspicious Activity Reporting12-16
    • § 12:2.2 : Special Issues Relating to Iran12-16
  • § 12:3 : Foreign Correspondent Banking12-19
    • § 12:3.1 : 2012 HSBC Case Study12-20
    • § 12:3.2 : Payable-Through Accounts12-23
  • § 12:4 : Money Laundering by Drug Cartels12-24
Chapter 13: Advising Witnesses in Light of Perjury Statutes
  • § 13:1 : Introduction13-1
    • § 13:1.1 : Federal Perjury Statutes13-2
    • § 13:1.2 : False Statements Statute13-3
  • § 13:2 : Materiality13-4
    • § 13:2.1 : Standard for Materiality13-4
    • § 13:2.2 : Literal Truth Defense13-5
  • § 13:3 : Perjury Prosecution Absent Prosecution for the Underlying Offense13-7
  • § 13:4 : Dangers of Crossing the Line13-11
  • § 13:5 : Perjury Traps13-12
  • § 13:6 : Conclusion13-14
Chapter 14: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the International Conventions on Bribery
  • § 14:1 : Introduction14-1
  • § 14:2 : The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act14-8
    • § 14:2.1 : Who Is Subject to the FCPA?14-9
    • § 14:2.2 : What Is Prohibited by the FCPA?14-11
    • § 14:2.3 : Exceptions and Defenses14-16
    • § 14:2.4 : Books-and-Records Violations14-19
    • § 14:2.5 : The Future of the FCPA14-24
  • § 14:3 : U.K. Bribery Act 201014-26
    • § 14:3.1 : The General Elements of a Bribery Act Violation14-27
    • § 14:3.2 : “Failure to Prevent Bribery” Offense; “Adequate Procedures” Affirmative Defense14-29
    • § 14:3.3 : The Bribery Act Compared to the FCPA14-30
    • § 14:3.4 : Final Implementation of the Bribery Act14-33
  • § 14:4 : International Conventions on Bribery14-33
  • § 14:5 : Alternative Bases of Jurisdiction/“Improper Advantage”14-36
  • § 14:6 : Practitioner’s FCPA14-39
Chapter 15: Representation of Companies in Criminal Antitrust Investigations
  • § 15:1 : Introduction15-2
  • § 15:2 : Elements of a Sherman Antitrust Criminal Prosecution15-2
    • § 15:2.1 : Conspiracy15-3
    • § 15:2.2 : Criminal Intent15-4
    • § 15:2.3 : Interstate Nexus15-5
    • § 15:2.4 : Statute of Limitations15-5
  • § 15:3 : The Department of Justice Policy for Prosecution of Sherman Act Cases15-6
  • § 15:4 : Criminal Penalties15-7
    • § 15:4.1 : Individual Sentences15-8
      • [A] : Sentencing of Individuals15-8
      • [B] : Extradition of Foreign Executives15-9
    • § 15:4.2 : Corporate Fines15-10
      • [A] : Calculation of Fines15-10
      • [B] : Recently Imposed Fines15-14
  • § 15:5 : DOJ Corporate Leniency Policy15-15
    • § 15:5.1 : Pre-Investigation Amnesty15-17
    • § 15:5.2 : Alternative Grounds for Amnesty15-18
    • § 15:5.3 : Antitrust Division’s 2008 Model Conditional Leniency Letters and FAQ15-19
    • § 15:5.4 : Leniency for Corporate Directors, Officers, and Employees15-20
    • § 15:5.5 : Potential Benefits of “Second-In” Cooperation15-21
  • § 15:6 : Foreign Application of Antitrust Laws15-22
  • § 15:7 : State Antitrust Prosecutions15-26
  • § 15:8 : Antitrust Compliance Strategies15-28
Chapter 16: Government Investigations Under the False Claims Act and Its Qui Tam Provisions
  • § 16:1 : Introduction16-2
  • § 16:2 : The FCA Statute16-3
    • § 16:2.1 : Liability and Damages Provisions16-3
    • § 16:2.2 : Qui Tam Provisions16-5
      • [A] : Complaint Filed Under Seal16-6
      • [B] : Provisions Allowing Relators to Share in Monetary Recovery16-7
      • [C] : Authority over Settlement16-8
  • § 16:3 : Steps of a Government Investigation16-9
    • § 16:3.1 : Agency Subpoenas16-9
    • § 16:3.2 : Civil Investigative Demands16-10
    • § 16:3.3 : The Government’s Decision to Intervene16-10
  • § 16:4 : Elements of FCA Liability16-11
    • § 16:4.1 : Claim16-11
    • § 16:4.2 : Intent16-13
    • § 16:4.3 : Materiality16-14
    • § 16:4.4 : Causation16-18
  • § 16:5 : What Conduct Is Covered16-19
    • § 16:5.1 : Off-Label Marketing16-19
      • [A] : Rule 9(b) Issues16-22
      • [B] : False Statements16-24
      • [C] : Causation and Damages Issues16-27
    • § 16:5.2 : Anti-Kickback16-28
    • § 16:5.3 : Pharmaceutical Pricing Cases16-30
  • § 16:6 : Defenses16-31
    • § 16:6.1 : Statute of Limitations16-31
    • § 16:6.2 : Tax Exclusion16-33
  • § 16:7 : Special Defenses Against a Qui Tam Relator16-34
    • § 16:7.1 : Public Disclosure Bar16-34
    • § 16:7.2 : Original Source16-37
    • § 16:7.3 : First-to-File Bar16-39
  • § 16:8 : Protection of Whistleblower16-40
  • § 16:9 : Other Whistleblower Laws16-42
    • § 16:9.1 : Tax Whistleblower Law16-42
    • § 16:9.2 : Securities Whistleblower Law16-43
Chapter 17: Appendix A: Thompson Memorandum
Chapter 18: Appendix B: Holder Memorandum
Chapter 19: Appendix C: McCallum Memorandum
Chapter 20: Appendix D: Public Hearing Held by the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
Chapter 21: Appendix E: Comey Interview
Chapter 22: Appendix F: Model Confidentiality Agreement with U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Chapter 23: Appendix G: Association of the Bar of the City of New York Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics Formal Opinion 2004-02--Representing Corporations and Their Constituents in the Context of Governmental Investigations
Chapter 24: Appendix H: Seaboard Report
Chapter 25: Appendix I: Sentencing Guideline Manual: Chapter 8--Sentencing of Organizations
Chapter 26: Appendix J: NYSBA Ethics Opinion 650
Chapter 27: Appendix K: United States Department of Justice Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or Disclosure Efforts by the Violator
Chapter 28: Appendix L: Environmental Protection Agency: Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations
Chapter 29: Appendix M: Department of Defense Voluntary Disclosure Program
Chapter 30: Appendix N: United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division Corporate Leniency Policy
Chapter 31: Appendix O: United States Department of Justice Antitrust Division Leniency Policy for Individuals
Chapter 32: Appendix P: Guidance on Enhanced Scrutiny for Transactions That May Involve the Proceeds of Foreign Official Corruption
Chapter 33: Appendix Q: McNulty Memorandum
Chapter 34: Appendix R: Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
Chapter 35: September 2008 Special Report
Chapter 36: Index to Deskbook on Internal Investigations Corporate Compliance and White Collar Issues

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